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In the broadest sense, this is a study of competing imaginations of the future under climate 
change, and struggles over the power to shape that future. Who gets to imagine what the future 
will look like? What are the material implications of those imaginations? How do certain 
imaginations of the future become reality, while others are silenced and foreclosed? How is the 
power to determine the future exercised? I answer these questions through an exploration of the 
intersection of development and climate change adaptation in Bangladesh, and the various actors 
that shape and contest it. 
Development in Bangladesh is increasingly defined by and through an adaptation regime, 
a socially and historically specific configuration of power that governs the landscape of possible 
intervention in the face of climate change. It includes institutions of development, research, media, 
and science, as well as various state actors both nationally and internationally. This adaptation 
regime works by de-historicizing and de-politicizing the dynamics of ecological change, 
legitimizing new interventions by donors, policy makers, researchers, and development agencies. 
By marshaling significant funding, infrastructure and political capital, the adaptation regime 
constitutes a new form of governance over the livelihoods seen as viable in the near- and long-
term future. The politics of uncertainty over whether, how, and when to adapt also enroll the 
scientific and research communities in activities of the regime. Strategies for pursuing “viable” 
 futures in the time of climate change range from the promotion of saline shrimp aquaculture in 
former rice farming communities to plans for resettling the populations of entire geographic 
regions.  
In this dissertation, I trace the rise of this regime from its colonial antecedents to the 
present, investigate the range of actors that have contributed to its emergence, and examine a 
variety of ways in which its impacts are experienced in communities in coastal Bangladesh. I focus 
on three communities that have taken different paths regarding shrimp cultivation, and that have 
variously mobilized against it. Their experiences and struggles challenge the notion that 
agriculture is no longer viable in their region, and suggest new possibilities for equitable futures in 
rural Bangladesh and beyond. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 Climate change in Bangladesh is everywhere and nowhere. This paradox plays out in 
newspaper headlines, foreign embassies, in the offices of the Prime Minister and the Planning 
Commission, NGOs, the World Bank, and UN agencies, at environmental protests, and in the 
villages on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, whose vulnerability is a source of constant speculation 
and intervention by those concerned with the country's development. Frequently referred to as the 
world's most vulnerable country to climate change (ADB 2012; Khan 2013; Nasiruddin and 
Sieghart 2014), the World Bank calls Bangladesh "the emerging 'hot spot' where climate threats 
and action meet."1 Climate change has become the terrain on which Bangladesh engages with the 
world. It is increasingly the lens through which Bangladeshis represent themselves abroad; and, in 
turn, it is the primary means through which the world recognizes Bangladesh. This terrain of 
engagement was endorsed in 2015 when the United Nations awarded Prime Minister Sheikh 
Hasina the United Nations Champions of the Earth award for Bangladesh's initiatives to address 
climate change. Conversations in the country about climate change are ubiquitous. They wind 
their way into topics as diverse as rice agriculture (Roy 2014), garment manufacturing (Black 
2013), microcredit (Micro loans offset effects  2014), and child marriage (Human Rights Watch 
2015; TakePart 2017).2 Addressing climate change is said to be necessary to the country's 
economic growth (Nakao and de Boer 2015), to becoming more democratic (Steele 2017) and 
more "cosmopolitan" (Climate Champions  2014).  
																																																						
1 This phrase, which is representative of climate discourse throughout Bangladesh's development and donor 
community, appeared in 2014 in the third newsletter of the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund, a 
now-defunct multi-donor trust fund administered between 2010 and 2017. I expand on this discourse in 
Chapter 2. 
2 I thank Dina Siddiqi for this point about child marriage in a presentation she made at the 2017 Association 
for Asian Studies annual conference.	
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 Bangladeshis also play a major role in international climate diplomacy, having organized 
and led the Less Developed Countries negotiating bloc in the UNFCCC negotiations since the 
bloc's inception. Claims about climate justice and climate action are ubiquitous amongst the 
country's massive NGO sector. These narratives focus on the responsibility for developed 
countries to pay for climate action in less developed countries as reparation for their historic 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Yet, when it comes to local political imaginaries, climate change rarely plays a role. 
Relative to this constant production of climate-related ideas, discourses, and interventions, climate 
change is surprisingly absent in local politics. It is rarely if ever invoked in local electoral 
campaigns, and politicians tend not to speak about it except in relation to the climate finance 
obligations of the developed world to Bangladesh. Activists concerned with civil and human rights 
rarely engage with questions of climate change and climate justice, and neither is it a significant 
political concern for the peasant social movements in coastal Khulna, the geographic focus of this 
dissertation as well as the object of many climate change adaptation interventions. While the 
environmental movement within the country is quite robust, local activists remain largely 
unconcerned with climate change, devoting their energies to specifically local ecological 
concerns, such as open-pit coal mining, pollution from power plants3 and garment factories, and 
																																																						
3 Protests against the proposed Rampal Power Plant are a case in point. This partnership between the 
Bangladeshi and Indian governments proposes to build a coal-fired power plant in Khulna, some nine to 
fourteen kilometers north of the boundaries of the Sundarban forest, one of the largest mangrove forests in 
the world. Rampal would be the country's largest power plant, although much of the power it generates 
would be exported across the border to neighboring India. Chief among the concerns cited by activists are 
the threats to Sundarban biodiversity, exacerbated by the inevitable increase in shipping traffic. Despite the 
government's professed commitment to climate action, they have rejected all efforts of activists to impede 
plans for this coal-fired power plant from moving forward. In 2016, the leader of the movement against 
Rampal, Anu Muhammad, received a series of death threats motivated by his work in the campaign that 
were traced to the cell phone of a high-ranking member of the ruling party (Sathi, 2016a). This was not the 
first indication of threats of violence made by the government against activists - another party member, and 
former environment minister, had previously suggested that Bangladeshi patriots might break the legs of 
activists who went too close to the proposed site for the plant (Sathi, 2016b). Activists decry the hypocrisy of 
a government that professes grave concern with the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions acting so 
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the impacts of shrimp aquaculture. These contradictions, between the primacy and absence of 
climate change in these competing Bangladeshi political imaginaries, suggest other dynamics are 
at play. 
 In this dissertation, I examine the conjunctural transformations of knowledge, environment, 
and political economy in coastal Bangladesh in the contemporary moment, both those that claim 
to be linked with climate change, and those that do not. In so doing, I demonstrate how the 
ubiquity of climate narratives precipitate an inherent teleology of climate dystopia. Seeing climate 
change everywhere fails to appreciate the conjunctural dynamics through which a climate-
changed future is actively shaped, negotiated, and contested in the present. I argue that we need to 
understand how diverse and discrete transformations combine and interact with climate change, 
and what the implications are of assuming that they are all part of the same inevitable future crisis. 
 Climate change is a global phenomenon with effects that are increasingly felt all over the 
planet. But the ways its impacts will be manifested in particular places are not predetermined. 
People will not be able to choose just what the future will look like under climate change (indeed, 
many quite serious climatic shifts are already locked in), but they will shape that future through 
ongoing political struggles in the present (McMichael 2008). This conjunctural analysis of the 
experience of climate change in Bangladesh entails a methodological and historiographic choice - 
to understand the contradictions, contestations, and interactions among a variety of linked and 
synchronous processes in the current moment including climate change and otherwise (Li 2014; 
Wolford 2016).4 
																																																						
decisively to promote the burning of fossil fuels in a particularly vulnerable	ecological zone. They also point 
out that if the Sundarbans are Bangladesh's primary defense against the cyclonic storm surges that may 
increase in severity due to climate change, then acting to threaten this vital coastal defense is perhaps a 
more dangerous hypocrisy. These activists, in turn, are relatively silent on the topic of climate change itself, 
suggesting that other local issues are more pressing. 
4 In this sense, the dissertation draws on a long history in agrarian studies of insisting that history matters 
(Wolford, 2007; Akram-Lodhi, Borras and Kay, 2006). 
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 There is a Bengali idiom, শাক িদেয় মাছ ঢাকা, meaning "covering up the fish with greens," 
used to indicate trying to hide something that is already well known to many. It might be used to 
describe the common attitude toward climate change discourse in Bangladesh. While climate 
denialism is rare, and few would disagree that the countries of the global north should take 
responsibility for mitigating the emissions of greenhouse gasses responsible, there remains in 
general, if not often publicly articulated, skepticism about the ways in which climate change is 
invoked. Climate change is largely considered to be the purview of "NGOs," a term literally 
referring to registered non-governmental organizations, but more generally inferring Bangladesh's 
massive development sector supported through international aid from the global north. Thus, there 
is a sense that the idea of climate change is deployed in ways that conceal the politics of 
environmental change that transpire locally. 
 Rising soil salinity in the southwest is a case in point of this skepticism about the drivers of 
change. Though it is commonly attributed to climate change in public discourse, most everyone 
would instead attribute it to a variety of other well-known changes in the landscape -- the 
construction of embankments, the diversion of much of the water of the Ganga river back to India 
through the Farakka Barrage,5 and the cultivation of shrimp. The point here is not to argue that 
climate change will not impact coastal Bangladesh, but highlight the dynamics of contestation of 
knowledge production about how it will be experienced and its relationship to other drivers of 
environmental change. Specifically, this constant production of knowledge about climate change 
is fraught with power dynamics that silence alternative understandings of the history and politics of 
environmental changes in the region. It also illuminates how the power to frame dynamics of 
ecological change continues to shape the landscape now and into the future. 
																																																						
5 In 1972, the Indian government unilaterally opened this barrage roughly 10 miles upstream from the 
Bangladesh border. Though the impacts of this barrage have been much-debated, it has been linked with 
serious ecological impacts in Bangladesh, particularly in Khulna (Adnan, 2009; Brown and Nicholls, 2015). 
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Political Ecologies of the Future: On the politics of prefiguration 
"Who has the power to make places of spaces? Who contests this? What is at stake?" (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997) 
 
Ideas about the future actively shape the politics of the present. Who gets to imagine what 
the future will look like? What are the material implications of those imaginations? How do certain 
imaginations of the future become reality, while others are silenced and foreclosed? How is the 
power to determine the future exercised? These questions about the politics of prefiguration have 
perhaps never been as salient as in the time of climate change. Many facets of climate change 
response build on well-worn modernist teleologies of development and growth, yet, in its 
profound and expansive implications, climate change has also brought about unprecedented 
declarations of the end of history (Segal 2017; Castree 2015; Lipschutz 2017). Climate change, it is 
said, "changes everything" (Klein 2014). The sense that climate change creates imperatives 
unprecedented in human history leads to claims to similarly inexorable responses and inevitable 
futures.  
What this dissertation demonstrates is that, even as the social and ecological threats posed 
by climate change may be unprecedented, far from being inevitable, their impacts are being 
actively shaped in the present. Climate change adaptation involves a normative process of 
imagining what the future will look like, and then working towards that vision, given particular 
constraints (Paprocki and Huq 2017). The power to determine those visions of the future is shaped 
by historical power dynamics and inequalities that far pre-date climate change. This prefiguration 
enlists and contributes to a “common sense” about what climate change is and the exercises of 
power that it necessitates (Gramsci 1971).6  
																																																						
6 Watts makes a related point about notions of “resilience” as a “theory of just about everything” (Watts, 
2015, p. 289). 
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I am interested broadly in the process of diagnosing dystopia. Who is the subject of this 
power of diagnosis and who is its object? How is that power secured and exercised? What is the 
relationship between a diagnosis of future dystopia and the present? How does the former shape 
the latter? Throughout the dissertation, I refer to “dystopic imaginaries” of climate change in 
Bangladesh, examining how they are formed and the kind of political work they do. A dystopia is 
a space where everything is bad or unpleasant; it evokes ruination, degradation, and deprivation. It 
also bears some relation to utopia; even as the two may be seen as obverse to one another, 
attempts to secure utopian visions may unwittingly have dystopic consequences, and one person’s 
utopia may be another person’s dystopia (Claeys 2017). Similar concerns are echoed in other 
scholarly works on apocalyptic climate imaginaries (Skrimshire 2010; Swyndgedouw 2010; Katz 
1995; Ginn 2015). Yet, unlike apocalypse, which represents a sudden rupture or break with the 
present, a dystopia grows out of existing social, political and environmental realities. Apocalypse 
is necessarily fictional – it does not exist, this is not necessarily true of dystopia (Levitas 2010).  
Imagination is also a powerful political force. It is a social practice and a means of world 
making. Imaginaries are not only figments, but they are both the product of and can have real, 
material effects. Imaginaries “build on the world as it is, but they also project futures as they ought 
to be” (Jasanoff 2015, 323). In this sense, they are deeply normative – the power of imagination is 
linked with the politics of prefiguration. If material and intellectual power dialectically reinforce 
one another (Marx and Engels 1998 [1846]), then the power of imagination fortifies the power to 
produce the future as it is imagined. A dystopic imaginary in the time of climate change is thus 
incredibly political potent. It reflects the actually existing material realities of social and 
environmental dispossession, while it also prophecies a catastrophic future collapse. This temporal 
ambiguity reflects a broader sense that elements of this dystopia may already exist. In its normative 
dimensions, a dystopic imaginary also projects an ideal alternative future. As it becomes 
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increasingly embedded into actually existing social and material worlds, it actively shapes them. 
Today, this power of prefiguration in Bangladesh has coalesced into what I call an adaptation 
regime, which I describe in greater detail below. The adaptation regime shapes ideas about the 
kinds of presents and futures that are seen as viable in the time of climate change. In many ways, it 
exacerbates the threats to which it claims to respond. Dystopic visions of a climate changed future 
produced by this regime have radical implications for people who are seen as under threat. For 
people in rural Bangladesh, that means dispossession from communities and livelihoods that are 
already vulnerable.  
	
Figure 1. Farmer holding shrimp in Khulna 
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Bangladesh as "ground zero" 
The role of Bangladesh as “ground zero” of climate change adaptation grew out of its 
status as "ground zero" of development - that is, of what Gillian Hart calls "big D" Development, a 
project of intervention in the "third world" emerging during the Cold War (Hart 2001). The 
centering of Bangladesh as ground zero was contingent on two dynamics: first, enframing 
Bangladesh as perpetual "basket case" (Mitchell 1988), and second, establishing it as a laboratory 
for development practice and research. As I explore further in Chapter 2, these processes continue 
to shape the work of development in Bangladesh and are the foundation of the adaptation regime. 
 
Development Regimes in Bangladesh 
 The history of Bangladesh itself has progressed alongside the growth of global development 
imaginaries and regimes. In the aftermath of the brutal war of independence from Pakistan in 
1971, unprecedented amounts of foreign aid poured into the country to finance reconstruction; by 
1979 these aid flows were equivalent to 20% of Bangladesh’s gross national product (Hartmann 
and Boyce 1983, 268). This aid has not come without conditions, however. As Rehman Sobhan 
argues, it produced a belief among major donors that “the size and importance of their 
contribution to Bangladesh’s development effort [gave] them a right to dictate how it should 
conduct its development affairs” (Sobhan 1982, 146). The country’s first administration, led by 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had an uneasy relationship with foreign donors, owing largely to the 
latter’s Cold War antipathy to the new government’s avowed socialism (Sobhan 1982; Lewis 
2011). Shortly after gaining independence, Bangladesh was infamously referred to by an American 
diplomat as a “basket case,” a characterization which has haunted the country ever since. 7 After 
																																																						
7 The “basket case” comment has regularly been attributed to Kissinger, although Lewis instead credits Ural 
Alexis Johnson, then a U.S. under-secretary of state for political affairs (Lewis 2011; White 1999). 
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Sheikh Mujib’s assassination in 1975, these tensions cooled (even if the external cynicism directed 
toward the country did not) as the military government of General Ziaur Rahman worked closely 
with the World Bank (as the leader of a consortium of major foreign donors) to implement far-
reaching market-led reforms, including trade liberalization, denationalization of the jute and 
textile industries, devaluation, monetary stabilization, establishment of early export processing 
zones, and reduction of subsidies by raising prices of public goods (Sobhan 1982; Uddin 2005; 
Muhammad 2006; Van Schendel 2009). The World Bank (along with other foreign donors) 
continues to exert a strong influence over Bangladesh’s national budget and policy making (Byron 
2015). The results of these reforms have been extraordinary; in 2014 the Pew Research Center 
called Bangladesh the second most pro-market friendly country in the world, while Forbes 
magazine dubbed it a “capitalist haven” (Dhaka Tribune 2014). 
 Many scholars have noted that Bangladesh’s capitulation to these reforms reflected not 
only a transformation in economic policy and resource flows, but also a surrender of considerable 
sovereignty over both domestic and international policy in exchange for ongoing aid commitments 
(Muhammad 2006; Lewis 2011). This capitulation has been bolstered by an expanding urban elite 
whose class interests have become bound up with the interests of foreign donors (Sobhan 1982, 
200). As David Lewis has written, “the content and representation of Bangladesh’s economy and 
society had now become absorbed within the international project of developmentalism… [Today, 
aid] remains a powerful influence at the level of ideas and policy” (Lewis 2011, 39). Thus, early 
skepticism (if not contempt) of Bangladesh’s right to self-determination8 was quickly succeeded by 
the hegemony of a development regime firmly rooted in the nascent neoliberal development 
																																																						
8 A transcript of a 1971 phone call between Nixon and Kissinger highlights these tensions. Following the 
receipt of a telegram from the US Embassy in Dhaka titled “Selective Genocide,” concerning violence 
against Bengali civilians by the Pakistani military, Nixon expressed his support for General Yahya Khan, the 
President of Pakistan, noting that “The real question is whether anybody can run the god-damn place,” to 
which Kissinger responded “That’s right and of course the Bengalis have been extremely difficult to govern 
throughout their history” (Blood, Nixon and Kissinger, 2013:243).  
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model. The significance of this developmentalism extended beyond the Bangladeshi state, as the 
country became a global “test case of development,” in the words of two former World Bank 
economists (Faaland and Parkinson 1976). 
 This hegemony coincided with the emergence of one of the most robust local development 
industries in the world (Lewis 2011). The model of neoliberal development was propagated largely 
through an NGO sector that grew rapidly (Devine 2003); today NGOs have a presence in at least 
90% of Bangladeshi villages (Siddiquee and Faroqi 2016). As these NGOs increasingly took 
responsibility for social welfare activities, such as education, health care, and the provision of 
drinking water, the provision of entitlements that were formerly considered the purview of the state 
were increasingly privatized (Feldman 1997; White 1999). The rise of Bangladesh’s NGO sector 
was linked with the country’s expansive capitalist market reforms. Collectively, they have provided 
fertile ground for the emergence of the adaptation regime. 
 
From Basket Case to Development Laboratory 
The role of Bangladesh in the climate change adaptation regime is only the most recent 
phase in a long pattern of such experimentation. Though experiments in social and ecological 
engineering existed during the British colonial period, the first official use of Bangladesh as a 
development "laboratory" was through the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARD, 
reborn after independence as BARD, or the Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development) (Ali 
2013). In 1959, PARD was founded through support from USAID, the Ford Foundation, and Ayub 
Khan's military regime. Its centerpiece was a “social laboratory” established in Kothwali Thana,9 
an administrative unit of about 150,000 inhabitants in the Southeastern part of the country (Haque 
																																																						
9 The word “thana” refers to a unit of police administration, which today are known as upazilas or sub-
districts.  
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1977). PARD produced a rural development paradigm that came to be known as the Comilla 
Model, and which was celebrated as a model to be replicated in rural communities throughout the 
"Third World" (Ruttan 1997). By 1977, the model had been used to implement rural development 
programs in 200 of Bangladesh’s then 434 thanas (Khan 1979). PARD functioned both as a 
training facility for rural administrators in new technologies in agricultural development, as well as 
a living laboratory for experiments in "cooperative capitalism," involving the dissemination and 
intensification of green revolution technologies through multi-class cooperative organizations, 
credit provision, reproductive health care for population control, and other experiments in social 
engineering, as well as a variety of public works, including the construction of irrigation and 
drainage canals, and flood protection embankments (Anisuzzaman et al. 1986).  
Following green revolution doctrine, the Comilla Model did not address itself directly to 
the problem of inequitable land tenure and agrarian production relations (Haque 1977). 
Embedded within an agrarian political economy that continued to exhibit an essentially feudal 
character, the benefits of the model consequently accrued to larger landholders, largely due to 
elite capture and disenfranchisement of the landless (Khan 1979). The program itself ultimately 
exacerbated rural inequality and dispossession, as land transfer from small to larger farmers grew 
within the cooperatives (Blair 1978; Haque 1977). In 1974, PARD’s lionized founder and erstwhile 
figurehead Akhter Hameed Khan (who departed in 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh) 
wrote “no more shall the people of Comilla be harassed by my antics, nor I be overwhelmed by 
their problems… I call myself an expert in failure” (Khan 1974). 
Yet, despite its failures in reality, the Comilla Model was largely regarded as a success in 
global development circles (Ali 2013; Blair 1978). This sense of the model’s success can be 
attributed largely to its ideological function in serving as a global platform for experimentation 
with new and mobile interventions by a growing development industry. PARD offered 
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development practitioners and the scientists who worked with them a platform for experimenting 
not only with a variety of development technologies, but also for exploring the possibility of a 
model for a suite of technologies that could be universally replicable. As one social scientist 
involved with PARD explained, "the contribution of these studies to sociology is that they utilize 
concepts and hypotheses that were developed in the United States in a new setting and test the 
universality of the existing findings. Their peculiar accomplishment is that they do this under 
severely adverse research conditions" (Choldin 1969, 490). East Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) 
provided the perfect platform for such a laboratory because of its status of severe impoverishment, 
as well as supposed lack of governing capacity, suggesting its need for external intervention. 
Choldin’s study highlights the importance of PARD in demonstrating not only the utility of green 
revolution technologies, but also their significance in establishing the importance of developing 
“social laboratories” for conducting experiments in rural development (Choldin 1969). 
In the 1980s, Bangladesh was at the front line of population control efforts, as neo-
Malthusian discourses of resource scarcity and overpopulation framed a new generation of 
development programs. With support from the Ford Foundation, USAID, the World Bank, and 
other bi- and multi-lateral donors, clinical trials and other experiments with Norplant, IUDs, and 
tubal ligation were carried out under the auspices of development programs (Hartmann 1995; 
Hardee, Balogh, and Villinski 1997). In 1981, Bangladesh received the largest total and largest per 
capita amount of funding for population control of any country in the world, almost ten times 
more per capita than neighboring India (Herz 1984, 19). While these programs facilitated access 
to some reproductive healthcare for poor women, they were also plagued by reports of failure to 
obtain consent from trial participants and forced sterilization (Hartmann 1995; Hardee, Balogh, 
and Villinski 1997). 
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By the early 2000s, Bangladesh was again in the spotlight of global development 
imaginaries because of? the burgeoning microcredit industry. Microcredit programs, and the 
development and research agencies that promoted them, promised an "end to poverty" through 
small loans to rural women (Yunus 1999). Over 60 percent of rural households are members of 
microfinance agencies, which by 2008 claimed some 10 million members and an annual loan 
disbursement of US$1.8 billion (Khandker, Koolwal, and Badruddoza 2013). The proliferation of 
microcredit programs brought Bangladesh worldwide attention as a global model for this new 
development "panacea" when Mohammad Yunus (and the Grameen Bank that he founded) won 
the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. Critics of microcredit, however, pointed out that despite unrestrained 
enthusiasm (even "evangelism") for this new model for rural development, little evidence existed to 
suggest that it had any real impact on the reduction of poverty (Rogaly 1996; Duflo et al. 2013). 
Moreover, several studies have found that microcredit is implicated in the social and cultural 
alienation of women, exacerbation of indebtedness, and other forms of rural dispossession (Cons 
and Paprocki 2010; Karim 2011; Paprocki 2016). 
As these examples illustrate, in its short history, Bangladesh is and has been a key site in 
the global development project, a geography of imagination and experimentation with new 
frontiers in "big D" Development. It is in this context that the emergence of the adaptation regime 
in Bangladesh must be examined, both in order to understand the role Bangladesh has played in 
its emergence, as well as in better understanding the regime itself. The role of Bangladesh at the 
forefront of climate change adaptation highlights the deep imbrication of the development project 
in the emergence of the adaptation regime. 
 
Adaptation Regime  
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Today, the centrality of Bangladesh in the global development project is increasingly 
defined by and through what I call an adaptation regime, a socially and historically specific 
configuration of power that governs the landscape of possible intervention in the face of climate 
change.10 The adaptation regime operates through three interrelated processes: imagination, 
experimentation, and dispossession. Each of these processes is produced and manifested both 
materially and epistemically. Imagination refers to the work of enframing Bangladesh as a space of 
climate crisis (Mitchell 1988), such that its social and ecological conditions can only be 
understood in relation to the impacts of climate change, and the vision of future habitation of the 
region is similarly delimited by this sense of impending crisis. This work of imagination is 
amplified through a process of experimentation with development interventions which are 
considered suitable for producing livelihoods appropriate to this changing climate. These 
interventions, referred to as climate change adaptation, produce agrarian dispossession by shaping 
and disciplining the possible production strategies of the region’s inhabitants. This dispossession is 
lauded as an opportunity for development and growth, owing to its contributions to the production 
of urban export commodities. It is bolstered by the sense of its inevitability of climate crisis. Each 
of these dynamics of imagination, experimentation, and dispossession is produced through and in 
conversation with existing development regimes in Bangladesh. Critically, these dynamics also 
characterize the development regimes which have shaped this region historically. 
The adaptation regime itself does not have agency, rather it is an agglomeration of actors 
(including donors, development practitioners, policy makers, researchers, and journalists) who do 
																																																						
10 I am concerned here with the adaptation regime in its historical and geographical specificity in 
Bangladesh. This analytical lens is at once deeply localized and profoundly transnational, as the adaptation 
regime both shapes and is shaped by a global geopolitics of capitalist development. In this sense, it is 
grounded in a methodological tradition which recognizes the need to construct an understanding of global 
phenomena through attention to historically and geographically specific social processes (McMichael 1990; 
Hart 2002; Akhter 2015). While the adaptation regime nevertheless involves a variety of global actors and 
sites of production, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine the global totality of its local 
manifestations.  
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exercise agency within their own spheres (sometimes in parallel but often in active coordination 
with one another). These discrete actions do not necessarily produce a coherent trajectory, yet in 
aggregate, they do have real, intelligible effects. Therefore, in describing this regime, I do not 
intend to invoke a unitary “thing,” rather an interconnected set of relationships that take form in a 
particular way in this unique historical moment in Bangladesh. As such, descriptions herein of the 
acts of the adaptation regime refer not to the regime itself as an actor, but to the aggregate effects 
of the actors composing it.  
Institutions of development, research, media, and science, as well as various state actors 
both nationally and internationally all participate in the adaptation regime. These actors both 
possess and endow the regime with authority. They legitimate this authority through their appeals 
to both scientific knowledge about ongoing changes in the region as well as their uncertainty 
concerning the future implications of climate change (Watts 2015). As such, the authority of the 
adaptation regime is paradoxically grounded in both knowledge and uncertainty about the present 
and future. Yet, to be clear, the adaptation regime also contains multiple perspectives and 
sometimes contradictions. "Regime" does not denote a single or totalizing authority. Rather, the 
adaptation regime evolves through the agency and interaction of multiply-situated actors who 
collectively shape and enforce its mode of governing.  
The adaptation regime concept builds on political economies of development which 
theorize development regimes as intrinsically global in their material and ideological power, yet 
both administered and officially recognized in their national manifestations and particularities 
(Friedmann and McMichael 1989; Ludden 2005; Gellert 2010; Akhter 2015; Goldman 2005). 
While Bangladesh’s adaptation regime is historically produced and concrete (as I examine below), 
it has been produced relationally within a global hierarchy of development and accumulation 
within and between nation-states (Hart 2001). I examine both global processes and local 
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specificities to illuminate the multiple scales through which production and social reproduction 
are managed and governed in the name of adaptation (Orlove 2009; Watts 2015). 
Bangladesh’s contemporary adaptation regime is at once a continuation of and a rupture 
with past development regimes (Ludden 2005). In many ways adaptation programs have resulted 
in the same material impacts, particularly, agrarian dispossession, of previous development 
regimes and have reinforced their long-standing logics and processes (Ireland and McKinnon 
2013). Yet, the adaptation regime also represents a shift to a new regime of dispossession (Levien 
2013) in the sense that it creates new opportunities for dispossession, legitimizes this dispossession 
differently and more urgently, and it thus (in its claims to inevitability) poses new challenges to 
resistance. I explore this process of dispossession both in its imbrication with prior development 
models and in its novel formations. The interface of development and climate change has also 
produced new understandings and discourses about the landscape, how it is changing, and what 
must be done to respond. Many development practitioners suggest that climate change presents a 
break with previous strategies and logics of development, in the sense that it produces new 
imperatives for transformation. If the impacts of climate change are inevitable, then the mandate to 
“adapt” is also inexorable.  
In theorizing adaptation regimes, I build on critical scholarship from political ecology and 
environmental studies concerning the new opportunities and risks associated with discourses and 
interventions responding to climate change (Adger et al. 2001; Watts 2011; Marino and Ribot 
2012; Barnes and Dove 2015; Watts 2015). Science and technology studies provides the tools for 
understanding the construction of knowledge associated with such practices, producing new 
sociotechnical imaginaries of life in a climate changed world (Demeritt 2001; Miller and Edwards 
2001; Miller 2004; Jasanoff and Kim 2015). These new interventions conducted in the name of 
adaptation are embedded in long histories of development, understood as a conceptual apparatus 
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for ordering global hierarchies of wealth and power (Ferguson 1990; Hart 2001; Li 2007; 
McMichael 2009). Finally, the tools of agrarian studies, which questions teleological predictions of 
the disappearance of the peasantry (McMichael 2008; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009; Wolford 2010), 
facilitate an exploration of what we might call the agrarian question of climate change. That is, I 
examine the kinds of agrarian transitions that will result from climate change, or from attempts to 
adapt to it – questions that have been debated since Kautsky’s foundational text (Kautsky 1988 
[1899]). 
 
Methods 
To carry out this study, I conducted two years of multi-sited ethnographic research, 
building on work I have been doing in Khulna since 2012. I use this multi-sited approach across 
multiple nodes and geographic scales in order to connect how they fit together, and also to 
understand how power operates within and between them. My research led me from Khulna to 
Dhaka and Kolkata, and beyond to international conferences in Europe and other parts of Asia, as 
well as to historical archives on three different continents. 
For over a decade, I have worked with a landless peasant movement in Bangladesh called 
Nijera Kori (NK), which means "we do it ourselves" in Bengali. Through my ongoing relationship 
with them, I became interested in studying the expansion of commercial shrimp aquaculture 
through development programs in the coastal region, which the movement has actively opposed 
for the past 20-30 years. Thus, I began my work in this region as a study of the agrarian political 
economy of shrimp cultivation. Through several years of pre-dissertation research, it became clear 
that today this expansion is intimately tied up with climate change adaptation and discourse. I 
heard repeatedly from development practitioners working in Khulna that shrimp farming should be 
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considered a climate change adaptations strategy, and that it was the only viable production 
strategy for the region.  
My focus on the study of the politics of climate change refracted through these experiences 
working with a social movement that does not expressly address itself to climate change has had 
significant implications for how I understand climate justice. This absence of climate justice 
discourse in the movement's own narratives orient me toward a more critical and generative 
analysis of what climate justice does or could mean in this context. I read actually existing 
"climate justice" discourse against the grain by unpacking the common sense of those claims that 
are made for current understandings of climate justice while also suggesting the possibility of a 
vision for climate justice in political movements that do not currently claim it. To that end, this 
work is in dialogue with other current ethnographies concerned with climate justice that focus on 
social movements that do not expressly concern themselves with climate change (Koslov 2016; 
Cohen 2016). Collectively, these approaches suggest new ways to open up our understanding of 
what climate justice could look like. 
In Dhaka, I conducted interviews and participant observation with donors, development 
practitioners, government officials and scientists. In Figure 2, I enumerate the types of agencies 
from which I interviewed respondents, most of which included multiple interviews with different 
staff members, often on multiple occasions. I selected respondents for interviews by identifying key 
decision makers in major development programs in every major aid agency working in Khulna 
and Bangladesh government agencies concerned with development planning in Khulna. I 
developed initial contacts through a combination of targeted emails to those I had identified as 
leaders in principal positions in these organizations, and also by introducing myself to people at 
conferences and other events where this community of decision makers gathers. I subsequently 
expanded this network through a snowball sample to other relevant agencies and practitioners 
 19 
within them. I sometimes found while interviewing someone that they had heard about me from 
other practitioners without my prior knowledge, and that they had speculated about my analysis 
based on the questions I asked. This usually involved concern about potential criticism of their 
work, about logics of climate change adaptation, and about shrimp aquaculture. Their speculation 
made it all the more important to accurately and adequately represent my research, which I 
usually did by describing it succinctly as a study of the politics of climate change and specifically 
the use of shrimp farming as a climate change adaptation strategy. 
Type of 
agency 
NGOs Donors/Embassies UN 
agencies 
Research 
organizations/ 
Universities 
Activists Government 
Agencies 
Number of 
agencies 
20 16 4 23 12 8 
Figure 2. Table representing the agencies from which (often multiple) respondents were interviewed 
The leader of one major aid agency, after sharing an internal report with me that was not 
ready for public dissemination (to which I had responded “Thanks for sharing! Very excited to read 
it.”), wrote to me in an email “Don’t get too carried away! 😀.”	About a year later, I ran into this 
official while interviewing another staff member at his organization, and he invited me into his 
office for another chat. He wanted to update me about how the project was developing and to 
hear about how my research was going. He told me that he knew my research had two facets – 
that it was both about the environmental problems being experience in Khulna, and about the 
people and processes involved in planning responses to them. While I never attempted to hide the 
focus of my research, it seemed that he had come to this conclusion after both reflecting on the 
questions I had asked him previously, and through conversations with other practitioners about 
questions I had asked them. I told him that this was true, and that I hoped he wasn’t uncomfortable 
with it, to which he responded that he hoped I would be “charitable” to his agency in my analysis.   
 These exchanges reflect the general tenor of my interactions with development 
practitioners – they were frequently very forthcoming with me about their work and often generous 
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about sharing information, but with varying degrees of caution, apparently owing to their feelings 
of the sensitivity of the subjects under discussion. Climate change and shrimp aquaculture are two 
particularly sensitive11 subjects among development practitioners in Bangladesh, at once 
ubiquitous and contentious, and both embedded in a variety of broader power dynamics related to 
the production of knowledge about development and environmental change (these concerns are 
explored further in Chapter 4).  
One way in which this sensitivity was manifested in my fieldwork was in relation to my 
requests to record interviews. I had originally planned to use a cell phone or small digital audio 
recorder to record and subsequently transcribe all of my interviews. In the first few months I had 
some success with this, however I also had experiences in which interlocutors denied my requests 
to record our conversations, and found that sometimes just the request to do so made them 
uncomfortable, and changed the tone of the conversation. Responding to my recording request, 
one administrator laughed nervously, “well, now I need to be careful about what I say to you…” In 
another interview, a practitioner handed me a report that he said could be downloaded online; I 
asked to take a picture of it, he agreed, and when I lifted the cell phone camera to do so, he 
abruptly ducked, swatting at the device, apparently uneasy that I would take a photograph of him 
(he clarified this, embarrassed, once I set it down and apologized for unnerving him). I also found, 
however, that sometimes these same interlocutors would follow up my interviews with invitations 
to meet for lunch somewhere outside their offices, at their homes, or over a drink at one of the 
private clubs frequented by expatriates.12 It became clear to me that most were much more 
																																																						
11 This “sensitivity” reflects similar dynamics to those explored by Cons in his work on “sensitive space” 
(Cons, 2016).  
12 Without a membership of my own, I was able to enter most of these clubs only by being signed in by an 
existing member. These clubs, exclusive to foreign passport holders, are affiliated with foreign governments, 
and therefore allowed to sell alcohol, which is otherwise illegal in Bangladesh. They also feature restaurants, 
pools, tennis courts, and spas, and are therefore popular spots for socializing among Dhaka’s expatriate 
community. 
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comfortable sharing information in a more casual context, and that this was impeded by my use of 
a recorder. They were also more likely, in these more casual contexts, to offer their reflections on 
the internal politics within and between the government and donor agencies, and their own 
critical perspectives on the work carried out by their own and other countries’ agencies. I therefore 
decided for the most part to stop recording my interviews, and to rely instead on detailed notes 
during conversations, fleshed out afterwards in more detailed field notes. Thus, most included 
quotations reflect my best effort to capture people’s exact words as they said them, subsequently 
copied into my field notes, though not excerpted directly from transcriptions. For the same reasons 
of this sensitivity, I have also attempted to protect the identity of my interlocutors when citing from 
private conversations. 
The activity among these various actors in Dhaka is happening constantly, often meaning 
there are several events in a week where key actors are invited and relevant agencies are expected 
to be represented. An important part of this work of understanding this community, then, was to 
attend all of the relevant seminars and workshops, get to know all of the key players at different 
agencies and embassies, and to become immersed in the everyday practices of the community. To 
the extent that I was able, I attended these events regularly, in order to become part of the 
community myself and participate in its ongoing dialogues.  
Becoming immersed in this community often posed methodological and ethical challenges 
related to working within communities holding often radically different political commitments and 
epistemological perspectives. Much of these challenges were related to the antagonistic 
relationship of activists and development actors, particularly in relation to conflicts over shrimp 
aquaculture. I was careful to disclose to development actors in Dhaka my ongoing work with 
activists in Khulna when it was relevant, while also not letting these relationships overdetermine 
the content of conversations with actors with other viewpoints. In Dhaka, I often found myself 
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enmeshed in conversations that produced precisely the dynamics I was studying. I was careful to 
ask questions in this area that were direct but did foreclose the possibility for practitioners to state 
viewpoints in support of shrimp. Examples of such questions included “I have heard about some of 
the negative social and ecological impacts of shrimp aquaculture and I have also heard from some 
practitioners that there may not be other options. What are your perspectives on this?;” “Is the 
threat of climate change changing agriculture and aquaculture development strategies in 
Bangladesh?;” and “How do you and your colleagues obtain scientific information about climate 
change and other ecological change in Bangladesh, and how does it inform your ideas about the 
kinds of agriculture and aquaculture strategies to pursue?”  
A common event among development agencies is the "stakeholder workshop.” While this 
title might suggest the attendance of those rural community members who are the subjects (or 
objects) of development programs, the stakeholder workshop is instead an event to which 
development practitioners and government bureaucrats are invited. I was also frequently able to 
talk my way into invitations to such events. I was often very aware that my presence as a 
participant observer at these events may have been construed as consent to the program proposals 
under discussion. Attendees at these events are commonly offered an envelope of cash as a per 
diem or "conveyance" (theoretically a transportation stipend) in recognition of their attendance. I 
observed that these payments were sometimes as much as 5,000 Bangladeshi taka (or about US 
$75) amongst larger aid agencies. I made a personal policy of never accepting these cash 
payments as indication of my role of observation as opposed to consent.  
I found these entanglements to be particularly challenging on a handful of occasions when 
I was offered the possibility of consulting contracts on projects related to aquaculture and climate 
change in Khulna. Because consultants engaged in these programs are often foreigners who have 
little to no experience in Bangladesh at all, I was told that my prior experience in Khulna, 
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relationships with local communities, and fluency in Bengali would be an uncommon asset to 
these programs. Even many Bangladeshi staff working in development agencies in Dhaka have 
little to no experience working directly in rural communities. While these opportunities would 
have provided me with unparalleled access to the inner-workings of such programs within 
development agencies, I ultimately turned them down to avoid any possibility of compromising 
my ability to conduct an independent analysis and to write freely about my findings.  
My access to this community of practice concerned with climate change adaptation was 
expanded about nine months into my fieldwork when I was invited to become a Visiting 
Researcher at the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) in Dhaka. 
ICCCAD's Director, Saleemul Huq, is a leader in global climate change policy and diplomacy 
networks. Because of the organization's leadership in these conversations within Bangladesh, 
ICCCAD is a key node in the adaptation regime. Dr. Huq regularly brought me with him to high-
level seminars and meetings to which he was invited, and facilitated exceptional access to the 
inner-workings of these networks and conversations. My relationship with ICCCAD gave me new 
insight into the threats of climate change to Bangladesh, the international negotiations surrounding 
climate treaties, and claims related to climate justice. These insights also gave me new sympathy 
for the political claims made within these discourses, and helped me to reframe my analysis of 
how we should think about what climate change is and does (I expand on this more directly in the 
conclusion). 
My research in Khulna built directly on relationships I developed and research I had 
conducted previously alongside NK. In 2012, I visited Khulna for the first time with Rezanur "Rose" 
Rahman, NK's Director of Research, and a longtime activist and community organizer with the 
organization. Rose has been a trusted colleague and interlocutor for over a decade, and I selected 
my research sites collaboratively with him. In 2013, I returned to these sites to conduct a study of 
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the agrarian political economy of shrimp aquaculture with my longtime collaborator Jason Cons 
and members of NK landless collectives (Paprocki and Cons 2014). To do this research, we used a 
participatory method we call Community Based Oral Testimony (CBOT), which we have used 
previously to study community perceptions of microcredit in northern Bangladesh (Cons and 
Paprocki 2010; Paprocki 2016). This study provided a robust foundation for my ethnographic 
study of related dynamics in Khulna, and it was a significant benefit to have already established 
relationships in each of these communities.  
The three field sites in Khulna highlight how the impacts of environmental change are 
being experienced in different ways. I chose them because they have taken very different 
approaches to navigating ongoing transformations in the region, and because they illuminate 
different possibilities for ongoing rural livelihoods there. The first community is in Polder 23, 
which has almost entirely transitioned from rice agriculture to shrimp aquaculture (starting in the 
1980s). Across the river, the community in Polder 22 has historically resisted the transition to 
shrimp largely through the mobilization of a landless social movement supported by NK. Farmers 
in the community in Polder 29 have transitioned from shrimp back to the earlier mode of 
agricultural production through this same social mobilization we see in Polder 29 (also through 
the support of organizers from NK). I regularly traveled between Khulna and Dhaka in order to 
continue ongoing work between these varied communities. In Khulna in particular, this approach 
had the benefit of allowing me to observe community dynamics through assorted growing seasons 
for shrimp, rice, and other agricultural crops. 
While traveling around rural Khulna, I stayed at the remote field offices where NK staff 
live, and I frequently spent time with NK members and local leaders. On occasion, members of 
NK would ask to be interviewed within NK compounds, which are generally relatively private 
compared with even domestic spaces in rural communities (such as homes or gardens, where  
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Figure 3. Nijera Kori field office in Polder 22 
neighbors will often wander into and crowd around conversations uninvited). However, I did not 
let NK staff accompany me while I was walking around the villages conducting interviews. This, I 
believe, allowed those community members who were not members of NK to more freely discuss 
their perspectives with me. Having already spent time in each of these villages the prior two 
summers, by the time I began dissertation fieldwork, most people had heard of my presence and 
my affiliation with the movement.13 Yet, perhaps because of the significance (in different ways) of 
																																																						
13 This was just one of many things I found that villagers had heard about me, others of which they usually 
seemed to find more curious, such as my habit of riding around on a bicycle, fondness for Bengali food, my 
absence of traditional gold jewelry (indicating, many often speculated, my father-in-law’s disdain for me), 
and my failure to have children at a surprisingly advanced age despite having been married for several years. 
My openness about these kinds of personal details obviously endeared me to people there, helping me to 
develop relationships quickly with many different community members, and smoothing the way for me to 
ask my own personal and probing questions about their lives. 
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shrimp aquaculture in each of these communities, most were excited to relay their own 
perspectives and personal stories, regardless of the role of shrimp within them. Their awareness of 
my affiliation with NK, I believe, also led them to a desire to account more thoroughly for their 
motivations in participating in the shrimp boom, details that enriched and nuanced my research 
findings. 
	
Figure 4. Nijera Kori field office in Polder 29 
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In Polder 23, I noticed that the out-migration of many community members meant that I 
was missing the perspective of a significant portion of the population. Since respondents there 
frequently told me stories of friends or family members who had migration to a particular slum on 
the outskirts of Kolkata, I began to solicit mobile phone numbers of these migrants with the 
intention of traveling to Kolkata to find and interview them. The vast majority of these phone 
numbers I gathered did not lead to viable interviews, both because of the pre-paid phone being 
out of service, and presumably also because of the discomfort of some people I was able to 
contact with being interviewed by an unknown stranger. I made a point of never soliciting 
information about these migrants’ legal status in India, though presumably many if not all of them 
did not have legal authorization to work or reside there. Concerns about this legal status were 
presumably a concern for many of them about speaking with me, heightened by a growing 
xenophobic rhetoric in the midst of the 2014 Indian elections, during which then-candidate 
Narendra Modi remarked “You can write it down. After [the election on] May 16th, these 
Bangladeshis better be prepared with their bags packed” (Modi seething at Bangladeshi immigrants  
2014). Two of the phone numbers that were shared with me in Polder 23 led to interviews with 
young men who had migrated from there, and these interviews led to a snowball sample of 
approximately 20 interviews with other migrants living in the same slum. I see this work as an 
extension of my research in the field site in Polder 23. 
I also conducted research internationally at conferences on climate change and adaptation 
in Paris, Rotterdam, Kolkata and Kuala Lumpur. This research helped me to better situate the 
dynamics of the adaptation regime I was observing in Bangladesh within a broader global context, 
and to understand Bangladesh's role within this global regime. In Kolkata, this participation also 
led to opportunities to conduct interviews with Indian NGOs and government officials conducing 
work in the Sundarban mangrove forest on the opposite side of the border from Bangladesh. This 
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work extended my understanding of the cross-border environmental planning and interventions 
and their relationships to linked but distinct development regimes. 
Finally, I conducted historical research in archives in Dhaka, Khulna, Kolkata, Delhi, 
London, Wageningen, Washington, DC, and outside Hamburg. This included government, NGO, 
and university archives, as well as the private collection of Gertrud and Helmut Denzau, a 
German couple who, as amateur naturalists with a passionate interest in the Sundarbans, have 
amassed what they (I believe rightly) consider to be the most comprehensive scholarly and 
historical archive in the region in the world in their home in a small village near the Baltic Sea.  
This research facilitated an understanding of the history of human intervention in this region, and 
how this intervention has shaped the current landscape and the vulnerability of communities 
inhabiting it. 
 
Narratives 
By working with each of these different sets of actors, I gained insight into how differently 
they understood the social and environmental challenges facing the region. These different 
understandings were manifested in different perceptions of the changes taking place, what those 
changes mean for the future of the region, and the normative value of those changes. These 
different perceptions also, importantly, were shaped by and had significant implications for 
material positions and actions among these various actors. Most significantly to understanding the 
adaptation regime, these competing interpretations of ongoing change shape the way the problem 
is addressed through climate change adaptation programs. 
For example, when it comes to rural-out migration from Khulna, these different actors have 
dramatically different understandings of what is driving migration, and whether migration is a 
positive shift. In this case, for donors, development practitioners, and Bangladeshi government 
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agencies, the migrations taking place out of the coastal zone are thought of as ‘climate migration,’ 
and they are considered a positive opportunity for economic growth. For scientists, their 
perspective on migration is contingent on their research questions, which shape the way they 
approach the problem. Thus, researchers who set out to study climate migration may identify it in 
places where those who set out to study historical patterns of agrarian transition might not. Finally, 
for farmers and migrants in and from Khulna, the migrations taking place are largely the result of 
changes in agrarian political economy. That is, local residents see the transition from rice to 
shrimp as a driver of economic and ecological transformation that results in rural dispossession. 
They understand the changes their communities are experiencing not as sudden ruptures caused 
by climate change, but instead as the products of ongoing historical patterns of agrarian 
dispossession. Each of these groups interprets changes being observed through their own 
experiences, preoccupations, and normative frameworks. Migration is a pattern that is shaped by a 
variety of social and material dynamics, and thus is susceptible to being attributed to any of these 
diverse drivers. By untangling the different drivers of change that have led to the present 
conjuncture, we can not only better understand the complexity of how migration is shaped by 
social and environmental change in the current moment, but we can also better comprehend the 
political significance of these different interpretations of change. 
 Similarly, there is broad agreement that the region is facing significant environmental 
transformations, including rising soil salinity, intractable water logging, and declining diversity of 
indigenous species of plant and aquatic life. Yet, the causes of those changes are understood quite 
differently. Specifically, the role of climate change carries different weight in these different 
interpretations of socio-ecological change. Donors, development practitioners and government 
agencies again largely attribute these ongoing environmental changes to climate change. For 
scientists, their understandings of these changes are again largely shaped by the object of their 
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research, but for the most part they (particularly international natural scientists) believe that the 
current environmental changes are the result of a combination of factors, among which climate 
change plays a relatively minor role. Community members in Khulna attribute these changes 
directly to changes in rural production (specifically the transition from rice to shrimp), as well as 
the large-scale polder engineering projects over the past several decades. 
 Perhaps most importantly, these different actors hold very different perspectives on what 
these changes mean for the future. Donors, development practitioners, and most government 
agencies see the environmental crisis as inevitable, which motivates the idea that agriculture in 
Khulna is “no longer viable,” or will no longer be viable in the near future. Clearly this sense of the 
inevitability of crisis has significant implications for the way that adaptation policy is designed and 
implemented. Scientists and farmers, however, largely see these changes in relation to particular 
historic and contemporary modes of planning and intervention (such as embankment engineering 
and aquaculture development programs). By identifying the ongoing formation and contestation of 
these plans and modes of intervention, scientists and residents of rural communities identify the 
active and ongoing production of these transformations, as opposed to their inevitability. This 
alternative interpretation of the inevitability of change suggests that with changes in current policy 
and modes of intervention, the dystopic future facing Khulna is avoidable. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
In its broadest sense, Threatening Dystopias is a dissertation about the politics of climate 
change and the possibility of agrarian livelihoods in a climate changed present and future. To that 
end, it examines the history, discourses, understandings of, and responses to ecological change in 
Bangladesh today. I approach this political ecology from a variety of different geographical and 
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historical perspectives in order to better understand the historical context of changes the country is 
currently experiencing. 
Threatening Dystopias begins in chapter 1 with an exploration of the environmental history 
of the region that is now Khulna. Instead of tracing this history chronologically, I examine a select 
set of historical patterns of intervention and representation of the region, dating from the colonial 
period to the present. Tracing these dynamics over time demonstrates not only the persistence of 
historical patterns of development in the region, but also how this exercise of power has shaped 
the landscape and the vulnerability of its inhabitants to climate change today. 
In chapter 2, I focus on the development politics of climate change adaptation 
interventions in Bangladesh. I do this by elaborating the concept of the adaptation regime, a 
socially and historically specific configuration of power that governs the landscape of possible 
intervention in the face of climate change. The chapter examines the political and historical 
dynamics through which Bangladesh has become "ground zero" for experiments in adaptation 
within the new global development regime under climate change. Chapter 3 extends this multi-
scalar focus on development politics through an examination of imaginaries of the future under 
climate change. I argue that the imagination of future ruination under climate change is used to 
justify ruination in the present. I explore how this prefiguration transpires both in Khulna as well as 
through the process of development planning in the context of climate change. This chapter 
examines what I call anticipatory ruination, a discursive and material process of social and 
ecological destruction in anticipation of real or perceived threats. I use this concept to examine 
not only the dynamics taking place in Khulna, but also the ways in which climate crisis is 
constituted more broadly. 
In chapter 4, I consider the politics of uncertainty embedded in the production of 
knowledge about climate change in Bangladesh. I argue that uncertainty about ecological change 
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and its drivers and impacts in the region is claimed, produced and mobilized to pursue particular 
ends within the adaptation regime. In so doing, I highlight the instability of the categories of 
certainty and uncertainty and how knowledge is enrolled in the production of each. Both are 
subject to interpretation and manipulation, and always in flux. 
Chapters 5 and 6 bring into focus the agrarian political economy of three villages in 
Khulna. In chapter 5, I concentrate on a village that has transitioned entirely from rice agriculture 
to shrimp aquaculture, and the narratives of the residents of that village and migrants from it who 
have experienced that transition. I juxtapose these experiences with dominant narratives of climate 
migration to expose how visions of “developed futures” in the time of climate change both shape 
and are shaped by the production of knowledge about ongoing transformation in those 
communities. Chapter 6 offers an alternative vision of the future from two communities that have 
resisted the move to shrimp aquaculture. It examines the social mobilizations that have catalyzed 
this resistance, and the socio-political contexts within which they emerged. It concludes by 
discussing narratives of “incremental” and “transformational adaptation” that are pursued within 
the adaptation regime. In so doing it highlights the importance of examining these alternative 
visions from communities in Khulna to to think different about what “transformation” can look like 
and how it is pursued. Together, these two chapters outline competing visions for rural futures 
being imagined by rural communities in Khulna themselves. 
In the conclusion, I advance a rubric for thinking about climate change as a biophysical 
process as well as a set of intentional social and political dynamics shaping life in the 
contemporary moment. Drawing on Gill Hart (2010), I propose that "big C"/"little c" C/climate 
change is a useful framework for understanding climate change not only as an immanent planetary 
shift, but also a social and political process that is in an ongoing state of production, 
transformation, and contestation in particular places. I sketch this new ontology for thinking about 
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what climate change is and does, proposing that we need to think differently about climate change 
in order to have a better understanding of how to develop strategies to live with it.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
“SLUTTISH, CARELESS, ROTTING ABUNDANCE:” PRE-HISTORIES OF A CLIMATE DYSTOPIA 
 
 
"[The Sunderbunds] are, in truth, a hideous belt of the most unpromising description, such as must 
cause any stranger wrecked on that coast, who should not proceed beyond the reach of the tide, 
to pronounce it a country fit for the residence of neither man nor beast" (Gilchrist 1825, 446). 
 
"Man, in conjunction with the beasts of the field, the monsters of the deep, and the malaria of the 
forests, has assisted in rendering the Soonderbuns a place of bad repute" (1859, 19). 
 
Long before the adaptation regime secured Bangladesh's status on the map of global 
climate crisis, a dystopic imaginary of the region had already started forming during the colonial 
period. The region, particularly the Sundarban14 forests contained within it, was an object of 
intense fascination, anxiety and denigration in the West.15 Rudyard Kipling called it 
"unwholesome" (1922, 86) while Charles Dickens dubbed it "not healthy" (1875, 379). British 
Geographer James Rennell, who created what is considered the first relatively accurate map of the 
region16 (see Figure 5)  opined, "I have long since forgot myself so far as to imagine that this is no 
part of it (the world), but only a separate part of the universe" (cited in Barrow 2003, 44). Yet, in its 
very remote, wild, and dystopic qualities, it has been enlisted in a variety of ways as a flexible 
resource in a shifting global political economy. As I explore further below, this has taken the shape 
																																																						
14 In the colonial record, the Sundarbans (সু-রবন in Bengali) were variably referred to as "Sunderbunds," 
"Sunderbans," "Soonderbans," etc. This variability is largely the result of an uncertain etymology, attributing 
the region's name in turns to the beauty of the forest, its proximity to the sea, the presence of embankments, 
and the abundance of sundori trees (a particularly valuable timber resource), among other theories. Unless 
quoting directly, I used "Sundarbans" to reflect the accepted current translation and transliteration. 
15 The contemporary district of Khulna in Southwestern Bangladesh (on which this study is focused) falls 
within the broader area historically referred to as the Sundarbans. The bounds of this region have shifted 
over time, both as a result of deforestation that expanded the area of human settlement, changing borders of 
districts and nation-states, and ongoing transformations in juridico-political regimes. Indeed, in 1927 the 
colonial Settlement Officer of Khulna wrote that "the revenue history of the area covered by Khulna district is 
almost entirely a history of Sunderban administration" (Fawcus, 1927, p.64). I thus take the historic region of 
The Sundarbans, however unstable, as a rough proxy for the region examined in this study more broadly. 
16 Supported by the East India Company, Major James Rennell carried out the first comprehensive survey of 
the Ganges, Meghna and Brahmaputra river systems in the late 18th century. His Bengal Atlas and 
accompanying Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan were essential texts employed in the British conquest and 
management of the subcontinent (Barrow 2003, Rennell 1781, Rennell 1788). 
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of both ideological and material resources, the value of which has shifted over time alongside 
regimes of governance. At the same time, the region’s unique biophysical particularities have 
chronically impeded attempts to subdue it. By interrogating this contingent and particular 
production of nature across spatial and temporal scales, this historical accounting of the 
Sundarban region facilitates a better understanding of the ecological politics of the present (Hart 
2002a; Smith 2008; Sivaramakrishnan 1999; Loftus 2013). 
	
Figure 5. Rennell's map of Bengal and Bihar 
The region’s unique physical geography has contributed to this dystopic imaginary. The 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) delta is the youngest, largest, and most active river delta in 
the world (Rahman, Chowdhury, and Ahmed 2003). This is manifested in the coastal floodplain 
area of Khulna by the presence of a dense network of river distributaries that are constantly 
moving, punctuated by land masses that are in a constant state of erosion and accretion (see Figure 
26 and Chapter 4 for a further discussion of erosion) (Brammer 2014a; Allison et al. 2003). Thus, 
the borders of the coastline itself and the islands of which the coastal region is composed are 
naturally predisposed to shifting at a rate that can be observed on an annual basis.17 This river 
																																																						
17 Allison et al. cite a rate of avulsion of the major rivers in the region - meaning complete abandonment of 
one river channel and formation of another - at the timescale of a single century (Allison et al. 2003, 319). 
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movement (or avulsion) happens when the water flow migrates from one channel to another, thus 
changing the size of channels as the water volume shifts. As the rivers carry alluvial sediment (both 
transported from the Himalayas and gathered along the course of the rivers), this dynamic of river 
movement also involves the siltation of river beds, when sediments are deposited, causing them to 
narrow and reduce their depth (see Figure 14) (Rogers, Goodbred, and Mondal 2013; Pethick and 
Orford 2013).  A related feature of the region's geomorphology is that the land is constantly 
subsiding, the result of both natural and anthropogenic factors (Brown and Nicholls 2015; 
Hanebuth et al. 2013).18 This subsidence was observed during the colonial period, but has come 
under particular attention recently due to its significance in measuring rates of relative sea level 
rise in relation to climate change (Brown and Nicholls 2015; Pethick and Orford 2013). That is, 
relative sea level rise can be caused either by absolute changes in sea level (which is one result of 
anthropogenic global warming) or in the local vertical movement of land related to local and 
regional processes.  
In this chapter, I trace the environmental history of the region that is now Khulna from the 
colonial period to the present. The boundaries of the region have shifted continually throughout 
this period, and the Khulna district itself was not officially demarcated until 1882 (Heinig 1892, 
E2). Thus, I focus here on the greater region of the Sundarbans, a mangrove forest that spans the 
border between what is today southwestern Bangladesh and the neighboring Indian state of West 
Bengal.19 The map in Figure 6 indicates the boundaries of the Sundarbans in the Khulna region 
																																																						
18 Though the interaction between natural and anthropogenic factors driving climate change is poorly 
understood, Brown and Nicholls have documented the its human influences in the GBM Delta, explaining 
that the most significant driver of anthropogenic subsidence in Khulna has been reduced sedimentation 
caused by protective embankments (2015). A thorough examination of anthropogenic drivers of subsidence 
in delta regions can be found in (Syvitski et al. 2009). 
19 In India, the dense mangrove forest along with the inhabited islands surrounding them are today 
collectively known as the Sundarbans, while in Bangladesh, this name is applied only to the areas of 
reserved forest. Thus, my use of this variable term is complicated by its unstable application across the 
border, while it is further complicated temporally by the deforestation of the mangroves throughout this time 
period (peaking during the colonial period). However, as the chapter will demonstrate, the discursive tropes 
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both inside and outside of the officially designated Protected Forest. I begin with the colonial 
period not to suggest that the political ecology of the region was not shaped in important ways 
prior to British intervention.20 Indeed, according to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the area of 
Paikgachha was settled under Hazrat Khan Jahan Ali, a legendary 15th century Sufi saint and 
governor of what is now the Khulna region under the Bengal Sultanate (BBS 2012). The name 
Paikgachha is said to be a reference to a particular group of peasant-militias drafted into service for 
clearing the Sundarbans (the “paiks”), and the trees they were forced to clear to make way for 
cultivation (“gach”). My focus on the colonial period to the present illuminates two important 
continuities from the colonial period to the present: first, the persistence of distinctively colonial 
modes of representation in enframing this region today, and second, a colonial re-shaping of the 
agrarian political economy that "forced the local economy to adapt to the needs of the metropolis" 
(Van Schendel 1982, 274).21 These epistemic and material dynamics both lay the foundation for 
and profoundly shape the current adaptation regime. 
Tracing these dynamics of the contemporary dystopic climate imaginary back through the 
colonial period is analytically significant in two ways. The first is in illuminating a longer history of 
contemporary ways of seeing and intervening in the landscape. Current discourses surrounding 
Bangladesh's unique vulnerability to climate change are not new, but draw on historic tropes 
about the region's inherent biophysical vulnerability due to low elevation, geomorphological 
instability, cyclonic activity, and mangrove ecology. Moreover, tracing this history helps us to 
																																																						
and management practices applied to the region transcend the boundaries of the forest (however they are 
demarcated). 
20 See Sivaramakrishnan, 1999 for a critique of the preoccupation among postcolonial scholars with 
colonialism as a watershed in South Asian environmental history. 
21 Richard Eaton has examined precolonial jungle reclamation and the advance of the agrarian frontier in 
this region, particularly the role of Muslim holy men in the early Mughal period (1990, 1993). While the 
timeframe of early settlement in the region is the subject of much debate (Beveridge, 1876), some scholars 
have dated settlement in the Sundarbans region as far back as the Ramayana and Mahabharata religious 
texts around 3000 to 4000 BC (Chattopadhyaya, 1999, p.26). 
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understand that the current ecological crisis faced by the region has been profoundly shaped by 
these modes of intervening in and imagining the region. In particular, we can see that even in the 
face of dystopic imaginaries, attempts to transform the landscape to make it more governable and 
susceptible to profit extraction have themselves exacerbated this vulnerability. Indeed, the 
vulnerability of Southwestern Bangladesh to climate change is not an accident of geography; 
rather, it is the product of the imbrication of its particular local ecology with global circuits of 
capital and governance (Watts 2003; Hart 2002b). Examining this history is thus essential to 
understanding the political ecology of the adaptation regime.  
	
Figure 6. Map of Khulna and the Sundarbans, indicating areas in and outside officially Reserved Forest Tracts. Source: 
(Blair 1990) 
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In this chapter, I begin by contextualizing this history first in relation to current literature on 
genealogies of wasteland development narratives. I then examine the significance of the region to 
global circuits of capital and accumulation. Finally, I examine this history by tracing the dynamics 
of the adaptation regime (imagination, experimentation, and dispossession) from the colonial 
period to the present. 
	
Figure 7. Map of the Ganges-Padma River System. Source: Banglapedia 
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Waste 
In 1793, the East India Company introduced a new land revenue system in Bengal through 
the Act of Permanent Settlement. In exchange for the British renunciation of any future increase in 
land taxation, the Permanent Settlement granted permanent property rights to a select group of 
Bengali zamindars who committed to large, fixed cash payments to the Raj. These zamindars were 
in turn responsible for collecting rents directly from cultivators who worked in their estates, thus 
creating a new landlord class with almost absolute authority over the land and agrarian economy 
(Iqbal 2010; Marshall 1987). Significantly, the codification of these property rights also 
necessitated the designation of a category of “wastelands,” which were not cultivated and 
therefore could not (yet) be subject to private taxation (Sivaramakrishnan 1999). Wastelands were 
not included in the Permanent Settlement, and were considered government property. The 
Sundarban region, covered with dense mangrove forest and largely uncultivated, was thus 
officially designated as “wasteland” as all of Bengal was being brought under a new regime of 
private property rights (Pargiter 1934).  
However, the the Act of 1793 was passed with no land survey or method of assessment or 
recording of land rights (Ludden 2011). As these methods were developed over the remainder of 
the 18th and early 19th century, a new office of the Commissioner of the Sundarbans was 
established in 1816 (Beveridge 1876a).22 This person’s primary task was to promote land 
reclamation (explored in further detail below), in order to facilitate the expansion of cultivation, 
and thus turn “waste” into land that generated tax revenue (Sarkar 2010; Iqbal 2010). 
Administrators believed that the instigation of private property rights would create an incentive to 
																																																						
22 This Commissioner of the Sundarbans existed until 1905, when the Sundarbans Act transferred the powers 
of the Commissioner to the Collectors of the three districts within which the forest was contained (Khulna, 
Backarganj, and the 24-Parganas) (Mandal, 2003). By this time the Sundarbans had been so 
comprehensively mapped and surveyed that the land administration was not so burdensome as to require its 
own administrator. 
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expand the areas under cultivation by motivating the improvement (meaning clearing and 
cultivation) of wastes (Guha 1982). As this cultivation expanded, new leases were granted, the 
revenues from which were managed by the Commissioner of the Sundarbans. The material and 
ideological conditions that gave rise to and resulted from this designation of the Sundarbans in 
particular are explored in further detail below. 
For the British, land was technically considered waste if it did not generate tax revenue for 
the Raj (Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010). Designation of wastelands facilitated enclosure (Goldstein 
2012), rendering the land an object of “improvement” (Guha 1982). Yet, the category was applied 
to a wide variety of existing ecological and biophysical conditions and to areas with extremely 
heterogeneous existing uses (Singh 2012). Thus, the Sundarbans and other areas considered 
“jungle” (another heterogeneous category) were designated waste along with many common lands 
such as pasture within villages used for grazing cattle (Sivaramakrishnan 1999; de Hoop and Arora 
2017). Determining a precise definition of “wasteland” is, however, confounded by the very 
mutability of its application (Baka 2013). Waste is a relational concept, constantly redefined 
alongside shifting development objectives and theories of value (Gidwani 2012; Baka 2016). 
As Gidwani explains, the discursive construction of certain lands as “waste” did political 
and ideological work for the empire (Gidwani 1992). In addition to having a revenue imperative 
(leasing waste lands to be brought under cultivation generated increased revenues for the colonial 
state), it also facilitated the British justification for colonization by simultaneously emphasizing 
what they understood to be the cultural and physical inferiority of Indians to the British. The British 
thus encouraged the development of waste lands for cultivation, offering new opportunities for 
governance and accumulation (Greenough 1998; Guha 1990).23 The categorization of waste thus 
																																																						
23 Sivaramakrishnan explains that the establishment of the Bengal Wasteland Rules in 1853 served a variety 
of purposes for the colonial administration, not always directly related to the extraction of forest resources 
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laid the foundation for material interventions facilitating extraction and accumulation by the 
colonial state and private British investors and corporations (Isenberg 2016; Gidwani and Reddy 
2011; Gidwani 2012; Baka 2013, 2016; Goldstein 2012). The government granted special leases 
to zamindars in order to facilitate cultivation, known as patitabad,24 with sub-leases granted by the 
zamindars to cultivators (Mukherjee 1983; Pargiter 1934; Ludden 2011). The government itself 
retained the right to determine the land’s potential for productivity. Figure 8 and Figure 9 feature 
maps of the areas categorized as “waste” in the Gangetic plain and land use and categorization 
throughout India, respectively.25  
																																																						
(1999, p.132). The present case of wasteland categorization supporting the reclamation of land for rice 
cultivation supports this analysis. 
24 The literal meaning of patitabad is “prostitution plantation,” reflecting the sense of these waste lands as 
offering exceptional potential for exploitation. It also reflects the moral valence of “wasteland” classification, 
explored in more detail by Gidwani 1992 and Baka 2013. 
25 Note in these maps that by the 1930s, much of the Sundarbans had been designated as protected forest, a 
shift that is reflected in the lower percentages indicated of “culturable waste.” Here, we find the result of 
heterogeneous and shifting definitions of “wasteland,” as explored further below. 
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Figure 8. Map of "cultivable waste" in India in the 1930s. Source: (Chatterjee 1941) 
The colonial imperative of expanded capitalist accumulation combined with its normative 
conceptions of the value of land (and the people and production relations inhabiting it) combined 
in wasteland development discourses as the foundation for governing both space and people in 
the Sundarban region, and continue to shape the way that the region is governed today.26 
Wasteland discourses have come under renewed scrutiny in recent years due to their revitalization 
within the rapid growth of large-scale land deals (the "global land grab") (Borras Jr and Franco 
2012; White et al. 2012; Wolford et al. 2013). Much of this literature has examined the roots of 
current land grabbing dynamics in the colonial enclosure movement (White and Dasgupta 2010; 
Baka 2016). South Asian Historians have likewise recognized the significance of wasteland 
																																																						
26 As a counterpoint, it is worth noting here that Historian PJ Marshall attributes the expansion of cultivation 
in the Sundarbans primarily to “climatic regularity rather than colonial rule” (Marshall, 1987, p.180). 
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development schemes and narratives in the British colonization of the subcontinent (Ludden 2011; 
Gilmartin 2003; Iqbal 2010).  
	
Figure 9. Map of land use and categorization in different regions India in the in 1930s. Source: (Chatterjee 1941) 
In the Sundarban region, the extent and variety of these lands categorized as waste offered 
ample scope for colonial administrators to devise methods of scientifically, politically, and 
physically managing the landscape. As one administrator observed, "this wilderness and labyrinth 
of rivers is the property of no landholder, but of the [colonial] sovereign," and thus cultivation and 
extraction could be undertaken on the basis of this sovereignty over waste (Hamilton 1820, 126). 
In addition to being home to extensive forested areas (which made up the majority of wastelands 
throughout British India), the chars and diaras (alluvial sediment deposits that form gradually into 
 45 
new land masses) were also classified as wasteland. Figure 10 depicts an example of the gradual 
formation of such alluvial land masses in the Sundarbans in the last several decades. The 
classification of the Sundarbans as waste was also claimed by colonial administrators as cause for 
excluding the region from the Permanent Settlement, thus establishing the government's indefinite 
right to the profits from all resources extracted from the area (Iqbal 2010; Pargiter 1934). 
	
Figure 10. Example of char formation in the Sundarbans, images taken in 1985 and 2015. Source: Google Earth 
Accumulation 
If the Sundarbans have been framed in colonial and post-colonial imaginaries as wild and 
remote, their position in global political economies has been anything but marginal. Its unstable 
ecological and biophysical features have in many ways undermined attempts at governance and 
accumulation. As successive development regimes have sought greater control over the landscape, 
these environmental challenges have stoked dystopic imaginaries of the region 
The British East India Company established its primary port and trading base in Kolkata 
(then Calcutta) in the late 17th century, and Kolkata subsequently became the capital of the British 
Raj. The Port of Calcutta became the most important port in British India, with all shipping traffic 
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routed through the Sundarbans (Hunter 1875b, 16),27 leading one colonial observer to refer to the 
Sundarbans as "the British emporium of the East" (Bull 1823, 124). The growing significance of 
these shipping routes contributed to the importance of Calcutta as a commercial city and the 
power of the British political and economic control in India (Mukerjee 1938, 26). The 1908 
Khulna Gazetteer referred to these shipping routes as "one of the most important systems of inland 
navigation in the world," with trafficked goods valued at nearly four million pounds sterling 
annually (O'Malley 1908, 128). The town of Khulna, located just north of the forested area of the 
Sundarbans, was an important node in this network, as the headquarters of the Salt Department 
under the East India Company and the "grand mart for all Sundarbans trade" (Hunter 1875a) well 
into the 20th century. 
As British economic power expanded in the subcontinent, so did the size of their trading 
ships and the traffic through the Sundarbans. However, the constant movement of the rivers, 
shoals, and chars presented serious challenges to this ship traffic. In a series of six lectures 
delivered in Calcutta in 1906 entitled "Waterways in Bengal: Their Economic Value and the 
Methods Employed for Their Improvement," one government engineer complained of the large 
amount of money that British Steamer Companies were forced to write off every year due to 
shipwrecks in the Sundarban passages (Lees 1906, 26). This predicament led administrators on an 
unabating quest to discover ways to reshape and control the waterways. In fact, the initial 
objective of Rennell's surveys (which ultimately produced his Atlas of the delta) was to map the 
shipping routes to Calcutta in order to facilitate the movement of goods, more efficient revenue 
collection, as well as the transportation of troops to the capital (Rennell 1910; Barrow 2003). At a 
forum held by the Society of Arts in London, one British official appealed for greater efforts to 
																																																						
27 Several of the field sites in which research for this study was conducted were bordered by the primary 
inland shipping route within this network, and Paikgachha itself became home to one of the most important 
weekly markets for trading Sundarban resources (Gastrula, 1868). 
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develop the Sundarbans passages following other major world economic powers, noting "America 
and Germany had utilized and improved their rivers, and made them capable of carrying an 
enormous quantity of goods at a very cheap freight, and the trade of those countries in 
consequence had prospered to an enviable degree" (Buckely 1906, 434). Thus, proposed remedies 
for challenges of navigation through the Sundarbans were abundant. As this same official 
explained, "a little deepening of the sand banks on the Ganges and the Brahmaputra would mean 
that all the steamers would be able to carry several hundred tons more than they would otherwise 
be able to do. What that would mean to the traffic of the country and to the rates charged was 
obvious" (Buckely 1906, 434). These proposals for re-engineering the landscape have been a 
recurring concern of subsequent development regimes in the region (United Nations Water 
Control Mission to Pakistan 1959; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1972c), 
and will be taken up further later in the chapter.  
As the economic priorities of the region's development regimes shifted, so did the 
governance of the Sundarbans. In the late 19th century, colonial planners began to see the 
development of a railway network across the subcontinent as integral to the progress and 
expansion of the British empire. As Iftekhar Iqbal has explored in his environmental history of the 
Bengal delta, the rail network increasingly took priority over the navigability of the vast network of 
waterways (Iqbal 2010). In a pamphlet entitled "A Letter to the Shareholders of the East Indian 
Railway, and to the Commercial Capitalists of England and India," the author argued that 
expanding the rail network into the Ganges delta from Calcutta would be of "universal benefit" to 
Britain, as "Calcutta is your emporium" and "the Ganges Valley is your manufactory--your trading 
ground--your source of wealth" (Transit 1848). Thus, facilitating the extraction and transport of 
resources from the delta region was necessary to the expansion of the entire empire. As explored 
further below, the governance of forest resources in the Sundarbans also shifted as administrators 
 48 
recognized that building this vast railway network would require a substantial amount of timber, 
and that the sundri mangroves were exceptionally suited for this, being used in construction of rail 
tracks (Buckland 1901; O'Malley 1908).  
	
Figure 11. Map of changes in the course of rivers in the Bengal delta between Rennell's survey and 1863 (changes 
marked in red). Source: (Fergusson 1863) 
After independence, Khulna continued to hold a significant place in the developmentalist 
imaginary for then-East Pakistan. The period following Partition between 1947 and 1971 was 
characterized by the political and economic colonization of East Pakistan by West Pakistan (Wood 
1981; Van Schendel 2009; Feldman 1999). This took the shape of intensive resource extraction 
from the East by the West, along with the failure of the utopian promise of agrarian reform 
(Hashmi 1992; Blair 1978; Lewis 2011). East Pakistan systematically subsidized the industrial 
growth of West Pakistan, largely through the export of raw jute (a natural agricultural fiber used for 
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making rope and burlap) (Sobhan 1971, 1962). In spite of East Pakistan earning approximately 60-
70% of the country's foreign exchange in the decade after Partition (Sobhan 1962, 37), it received 
only 20% of the country's development expenditure (Haq et al. 1976). While development 
investments were nationally concentrated in the growth of industrial manufacturing (Huq 1958), 
the largest investments in East Pakistan were made in water management infrastructures in Khulna 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1972b). These investments were justified 
on the basis of the Green Revolution goals of expanding the cropping area and growing yields in 
order to facilitate increased exports of raw agricultural resources (Warner 2008). The results of 
these interventions and infrastructural investments will be explored further below. 
Although the priorities of these successive developments regimes can be understood in 
relation to economic priorities and potential for accumulation, they should also be understood in 
relation to broader concerns related to governance and state building. Since the colonial period, 
governance objectives in the region have integrated, on the one hand, resource exploitation and 
capitalist accumulation, and other priorities related to state territoriality and the production and 
maintenance of hegemonic legitimacy. Barrow argues that Rennell's Bengal atlas served this 
purpose of extending the legitimacy of British East India Company rule in Bengal (at a time when it 
was under threat and particularly weak), writing that Rennell "gave Company rule a colonial 
character, suggesting that the Company was interested in governance and improvement and not 
just in conquest" (Barrow 2003, 40). After Independence, aid flows were motivated heavily by the 
competing interests in the Cold War, each of which saw investments in development as vital in 
establishing ideological legitimacy in the region (Sobhan 1982; Van Schendel 2009); in particular, 
agencies from both the West and the Soviet Bloc invested heavily in water management 
infrastructure in the Southwest (Agency for International Development 1967). 
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Figure 12. Picture of Norman Borlaug, "father of the Green Revolution," in the entrance to the headquarters of the 
Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council 
	
Temporariness 
The impermanence of this landscape has consistently been among the greatest challenges 
to those seeking to govern it, a challenge which has characterized these successive development 
regimes. The temporary political geographies that have resulted have thus themselves been 
ephemeral and unstable. Recognizing this biophysical mutability and its relationship with the 
region's political mutability facilitates a better understanding of the dynamics that have given rise 
to the contemporary adaptation regime. Recognizing this temporariness, these dynamics are best 
understood through a "mosaic approach" to environmental history advocated by 
Sivaramakrishnan, that attends to the stochastic and disorganized nature of environmental change 
(Sivaramakrishnan 1999, 14). 
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The natural dynamics of river movement and deltaic transformation were a source of 
unremitting anxiety for colonial administrators. They questioned whether the land in the delta was 
stable enough to inhabit, or to accommodate the kinds of durable settlements they envisaged. One 
colonial administrator, chronicling the effects of these river movements on landholders, remarked 
"No buildings intended for duration can be raised on so unstable a foundation" (Hamilton 1828, 
175). These questions about whether the land was fit for habitation resonate today with 
contemporary concerns about whether climate change will make coastal Bangladesh 
uninhabitable. 
The British sought at length to understand and document the constantly shifting nature of 
the landscape, as well as to find scientific means to mitigate its transience. One former judge in 
the Calcutta High Court recalled,  
"I can state that, between the years 1842 and 1869 inclusive, or my period of active service 
in India, I never recollect a time in which some proposal or other was not under 
discussion, in the Press and in official correspondence, in regard to these rivers. There was, 
generally, a dread that this or that channel was silting up; and there were repeated 
proposals for dredging, improving, or widening the channels" (Seton-Karr 1899, 651).  
 
In addition to these concerns about how to physically manage the river channels, colonial officials 
also deliberated extensively about how to manage the rights to alluvial accretions and their 
associated economic benefits. While the temporariness of the land threatened the stability of 
colonial accumulation, colonial administrators sought to manage the temporary geography of 
deltaic land masses by devising new means of legally recognizing the economic value of 
unexpected possibilities for accumulation. This was carried out through unique land tenure 
arrangements that temporarily suspended taxation to promote expanded cultivation, as well as 
physical interventions to reclaim land mass, both explored in greater detail below. 
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Figure 13. Map of land form changes across the coast between 1779 and 1963. Source: (Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 
1968) 
 
Imagination 
The imaginative geographies of catastrophe and dystopia that characterize the adaptation 
regime far predate it. Both colonial administrators and East Pakistan-era development planners 
described the natural threats facing the region as "existential," meaning the very continued 
existence of the physical space and the communities inhabiting it was imperiled. They also 
considered the causes as well as potential timeframes of these immanent threats to be uncertain. 
Moreover, the nature of these imaginaries is deeply shaped by normative conceptions of the lives 
of people inhabiting these landscapes.  
In describing the Sundarban region in both official documents and popular texts, colonial 
officials described rural life with great linguistic flourish, using words such as dreary, gloomy, 
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desolate, miserable, depressing, miasmatic, and umbrageous. Paul Greenough describes colonial 
accounts of the Sundarbans as involving "extravagant rhetorical effort" (Greenough 1998, 238). 
These accounts of the Sundarbans often blended imperial and scientific authority with the 
exaggerated affect of dystopian fiction. H. James Rainey, a British subject writing from Khulna,28 
published a fictionalized account in the Calcutta literary journal Mookerjee's Magazine of the 
apocalyptic end of the imaginary coastal city of Bangálah: 
"Let us imagine the last day of Bangálah,–the utter annihilation of a populous city. How 
was this over-whelming calamity brought about? Did it sink beneath the surface of the dark 
waters of the Bay, amid the convulsions of nature? That page of history which ought to 
have recorded such an appalling event, is, at least as far we are aware, a perfect blank, so 
we think we may be allowed to fill it up as we best can." (Rainey 1872, 348) 
 
Rainey continues in detailed, theatrical narration to describe the "shreaks of a hundred thousand 
frantic souls" perishing in a violent cyclonic storm surge: "Sunk underneath the Indian flood!" The 
story ultimately fizzles out in muddled speculation about the fate of the "Muhammadan" 
inhabitants of the coast at the "gates of high Heaven" who were "ill prepared indeed to face the 
Eternal" (Rainey 1872, 348). While Rainey’s environmental fable was plainly fictionalized, it 
reveals the affective qualities of colonial dystopic imaginaries. The imaginative force of these 
narratives encouraged colonial attempts to control and subdue the physical and ecological 
landscape (and to extract from it). To the extent that these imaginaries fortified such efforts to 
intervene in the landscape, which in turn resulted in greater threats to the environment and is 
																																																						
28 Rainey himself was a charismatic and infamous character, who purchased and inhabited a large zamindari 
estate near Khulna, which he called "Rainey Villa" (Rainey, 1897), for the purposes of cultivating indigo 
(Westland, 1874). In 1874, Westland, then the Magistrate of Jessore, wrote that the sub-division of Khulna 
had been originally established in 1842 with the "chief object... to hold in check Mr. Rainey, who had 
purchased a zemindari in the vicinity and resided at Nihalpur, and who did not seem inclined to 
acknowledge the restraints of the law" (Westland, 1874, pp.221-2). The antipathy between Rainey and 
colonial administrators appears to be mutual. He was among the most vociferous opponents of the transition 
away from the promotion of Sundarban land reclamation (examined further below), which he described as 
"retrograde" (Rainey, 1891, p.279), accusing the government of "neglect" for failing to recognize the role that 
Sundarban reclamation could play in the mitigation of famines (Rainey, 1874, p.332). His dystopic 
imagination of Khulna combined with these proposals of intervention suggest that Rainey may have been an 
early adopter of anticipatory ruination (examined further in Chapter 3). 
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inhabitants, they supported the production of the very future to which their anxiety was oriented.	
These imaginaries resonate powerfully with contemporary accounts of climate crisis, in particular 
the narratives I describe in Chapter 2 as "climate crisis memoir."29  
Environmental threats coalesce in these imaginaries with more general misfortunes and 
failings understood to characterize the lifestyle of rural coastal inhabitants. Thus one former 
Inspector-General of Forests wrote that "to live in a boat in the Sundarbans is charming, for you 
have the means of escape under your feet; to live on land must be horrible in the extreme" 
(Eardley-Wilmot 1910, 236). As these accounts of coastal life unfold, the reader finds that 
subsidence, cyclones, and other biophysical risks are lumped together with imaginaries of socio-
political hazards, such as the threat of Portuguese and Arakanese30 pirates and of "Jungle Fever" 
(Mukherjee 1983; Phillimore 1945; Rainey 1868; Mackay 1860). The frequency of disasters and 
imagination of environmental catastrophe seem to be inseparable from these concomitant dangers. 
Moreover, fearful and derisive reflections on the landscape are blended with aspersions on 
the moral fortitude of its inhabitants and their cultivation of it. The failure to subdue the 
catastrophic environment of the Sundarbans is attributed to the "indolent and improvident habits" 
(Hamilton 1828, 183) of its "heathen natives" (1859, 19), their "unambitious" disposition (Mundy 
1858, 283), their aversion to "even the semblance of innovation" (Hamilton 1828, 189) and to 
their possession of "neither the means nor the intelligence necessary" to improve the landscape or 
its cultivation (O'Malley 1908, 100). Thus we find that the imaginative geographies of dystopia in 
the Sundarbans are shaped as much by the orientalism of the colonizers as they are by a study of 
the biophysical dynamics of the environment itself. 
																																																						
29 This analysis also resonates with Franklin Ginn’s argument that contemporary fictional fantasies of climate 
apocalypse support the production of the Anthropocene (Ginn, 2015). 
30 In the colonial period, both the British and Bengalis consistently referred to this group, indigenous to a 
shifting region straddling what is now the border of Bangladesh and Burma, as "Mugh" (Eales, 1892, p.197). I 
avoid using the term here because it is considered to be derogatory. 
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A paradox woven throughout these imaginaries is that they fluctuate between embracing 
these dystopic qualities as threat to and opportunity for accumulation in the region. One recurring 
trope involves discussions of the fertility of the soil, including normative claims about its 
implications and virtues. On the one hand, this fertility is acclaimed for what the colonizers seem 
to regard as limitless potential for extraction. One British Conservator of Forests wrote of the 
Sundarbans that "Reproduction is most favorable... It has been put forward that reproduction all 
over the Sunderbuns is unlimited, and that cleared blocks will be covered again with forest in a 
very short time" (Schlich 1876, 9). During certain time periods, this unlimited potential was taken 
as a justification for unrestricted deforestation and resource extraction from the region. Yet at the 
same time this fertility presented a challenge to colonial administration of the land and its 
resources. One official demonstrates this paradox in remarking on the villages of the Sundarbans 
region through vivid descriptions of their "sluttish, careless, rotting abundance" (Seton-Karr 1883, 
424). Even as they praised it for its promise in greatly expanding the taxation base of the Raj, 
administrators lamented this fertility as "excessive" (Rainey 1891) "evil" (Westland 1874, 178), 
requiring careful and constant management in order to be brought under controlled cultivation. 
The proclivity of reclaimed lands to relapse rapidly into untamed jungle undercut their attempts to 
subdue expanding Sundarban estates for planned and managed cultivation of rice. 
 
Experimentation 
In response to these dystopic imaginaries, successive development regimes have devised a 
variety of technical and social experiments to transform the landscape and the communities that 
inhabit it. The uncertain threat of environmental crisis has consistently been evoked as the specter 
demanding these experiments. As one English merchant wrote, 
"Every thing and every one must be prepared to see a day when, in the midst of the horrors 
of a hurricane, they will find a terrific mass of salt water rolling in, or rising up upon them 
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with such rapidity that in a few minutes the whole settlement will be inundated to a depth 
of from five to fifteen feet! unless it be duly secured against such a calamity by efficient 
bunds, say of 20 feet high... Such a visiting may not occur for the next five years, or for the 
next twenty years; but it may occur in the coming month of October." (Piddington 1853, 
20) 
 
These "bunds," or embankments, then, have consistently been proposed as possible safeguards 
against potential future destruction. Designs for such protective infrastructure have drawn on a 
broad range of engineering technologies and scientific hypotheses about effective management, 
while questions have also consistently been raised about the suitability of these technologies to 
local conditions. Experimentation with embankments in the Sundarbans served a dual purpose: 
both to protect land from inundation, and also to exercise greater control over water and sediment, 
the movement of which caused the river channels to shift (impeding ship traffic within them). 
During the colonial period, the construction and maintenance of embankments was a 
constant preoccupation of administrators concerned with governing the Sundarbans and was 
employed for the purposes of both protection and appropriation. Beginning in 1770, the East India 
Company began building embankments in the Sundarbans for the purposes of artificially building 
up land mass through the accretion of sediment (see Figure 15) in order to expand the area under 
cultivation (Bandyopadhyay 1987; Maitra 1972).31 This work of land reclamation resulted in rapid 
deforestation and expansion of the area of settlement and cultivation. The 1908 Khulna Gazetteer 
thus stated that "the forest is being replaced by smiling rice fields" (O'Malley 1908, 2) and 
"cultivation and villages now exist where a century ago all was waste" (O'Malley 1908, 3). As 
these marshy lands were embanked and drained through protection from tidal inundation, the 
boundaries of the forested area of the Sundarbans gradually shifted southward. 
																																																						
31 The history of habitation in this region is contested, but Mukerjee asserts that land reclamation began in 
the region in the 15th century (Mukerjee, 1938, p.137), while Eaton suggests that forest clearing for the 
intensification of wetland rice agriculture began here in the 13th century under the rule of independent 
Indo-Turkish sultanates (Eaton, 1990). 
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This reclamation took place through active promotion by the government. Land settlement 
and taxation laws were written specifically for this purpose, creating incentives for bringing 
wastelands under cultivation and penalizing tenants for not bringing their entire plots under 
cultivation within fixed periods. Renting out land as Temporarily Settled Estates allowed for the 
government to extract greater rents from tenants over time, unlike lands within the area of the 
Permanent Settlement (for which revenues were fixed). For example, between 1882 and 1901, the 
land revenues of Khulna almost doubled, an increase attributed primarily to the enhanced rents 
from reclaimed land in Temporarily Settled Estates in the Sundarbans (O'Malley 1908, 149). The 
majority of these leases of uncultivated lands were granted to British subjects, owing to their 
"superior knowledge" (Das 1996, 58), as well as to high-ranking Indian mercantilists with positions 
in the Revenue Department of the Raj. 
Needless to say, these urban elites who were granted leases in the Sundarbans did not 
themselves undertake the task of land reclamation. The labor required for this work of reclamation 
was significant as well as arduous, involving manually clearing the densely forested jungle for 
planting. Administrators often sought to secure the labor of raiyats (peasant laborers) who were 
already locally employed in government salt manufacture (which did not require land reclamation 
(Westland 1874, 68). In the late 18th century, a scheme was even floated to expand the cultivated 
area of the Sundarbans through grants of wasteland to convicts (Westland 1874, 63).  
One Indian Geographer estimated in 1969 that in the preceding 200 years, about half of 
the 20,950 km2 of Sundarban forest had been prematurely reclaimed (Mukherjee 1969a, 311).32 If 
the environmental impacts of this reclamation were not well understood before it began, they 
																																																						
32 “Premature reclamation” is a contested category. While it refers to the act of constructing embankments to 
artificially trap sediment and build up land, there is no obvious boundary between this kind of intervention 
and the act of constructing an embankment around a secure piece of land to prevent erosion and 
inundation. Given the active nature of the delta, in the absence of intervention, any piece of land relatively 
proximate to a river is liable to erode away in due course. 
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quickly began to make themselves apparent. As the reclaimed area expanded (see Figure 15), the 
tidal flow was cut off (Westland 1874, 180), accompanied by a cascading series of environmental 
threats. The river channels began to silt up, meaning that alluvial sediment, without having space 
to flow onto land during tidal inundation, was instead deposited on the bed of the rivers and 
canals, which slowly became narrower and more shallow (see Figure 14) (Bandyopadhyay 1987).  
	
Figure 14. Diagram of process of river bed siltation. Source: (Fergusson 1863) 
As the channels narrowed, they became hydraulically “unfit,” meaning the water becomes so 
concentrated in the remaining space that it puts excessive stress on the embankments, which as a 
result periodically breach (Maiti, Das, and Majee 2010, 25). Meanwhile, in the absence of the 
sediment deposits that formerly built up the land within the embankments, the contained area 
gradually subsided (Das and Maiti 2010, 25; Bhattacharyya 1990).33 With the river beds rising and 
the settled land inside the embankments falling, drainage became more difficult as the high tides 
(and even sometimes the low tides) were higher than the land, resulting in water logging where 
there was insufficient space for water (either from breached embankments or rains) to drain back 
into the rivers through gravity (IOR 1915, 3). Each of these biophysical phenomenon resulting from 
																																																						
33 Subsidence is also the result of tectonic movement and sediment compaction. However, the net result of 
these physical processes was historically counteracted throughout most (though not all) of the coastal region 
by ongoing tidal sediment deposition (Nicholls et al. 2013; Wilson and Goodbred 2015)). Thus, this current 
observation of change in elevation is most appropriately described as net subsidence. 
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embankment construction continues to play an important role in the physical (and social) 
landscape of Khulna. 
	
Figure 15. Process of land reclamation. Source: (Mukherjee 1969b) 
This dynamic of using embankment technologies to artificially reclaim land in the delta 
continued during the East Pakistan period. It was entrenched through the creation of the East 
Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (EPWAPDA), an autonomous government 
agency that by the 1960s was receiving approximately 20 percent of East Pakistan's development 
resources, an estimated 15 to 20 percent of which was paid directly to foreign consultants 
(Thomas 1972a, 8). The projects of EPWAPDA to develop new water infrastructures throughout 
East Pakistan embodied the donor-driven, high-cost, technically complex infrastructure design that 
characterized post-war high modernist development planning. These programs also diverged 
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further from local water and land management regimes than ever before. One USAID consultant 
wrote in a scathing evaluation of their programs that  
"Engineers working on every one of [EP]WAPDA's projects under valued the importance of 
communicating with farmers to gain their support, organizing them for irrigated farming, 
and assisting them in learning to produce under new conditions. Too often the solution to 
agricultural problems was to go ahead with design that suited engineering requirements 
and assume that a call for more agricultural extension officers or technical assistance will 
solve the problems. [EP]WAPDA projects adequately proved that this easy formula was 
totally inadequate." (Thomas 1972a, 30) 
 
In Khulna, this inadequacy was largely manifested in the biophysical phenomena described above 
resulting from embankment engineering interventions. The failure of these programs in design and 
maintenance, as well as the inadequacy of the response to the recognition of these failures, poses 
perhaps the greatest challenge to coastal communities in Khulna today.   
The most significant of these projects undertaken by the EPWAPDA was the Coastal 
Embankment Project (CEP) (see Figure 16). The existing embankments built prior to independence 
had been rebuilt annually, allowing for seasonal inundations that facilitated the periodic deposit of 
sediments in tidal floodplains. This maintenance was supported by zamindars (large land holders), 
with the labor of the cultivators. After the collapse of the zamindari system after independence, the 
embankments deteriorated (Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968, 18). The CEP was developed not 
only to restore the embankments, but to establish an entirely new water regime in the coastal 
region.  Initial plans were developed by the International Engineering Company (IECO), a San 
Francisco-based firm that developed several major infrastructure programs for EPWAPDA through 
financing from USAID (Agency for International Development 1967), along with additional 
engineering consultants from another San-Francisco-based engineering firm, Leedshill-De Leuw 
(Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968). The latter wrote in their initial report that the project "will 
rank among the largest undertaken by Pakistan and will rank high on the list of earthmoving 
projects in the entire world" (Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968, 155). Initiated in 1961 at an 
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estimated cost of US$55 million, plans, timeframes, and costs of the project repeatedly swelled, 
such that by 1971, estimated costs had grown to US$278 million (General Accounting Office 
1971).34 In planning reports, foreign consultants repeatedly invoked the "existential" necessity of 
this undertaking to East Pakistan, suggesting that the physical existence of the province and the 
survival of its population was at stake (National Research Council 1971; United Nations Water 
Control Mission to Pakistan 1959). Yet, at the same time they also recognized the potential impact 
of the CEP on the U.S. Economy. One USAID report justified the loans to Pakistan for the CEP 
candidly, 
"The loan funds will be used for the purchase of services (and possibly a small amount of 
goods associated with these services) in the U.S. U.S. firms and experts will be employed. 
Local currency costs of contracts will be met by the GOP - thus there will be no direct 
outflow of dollars. The effects of the loan on the balance of payments initially will be 
neutral... In the long run, the loan will have a favorable effect on the balance of payments, 
because the full amount of the loan including interest will be repaid to the U.S. In dollars." 
(Agency for International Development 1967, 38) 
 
If the economic motivations of the project for the consultants (who designed and then were paid to 
manage the construction of the embankments) were clear, the impact on the coastal region and its 
inhabitants was even more dramatic. The CEP was designed to protect coastal lands from tidal 
inundation in order to expand the cropping area for increased food production. Planners estimated 
that upon completion, the approximately 2,000 miles of embankments would provide protection 
for 3.4 million acres of fertile land across four coastal districts (including 1.26 million acres in 
Khulna alone) (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1972b; Bari 1978, 18). 
The essence of the plan was to build a system of 108 polders (today there are a total of 123) across 
the coast. "Polder" is a Dutch word for a low-lying tract of land completely surrounded by a 
																																																						
34 One USAID report explicitly states that "the scope of the project was expanded in fiscal year 1962, on the 
basis of a plan prepared by a U.S. engineering firm" (General Accounting Office, 1971, 55), suggesting that 
Leedshill-De Leuw was initially hired to manage the CEP, and they quickly expanded the scope of work of 
the work they were intended to undertake. 
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protective dike; the infrastructure is intended to artificially isolate the polder from the adjacent 
hydrological system, allowing internal water levels to be controlled through mechanical pumps 
and sluice gates. New agronomic conditions within the polders would allow for the expanded 
cultivation of new high-yielding foreign rice varieties (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 1972c). By creating these larger land units and eliminating the movement of water 
through tidal streams within them, the polder system was designed to ultimately close off the 
coastal estuaries (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1972d). 
	
Figure 16. 1968 map of plans and status for CEP polders in Khulna. Source: (Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968) 
However, problems with the technical design of the polder system manifested almost 
immediately. The embankments cut off the flow of water necessary for agriculture in many parts of 
the polders, while causing water logging in other parts where they inhibited drainage (National 
Research Council 1971, 38; Saifuzzaman and Alam 2010; Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968; 
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Advisory Group on Development of Deltaic Areas 1966). In some areas, faulty designs 
exacerbated saline intrusion and siltation, as opposed to preventing them (Bari 1978). 
These problems highlighted in particular the failures of local consultation and lack of 
understanding of the complex delta environment among the foreign consultants employed in 
project design (Thomas 1972b). One researcher likened the attempt to transfer poldering 
technologies from the Netherlands to treating Bangladeshis "like guinea pigs in a laboratory" 
(Warner 2008, 142). Others highlighted the inadequate understanding of consultants in 
topography, sedimentation, and local socio-economic and agronomic conditions (Nandy 1991; 
Thomas 1972c; National Research Council 1971, 38). One report indicated the cause of these 
failures more directly, in explaining the particular inappropriateness of these highly experimental 
technical designs in Khulna's uniquely dynamic landscape,  
"there is considerable risk in an area like East Pakistan in dependence on mechanical and 
human efficiency, particularly if the decision-maker, the operator of the machinery, does 
not share the priorities and interests of those dependent on him. The hazards of creating a 
situation in which the welfare of a large number is dependent upon the precise timing and 
reliable operation of a human and mechanical system in an environment not conducive to 
this type of precise efficiency constitutes a drawback of the polder project concept." 
(Thomas 1972a, 21) 
 
As this indictment of the CEP indicates, the failures of these infrastructures were the result more of 
the experimentation in technological design than of the region's particular environmental 
challenges. Shapan Adnan has described this experimental technocratic approach as the "dryland" 
view, which is directly opposed to the "wetland" vision which characterizes the region's 
indigenous water regime (Adnan 2009). The dryland vision entails a complete rupture with 
existing agrarian water management practices, and a failure to recognize their advantages in 
relation to soil fertility, maintenance of groundwater reserves, and the natural breeding of wild fish 
populations. Instead, this view sees the traditional flooding patterns of Khulna's wetlands as a 
threat to be eradicated through central planning and landscape engineering. 
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While donors and consultants continued to pursue this approach by adapting and 
expanding the polder system as challenges arose, resistance to these new experimental designs 
quickly emerged. In the final chapter of Leedshill-De Leuw's 1968 report on the progress of the 
CEP construction, they briefly note that several local governmental bodies in Khulna requested that 
infrastructures not be built in their localities due to the problems already emerging. The engineers, 
however, demurred, explaining that "positive benefits and economic justification can be shown" 
(Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968, 296), and thus construction would continue. On several 
occasions, local farmers took resistance into their own hands by physically dismantling sections of 
the embankments to restore the flow of water (Rahman 1995; Koch 1991; Leedshill-De Leuw 
Engineers 1968; Nandy 1991).35 These events recall earlier resistance to embankments during the 
colonial period, during which administrators complained of cultivators intentionally breaching 
protective embankments in order to allow water to flow in to irrigate their fields, thus undermining 
the integrity of reclamation infrastructures (Harrison 1875, 5; Westland 1874, 121). In the late 
1980s, when development agencies proposed a dramatic expansion of major flood control 
infrastructures, building on the same technical approach as the CEP, known as the Flood Action 
Plan (FAP), civil society activism against the plan was so robust that it had to be completely 
withdrawn (Boyce 1990; Adnan et al. 1992). 
One of the most significant problems that emerged in the years following the initial 
construction of the polders in the 1960s, continuing to plague the coastal region today, has been 
the failure to plan or make provisions for their maintenance. Though this lacuna has been 
recognized repeatedly throughout this period of development planning, it remains a primary cause 
																																																						
35 Thomas cites similar problems in 1964 and 1965 with another WAPDA embankment project further north 
(the Ganges-Kobadak Project). Out of desperation for water to irrigate their rice fields, farmers cut the 
embankments to allow water to flow in from the river. On both occasions they were fired on by the police 
and several farmers died (Thomas 1972b, p.16). 
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of the most serious failures of the embankment infrastructures. The CEP was designed following 
the Dutch polder model, which relies fundamentally on considerable annual maintenance paid for 
by both the national government and local municipalities (the Dutch spend about €500 annually 
on maintenance alone for existing water control infrastructure, though this is expected to increase 
dramatically as new plans are developed to address the threat of climate change) (Dutch draw up 
drastic measures  2008; Stijnen et al. 2014). The initial plans for the CEP recognized that its 
success was contingent on the proper operation and maintenance of the polders; in lieu of making 
provisions for this maintenance, the plan indicated that it would be the responsibility of the 
farmers who were benefited by the protection (Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968). However, even 
these early reports indicated an awareness that this would not be feasible. Leedshill-De Leuw's 
1968 report on the CEP explained that "Farm sizes smaller than about five acres would not have 
the payment capacity for project costs, except by reducing the farm family living expenditure."  
With 78% of farms in Pakistan being less than 5 acres in 1960 (Bose 1972, 79), this plan to have 
individual farm households provide for the maintenance of the CEP was clearly not grounded in a 
realistic analysis of the local agrarian political economy (van Ellen 1991).  
Additional problems included the recognition that it would be necessary to pump water 
out of the polders (as opposed to allowing gravity to propel drainage through sluice gates), though 
the costs and installation of pumps were not included in project design or donor plans (National 
Research Council 1971). Recollecting problems observed in the colonial period, the failure of 
sufficient maintenance of the embankments has exacerbated problems inherent in their design, 
resulting in the weakening and breaching of embankments, siltation of internal canals, and 
intractable water logging due to insufficient drainage (Koch 1991; Soussan 2000; Swingle et al. 
1969a). Building such a massive flood control infrastructure without the plans or capacity to 
maintain it was itself a kind of experiment undertaken by consultants, donors, and the local 
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bureaucracy that relied on them. Today, Bangladesh continues to grapple with the aftermath of 
these failed landscape engineering experiments of the Pakistan period. Their legacy fundamentally 
shapes the region's vulnerability to climate change, both present and imagined. 
 
Dispossession 
These modes of experimentation in landscape engineering and land management 
ultimately facilitated extraction through the dispossession of local inhabitants. In imagining the 
dystopic present and future of the Sundarban region, the administrators of successive development 
regimes have sought to intervene in the landscape in ways that transform it to enable 
accumulation. Examining this historic pattern of intervention illuminates the longer trajectories of 
accumulation by dispossession in the delta. 
The adaptation regime exhibits a much longer historical pattern of intervention based on 
normative conceptions of the value of this landscape. In particular, questions about whether the 
Sundarban region is worth saving have been a recurrent theme in these attempts to govern the 
region. The 1875 Bengal Embankment Manual, that sought to codify the norms and laws around 
how and when to protect, reclaim, and reshape which lands, asked "The only question that can 
arise in these tracts is whether the country to be protected is worth the cost of the protective 
works" (Harrison 1875, 29). This fundamental question has beset every subsequent development 
regime in the region. Meanwhile, the sense that the land to be protected is not worth the cost of 
the protective works, or not worth the risk of the experimental proposals for protection, has 
consistently been a driver of dispossession. 
The Bengal Embankment Manual also prescribes that the benefit of embankments must be 
"large and general" (Harrison 1875, 14). The vagueness of this dictum allowed for the normative 
assessment of what constitutes a "large and general" benefit to shift over time and to be applied 
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unevenly. The shift from local toward central control of embankment infrastructures over time 
facilitated this. While this centralization can clearly be observed in the CEP and the FAP examined 
above, it had already begun in the colonial period.  
As explored above, colonial administrators repeatedly used the unique biophysical features 
of the landscape as justification for shifting land management regimes in the Sundarbans 
(O'Malley 1908, 83). This often meant unsettling claims of cultivators to self-determination in the 
use and management of their lands. The "temporarily" settled legal status of the Sundarban land 
tenures allowed the government to exert control over which lands would be reclaimed, how they 
would be taxed, and the kinds of infrastructures that could be used in protection and reclamation. 
Tenants in the Sundarbans who were subject to these laws repeatedly contested these fluctuations 
in land management policy, as demonstrated in legislative records concerning disputes over 
taxation, lease renewal, and land management (Gupta 1935).  
The administration of Sir Richard Temple, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal from 1874 to 
1877 provides an indicative case of the fluctuations in these administrative regimes. During a visit 
to the Sundarbans at the beginning of his tenure as Lieutenant Governor, Temple observed that the 
forests were home to an abundance of timber resources that were valuable for fuel for the growing 
capital of Calcutta, as well as for boat building (Temple 1882, 419). The timber was also necessary 
to the expanding rail network and, as Buckland notes, "an experiment was also being tried for 
employing the sundri timber in the manufacture of railway sleepers," (Buckland 1901, 613; Guha 
1990). This new management of timber resource extraction was at odds with the existing policy of 
essentially unmitigated deforestation in service of land reclamation and expansion of agricultural 
cultivation. In light of these observations, Temple somewhat abruptly shifted government forestry 
policy in the Sundarbans away from active land reclamation and deforestation toward the 
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controlled management of forest resources to facilitate their extraction and taxation.36 By 1904, 78 
percent of the total forested area of Khulna had been categorized as protected forest "as a means of 
ensuring a continuing supply of timber and other forest products" (Richards and Flint 1990). 
Temple’s new policy in the Sundarbans coincided with a broader transition throughout 
British India toward government-controlled forest management (Brandis and Smythies 1876), 
culminating in the Indian Forest Act of 1878. These shifts, Ramachandra Guha has observed, were 
“concerned above all with removing the existing ambiguity about the ‘absolute proprietory right of 
the state,’” and “usurpation of rights of ownership by the colonial state which had little precedent 
in precolonial history” (Guha 1990, 67, 65). The prior categorization of forested lands as “waste” 
was invoked in service of British claims on the unalienable “right of conquest” of the colonial 
government, which one British administrator described as such: “We hear a great deal about the 
rights of the people, but, as a matter of fact, the State since it assumed the administration of our 
forests, never has admitted the existence of any class of public rights to them. To do so would be 
to cease to administer them” (Amery 1876, 28). In the Sundarban estates, being outside the 
Permanent Settlement, this meant that the government could levy higher rates of rent, and impose 
new conditions on land management (such as requiring the building or maintenance of 
embankments) (Gupta 1935). By stemming the expansion of the agro-ecological frontier, this new 
forestry policy put increasing pressure on zamindars, whose profits were contingent on a gradual 
expansion of cultivation in newly reclaimed lands. As the zamindars sought to increase their rental 
earnings without expanding the area of their tenure, they exerted increased pressure on the 
cultivators, the results of which were magnified as it was passed down through the hierarchy of 
sub-infeudation (Iqbal 2010; Das 1996). As Iqbal explains, “agrarian decline occurred as a 
																																																						
36 Reclamation through large-scale grants to lands in the Sundarbans was officially discontinued in 1903 
(Iqbal, 2010, p.27). 
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consequence of the erosion of cultivators’ entitlement to ecological resources” (Iqbal 2010, 187). 
Thus, dispossession of cultivators in the Sundarbans was the result of both a shifting regime of 
forest management, as well as an agrarian class structure that had become increasingly stratified 
through the period of colonization. 
Yet, it was not Temple's object simply to expand forest conservation in Bengal. Rather, he 
imagined colonial forestry as a science of shifting geographies based on the requirements of 
accumulation at different points in time. In one of many memoirs he wrote after his term of 
service, Temple argued that  
"National benefit would arise if the people were to migrate from one centre of industry to 
another, according to need. But this would be an undertaking contrary to their disposition, 
and certainly beyond the power of any government. Though some classes are migratory, 
yet the people in the main are domestic and home-abiding. They are attached to their 
ancestral rights in land, are fond of the fields they till, and cling to the humblest of their 
homestead... If, however, the people were stirred by the colonizing impulse which moves 
hardier and sturdier races, there is still, within the bounds of India itself, a vast quantity of 
arable land awaiting the invasion of the plough... [In some places,] when enquiry is 
specially turned towards the cultivable waste, outlying lands are found, some here and 
some there, the grand total of which would be anticipated by few except statisticians or 
surveyors" (Temple 1880, 82-3). 
 
Temple goes on to describe the vast "wastelands" of relatively newly colonized British Burma that, 
in their proximity to Bengal, offered the potential for the immigration of farm labor to expand the 
cultivated land within the empire.37 Thus, even as Temple laments that moving people around to 
serve the needs of the state would be "beyond the power of any government," he nevertheless 
shaped forestry policy toward precisely that end.  The dispossession of agriculturalists in the 
Sundarbans served to expand the accumulation through the extraction and taxation of resources, 
as well as bolstering the growth of the industrial city of Calcutta through supporting the extraction 
																																																						
37 The legacy of this agricultural labor migration can be observed in the current humanitarian crisis of the 
Rohingya, a stateless minority in Burma descended from landless agricultural laborers who migrated in the 
period prior to Partition from the region that is now Bangladesh to the region that is now Burma (Bjornberg, 
2016). 
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of timber for fuel and other urban requirements. The imagined role of migration in this 
development regime shares important parallels with the imagined role of climate migration in the 
adaptation regime (explored further in Chapter 4). 
These tensions between the agricultural cultivation and forest resource extraction in the 
coastal zone were a subject of ongoing debate within colonial administrations (Richards and Flint 
1990). One particular debate concerning the formulation and application of these laws in Kolkata 
in 1915 demonstrates illustrates these debates and resistance to the dispossession they revealed. 
The reclamation and settlement of the Sundarbans had historically been realized through the 
construction of small embankments around plots of land in the tidal range, in order to protect 
fluvial accretions. The work of constructing these embankments was carried out by raiyat laborers, 
while it was supported and promoted by zamindar landlords, who were benefited by the resulting 
expansion of the size of their landholdings. As the goals of the colonial administration shifted, 
however, the government’s objectives came into conflict with those of the zamindars.  
Recognition of the risks of premature land reclamation led administrators to attempt to 
better control the construction of embankments. Whereas over a century of reclamation work had 
relied on intensive intervention that artificially re-shaped the landscape, suddenly administrators 
were concerned with understanding how the natural tidal patterns sustained the interests of the 
state and of capital. British forester EA Smythies observed that "the khals [tidal channels] are the 
natural highways for the extraction of forest produce, which is all brought out by boat, the tidal 
currents being utilized for conveying the boats in one direction or the other" (Smythies 1925, 41). 
Given this recognition of the importance of the natural flow of these waterways, it followed that 
the construction of embankments which would interfere with tidal flows should be controlled. 
Thus, in 1914 a bill was introduced to the Bengal Legislative Council proposing that all 
embankment construction should be at the discretion exclusively of the Government, and 
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impugning the "cultivators" of the Sundarbans for causing the deterioration of the tidal channels 
through the unauthorized construction of embankments and obstruction of natural drainage (IOR 
1915). The papers documenting the deliberations over this bill reveal a heated debate over state 
control of land and water management in the Sundarbans.  
Of the five-member Select Committee tasked with developing the legislation, two members 
were Indian, Hrishikesh Laha and B Chakravarti, the Secretaries of the British Indian Association 
and the Bengal Landholders' Association, respectively, both essentially organizations composed of 
and advocating for the interests of Bengali zamindars. Laha and Chakravarti objected emphatically 
to the proposed legislation, as well as to the characterization of the activities of cultivators in the 
Sundarbans which it addressed. They argued that cultivation in the Sundarbans was only possible 
through the prevention of the saltwater from coming in and also to retention of rain-water for 
irrigation purposes. These objectives were only possible, they explained, through the local and 
small-scale construction and management of embankments at the cultivator's own discretion 
(including the liberty to cut the embankments open in order to discharge excessive accumulation 
of water), allowing them to respond quickly and efficiently to dynamic changes in the tidal 
environment. The proposed legislation, they argued, would prevent the capacity of cultivators to 
do so, and would also undermine the legal rights of Sundarban residents and cultivators to the 
fluvial accretions that might emerge adjacent to their lands. At any rate, they asserted, the 
legislation was based on a "misapprehension of facts" on the part of the government about the 
natural tidal patterns of the Sundarbans and the effects of small embankments within them. 
Siltation of the canals, they explained, was not caused by these small embankments, it was only a 
naturally occurring phenomenon in these waterways which are "generally not navigable by large 
steamers." Beatson Bell, the Member in Charge of the committee, arguing in defense of the Bill, 
retorted that "it is extraordinarily difficult to define the word 'navigable,'" and "a navigable river is 
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a river which is navigable." Bell was arguing that any channel through which any kind of 
watercraft, including a simple raft, could be floated, made that channel by definition “navigable,” 
concluding “now, it is well known that rafts can float in almost every creek of the Sundarbans.” 
The crux of the disagreement is that the Indian members representing the zamindars perceived the 
value of the Sundarbans for agricultural production and settlement, and thus advocated for the 
autonomy of the cultivators, while the British members of the committee sought a shift toward the 
more active state management of all of the waterways and shipping routes.  
Throughout the recorded proceedings, Laha and Chakravarti explain and articulate their 
objections to a pattern of government interference and dispossession that the proposed Bill would 
only entrench. They appeal to historic experience in the region, including several failed 
"experiments" in water and land management on the part of the Government and a general pattern 
of "cumbrous and dilatory" government control. The British members dismiss these charges of 
dispossession with reference to an alternative understanding of the region's biophysical dynamics 
(how the land and watercourses shifted, what the effects would be of planned management, the 
appropriate role of human intervention and habitation). They do so through repeated appeals to 
scientific expertise and their interest in "proper and expedient" management measures. In the end, 
outnumbered, Laha and Chakravarti were overruled; the bill passed in 1915. 
While the legacy of these debates over embankment infrastructure continues to reverberate 
in the landscape today, the impacts of Wasteland settlement policies on land tenure have had 
perhaps an even more profound influence on the social life of the region today. Land tenure in the 
Sundarbans during the colonial period was shaped both by the particularities of policies put in 
place to support land reclamation, as well as the unique biophysical features of the landscape and 
the associated challenges of settlement. This land tenure was characterized by an extraordinary 
degree of sub-infeudation (relative to the areas settled under the Permanent Settlement outside of 
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the Sundarban tracts), with tenancies being multiply sub-divided into an extensive hierarchy of 
sub-tenures. The diagram in Figure 17 illustrates an example of this sub-infeudation. Taken from 
the Final Settlement Report off a single Sundarban estate, the diagram represents each of the 
tenancy strata and its leaseholders falling under the estate’s zamindar.  
	
Figure 17. Diagram of sub-infeudation in Phulhaita Estate in the Sundarban region. Source: (Mukerjee 1908) 
This exceptional sub-infeudation in the Phulhaita and other Sundarban estates can be 
attributed directly to government efforts to settle new lands in order to increase tax revenues 
(Hunter 1875b, 62). The "mania" among government officials to survey and sell wasteland 
tenancies took place with so little oversight that they often usurped lands that were already 
occupied (Buckland 1901, 543). Leaseholders were granted large plots in the Sundarbans under 
"exceedingly liberal" terms that were revised four times between 1784 and 1853 (Iqbal 2010, 27; 
Westland 1874). These terms stipulated that no rent would be required for periods of up to 20 
years; however, these leases would be terminated if tenants failed to bring significant portions of 
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the land under cultivation within a stipulated amount of time. Because this reclamation could only 
be undertaken though considerable expense, the tenancies were usually taken by wealthy 
absentee inhabitants of Kolkata, about half of whom were British (Hamilton 1820; Hunter 1875b, 
1875a; Sarkar 2010).38 Clearing the dense jungle to facilitate cultivation was strenuous, carried out 
by hand with machetes and axes by teams of ten to fifteen manual laborers accompanied by a 
fakir (a Sufi holy man) entrusted with their protection from tigers (Fawcus 1927, 31). This manual 
labor was necessarily undertaken annually for several years before the threat of reversion to jungle 
subsided, and one observer noted that it took five years before the soil was domesticated enough 
for the use of a plow, ten years for the harrow (Fawcus 1927, 32). 
This formidable enterprise of taming the land, as well as the natural fragmentation of large 
plots by rivers and canals, made the task of reclaiming large plots unwieldy in the expedited 
timeframes stipulated by the lease terms (Bose 1999, 43). Thus, reclaimed plots were substantially 
and increasingly subdivided at an unparalleled rate (Bose 1986, 17). This also eased the burden of 
the significant costs of reclamation on any single tenant holder (Bose 1993). This sub-infeudation 
through a network of middlemen produced what one British Settlement Officer called "the most 
amazing caricature of an ordered system of land tenure in the world" (cited in Eaton 1993, 221), 
with as many as 20 sub-tenures parceled out for a particular plot (Das 1996, 58). Land legislation 
explicitly allowed these middle-men to proliferate between the leaseholder and the cultivator 
(Field 1885; Tanigushi 1981), while the proprietors "freely exercised the power of alienation," 
meaning that landlords and middlemen could allocate leases to different tenants at will (O'Malley 
1908, 145).39  
																																																						
38 In 1871, the Commissioner of the Sundarbans reported that there were 431 such temporarily settled 
estates (Hunter, 1875a). 
39 In the 1908 Khulna Gazeteer, O’Malley describes instances of middlemen re-allocating leases to new 
tenants at a higher rate once the difficult work of reclamation and deforestation was already complete, 
although he also describes some tenants receiving certain privileged concessions in their leases that reflected 
their work to clear the jungle or build or maintain embankments (O’Malley, 1908). Iqbal speculates that 
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These historic modes of agrarian dispossession continue to impact rural life in this region 
today, contributing to the region's acute inequality of land tenure and high rates of landlessness. 
This inequality refracted through the failures of post-colonial land reform and new modes of 
market integration have resulted in structural continuities that sustain patterns of dispossession, 
appropriation, and unequal agrarian class structure (Adnan 1999; Boyce 1987).  
Throughout the subsequent history of the region, these continuities can be traced through 
foreign aid relations development interventions. In an indictment of the CEP and other projects 
implemented through WAPDA, one USAID consultant wrote “the record of these large projects 
supports the conclusion that the rural people are not their primary beneficiaries” (Thomas 1972c, 
7). His reflection confirms the notion that even as development regimes changed in the delta, the 
pattern of dispossession continued to play an important role in shaping the landscape and the 
communities that inhabit it. This is further demonstrated through the expression of interest in 
developing shrimp aquaculture in early documents related to the CEP and related development 
interventions. While it is commonly thought that the promotion of shrimp began in the 1980s 
under structural adjustment programs (Adnan 2013; Paprocki and Cons 2014), earlier 
development planning documents suggest that these aspirations existed from the very inception of 
the CEP. The stated goal of the CEP was to keep saltwater out of the polder; yet, Leedshill-De 
Leuw’s 1968 report repeatedly mentions the potential for shrimp cultivation within the polders by 
using their sluice gates to bring water in, and the embankments to prevent the water from leaving 
(Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers 1968). This potential for facilitating saline water intrusion to 
promote shrimp aquaculture was echoed by World Bank reports in 1970 and 1972 (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1972a, 1970), and pursued directly in 1969 through a 
																																																						
these differences in tenancy provisions were most likely the result of later arrivals receiving less privileges as 
land became more scarce and population (and availability of labor) increased (Iqbal, 2010). 
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USAID-supported project undertaken by researchers from Auburn University in Alabama (Swingle 
et al. 1969a). 
In a keynote lecture given at a workshop on Integrated Flood Management in Dhaka in 2014, 
Ainun Nishat, one of Bangladesh’s leading experts in water management and climate change 
adaptation, drew direct links between donor visions for expanded shrimp aquaculture and 
inappropriate water management technologies. Weaving between English and Bengali to a room 
primarily full of Bangladeshi water engineers, Nishat admonished development professionals who 
promote particular interventions without a full understanding of their relationship with the local 
physical geography. Another workshop on “Revitalizing the Ganges Coastal Zone” had taken 
place the immediate three days prior examining similar topics, but organized by the CGIAR 
research consortium and attended by a far greater proportion of foreigners, who gave presentations 
about research they had conducted and interventions they were promoting in water management 
and production systems in Bangladesh. In this speech the following day, Nishat reproached the 
experts in attendance at this prior conference for failing to understand the specificity of 
Bangladesh’s coastal landscape and for seeking to apply foreign expertise to local problems. “They 
don’t have a clue about what is the the coastal zone of Bangladesh!” he protested, saying that they 
had embraced an approach based on non-tidal hydraulics, totally unsuited to local conditions. He 
said that foreigners don’t understand that Bangladesh has three different kinds of cropping seasons, 
and that this is important to understanding the different kinds of water management techniques 
suited to each of these distinct seasons. “Bangladesh is different from Malaysia!” he said, obliquely 
referencing the findings garnered by many CGIAR experts in South East Asia that are frequently 
applied to Bangladesh.40 The CGIAR consortium, he said, “had a huge conference, they paid lots 
																																																						
40 WorldFish, for example, is headquartered in Malaysia, while IRRI, the International Rice Research Institute 
is based in the Philippines. 
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of money for lots of studies, but their approach is all wrong. They want to keep the water there for 
shrimp.” However, the conflicts between shrimp and rice were only increasing, he explained, and 
effectively addressing the water management challenges facing the southwestern region would 
require addressing these conflicts directly. Not doing so would only result in further dispossession. 
As development agencies have consistently described shrimp aquaculture as beneficial, or at 
least benign and inevitable, they have actively ignored indications to the contrary. An evaluation 
conducted in 1996 of Dutch development programs in Bangladesh since Independence highlights 
this. The evaluation examined the Delta Development Project, a development program carried out 
in Polder 22 between 1976 and 1992 with the objective of “integrated development of land, water 
and human resources” (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996, 142). Under the direction of 
a collective of young, idealistic activists who had been hired as consultants, the DDP worked 
closely with Nijera Kori to catalyze the successful organization and empowerment of landless 
peasant groups in the Polder. The program facilitated access to common lands by landless 
agricultural collectives around the edge of the entire island, and in turn these collectives took 
responsibility for routine embankment maintenance. However, the report indicates that the Dutch 
aid agency decided to discontinue the project in the late 1980s because it was at odds with the 
rapid expansion and “severe pressure” toward transition to shrimp cultivation in surrounding 
polders (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996, 142). This recognition and failure to address 
the role of shrimp in agrarian dispossession in Khulna must be understood in the context of the 
much longer history of intervention in this region examined in this chapter. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, human intervention in the Sundarbans region has shaped the 
area that is now Southwestern Bangladesh, and the social structures of the communities that 
inhabit it, in profound and enduring ways. Any systemic understanding of the vulnerability of this 
region to climate change cannot fail to take into account how these historical patterns have 
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shaped Khulna’s geography today. Instead of thinking about these dynamics in isolation, we would 
be best served to interrogate them dynamically, and thus to understand how climate vulnerability 
itself has been historically produced.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THREATENING DYSTOPIAS: DEVELOPMENT AND ADAPTATION REGIMES 
 
On the sidelines of the 2015 United Nations Climate Conference in Paris, while delegates 
of the UN’s member states were reaching a global agreement on reducing and responding to 
climate change, representatives of the world’s leading development agencies were meeting nearby 
at the Development & Climate Days workshop. The goal of the workshop was to discuss strategies 
to “seize the opportunities presented by climate-compatible development.” Through lectures, 
panels, role-playing games and other interactive sessions, participants discussed with an almost 
breathless enthusiasm the opportunities offered by climate change for realizing a particular vision 
of development. This vision, organizers explained, would entail “tough talk” on the transitions in 
energy, land use and human habitation that they described as “crucial” and “necessary.” While 
speakers saw these transitions as imperative due to the effects of climate change, they also saw 
them as “opportunities.” The excitement surrounding these opportunities was illuminated by 
colorful neon stage lights bouncing off the historic wooden beams of the handsomely renovated 
event space. 
Throughout the two-day workshop involving eighteen plenary and breakout sessions, 
speakers implored the over 200 participants, primarily policymakers, scientists, and development 
practitioners, to “speak the language of business.” Business, we were told, is a natural ally of 
development and climate change adaptation. “Do you accept that in the long term, development 
is about deep structural transformation of economies?” the leader of one major aid agency 
boomed animatedly into his microphone during one plenary session. Nearly everyone in the room 
raised their hands in agreement. He went on, 
We need to talk about development and climate change together… Development needs to 
be at the center of the conversation about climate change… If we go ahead 30 years down 
the road, if we’re looking at a village today, maybe no one in that village will live there 
  80 
anymore, and they’ll all be working in a garment factory down the road. So our job [as 
development practitioners] is to help manage that structural transformation for the benefit 
of the people who live in those villages. 
 
The crowd was energized. The speaker had crystallized the vision for the future of the gathered 
development agencies, one articulated repeatedly through their discourse and activities 
concerning climate change adaptation. The specter of climate-induced ecological crisis was 
translated by the speaker into possibilities for industrial growth and export-led economic 
development (along with the demographic shifts which will accompany them). 
As I watched from the back of the room, having just arrived in Paris after two years of 
fieldwork in Bangladesh, I was struck by how this vision of rural futures mirrored the narratives I 
heard repeatedly from development practitioners in Dhaka, Bangladesh’s capital. It seemed that 
the village in this man’s parable might easily be one of the villages where I had worked for several 
years in southwestern Bangladesh, in the district of Khulna. His narrative of rural decline, as well 
as his normative vision of the need for? urban development alternatives, aligned closely with the 
ways that development practitioners and policy makers in Bangladesh discuss the future of these 
villages and their inhabitants. In this coastal region of Khulna, a complex of ecological and 
political-economic shifts threatens rural livelihoods and even the existence of rural populations 
and the landscapes they inhabit. In what follows, I argue that the convergence of Bangladesh’s 
contemporary development regime with new discourses and practices of climate change 
adaptation is not only transforming Bangladesh’s coastal geography, but it is also shaping it as a 
laboratory for such development throughout the rest of the world. 
This chapter examines the emergence of the adaptation regime as a mode of governing 
both people and landscapes in Khulna. This governance is contingent on new imaginaries of a 
certain and devastating future under climate change, and a discourse about the inevitability of this 
future both globally and in Bangladesh in particular. In response to the belief in this future, many 
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development agencies have begun to propose dramatic (even previously unthinkable) social and 
spatial re-organizations of the rural coastal zone of Bangladesh, a dynamic that I refer to as 
“anticipatory ruination, and which I explore further in Chapter 3. Although the vision of these 
agencies is predicated on many of the same assumptions and goals that have characterized the 
development project (McMichael 2004) since the 1950s (Hart 2001; McMichael 2008; Watts 
2008), the discourse of climate change makes them different in their appeals to urgency, 
inevitability, and appeals to scientific authority. Through the adaptation regime, the dispossession 
of rural communities and growth of an urban industrial economy come to be seen as both 
inexorable and propitious futures. 
 
Who is the Adaptation Regime? Where is the Adaptation Regime? 
Who are the actors who build, shape, participate in the adaptation regime? What are their 
interests? What do the everyday practices of this work look like? What kinds of fissures exist in 
their narratives and approaches? The greatest challenge in studying the rise of a social construct 
like the adaptation regime is in attempting to answer such questions in the context of great 
diversity and thus to understand how power operates in this context without reify it. The 
adaptation regime is not unified or coherent; it is not a "thing." Yet it does involve systems of 
practices and ideas that must be understood collectively.  
The adaptation regime is illuminated through both the "common sense" and "counter-
discourse" of the actors who operate within it (Wolford 2010; Abu-Lughod 2000). My 
ethnographic practice among these actors involved a variety of both formal and informal 
exchanges, from observing their public dialogues at large conferences, to private conversations in 
their offices, chats over lunch or tea, on boats and in cars in Dhaka's infamous traffic jams. 
Amongst these different settings, it became clear that these diverse actors variously advanced, 
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consented to, and challenged public narratives of their own agencies and the broader regime of 
which they were part. While I would frequently hear them clearly articulate a dominant discourse 
of adaptation imperatives, these actors (more often in private) would also cite discrepancies, or 
acknowledge their own reservations when I myself questioned them. It is through such 
contestations and conjunctures that hegemony itself is actually produced (Goldman 2005, 24).  
For actors within development agencies, this often meant an explicit or implicit 
acknowledgment of the silences their work engendered. While there was broad commitment to 
the idea of the need for action related to climate change, these actors often acknowledged to me 
that their interventions would be the same regardless of climate imperatives. It also meant 
recognition of the normative work done to frame both narratives and interventions. They were also 
often aware of the politics that they felt they necessarily ignored. For example, I regularly asked 
questions of staff at large aid agencies about land politics, and their programs' disregard of them in 
imagining climate change adaptation. I found that they frequently agreed with me that addressing 
land inequality could have a significant impact on the vulnerability of coastal inhabitants, but they 
explained that doing so would be "messy," would take more time than they had within their 
program cycles, and was generally beyond the scope of what they felt they could accomplish. One 
donor from DFID, responding to my question about concerns with land grabbing and related water 
management conflicts, explained “dealing with all that social stuff is very complicated, time 
consuming, and does not consume a lot of money. But if you’ve got a lot of money to spend, 
infrastructure is the way to do it.” The implication here is that investing in projects like 
embankments, which are considered less politically contentious, are less complicated for donors, 
and in facilitating large capital expenditures, allow them to demonstrate significant impacts of their 
work. Yet, this donor also recognized the implications of these gaps to their programming, later 
explaining to me “We could do better in understanding the political economy and governance 
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issues before we launch into proposing solutions.” My questions about development agencies' 
support of shrimp aquaculture were frequently met with similar agreement. While USAID is one of 
the major supporters of the expansion of shrimp aquaculture in Bangladesh, I heard reports from 
several staff there about contentious debate within the agency itself about whether they should 
support it, citing negative social and environmental impacts. 
Similar contestation exists among local Bangladeshi actors who participate in the 
adaptation regime. Government bureaucrats and local staff of NGOs would frequently explain to 
me that a particular narrative or approach was necessary for the sake of the Bangladeshi nation, 
which needs the funding that is made available through bi- and multi-lateral climate change funds. 
Sometimes they would legitimize certain actions by explaining that it was the donors who made 
the decisions about the kinds of development activities to pursue and promote. With shrimp 
farming in particular, personal experiences and entanglements often shaped their opinions about 
aquaculture or its use as a climate change adaptation strategy. Given the investments in 
aquaculture among urban elites, I met many actors who had (or had family members with) 
personal financial interests in the promotion of shrimp aquaculture; at the same time, several such 
people now living in Dhaka grew up in villages in Khulna and expressed conflicted feelings about 
the changes they had observed in the landscape through the transition from rice to shrimp. Thus, 
even as I deploy categories such as development practitioners, government bureaucrats and 
scientists, I am conscious of their own recognition of the incoherence of their narratives along with 
their responsibility to advance them.  
While there is significant diversity within these categories of actors participating in the 
adaptation regime, the categories of “local” and “international” are equally incoherent. Neither do 
these categories map clearly onto the interests or motivations of various actors. Both Bangladeshis 
and foreigners participate in the adaptation regime. Yet the experience of most of these actors is 
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profoundly transnational, shaped by often decades of experience working and negotiating with a 
variety of international actors, both in Dhaka and abroad. Even as claims to local knowledge and 
perspectives are based on true experiences, the experience of being a Bangladeshi is not unitary, 
and is itself shaped by class, gender, livelihood, and a variety of other socio-cultural factors. The 
ideas of these actors about possible or desirable futures under climate change are profoundly 
shaped by these transnational circuits of knowledge and capital. Thus, even as we examine the 
particular historic and geographic specificity of the adaptation regime in Bangladesh, we must 
necessarily understand it as a node in an international political economy of development that is 
always and already shaped by global actors and processes. 
 
Imagination 
The role of Bangladesh in understanding the impacts of and adaptation to climate change 
and, conversely, the role of climate change discourse in understanding Bangladesh's development 
landscape today, are equally important dynamics in the adaptation regime. In interviews I 
conducted as well as public events in Dhaka, development practitioners and government officials 
alike asserted the inseparability of climate change from any possible imagination of Bangladesh's 
future. Every conversation about Bangladesh's development over the next decade to the next 
century thus must reflect on and respond to the possibility of climate crisis, a continuously asserted 
existential risk. The notion of this inseparability is an important tenet of the adaptation regime, and 
is what makes Bangladesh the ideal site for its establishment.  
At a public seminar in Dhaka in January 2015, the Secretary of Bangladesh's Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, the primary ministry tasked with managing climate change adaptation 
efforts, appealed to the audience of adaptation experts (practitioners and academics) to recognize 
the importance of Bangladesh in this global adaptation landscape. "This is the ground zero of 
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vulnerability," he proclaimed, it is "disaster's homeland... We are living testimony of what is 
happening due to climate change.” The Secretary's concern with framing this relationship 
indicates the importance of establishing Bangladesh both epistemically and ontologically in this 
global regime. The international finance and support of adaptation programming in Bangladesh is 
contingent on the ideological consensus concerning its vulnerability. It is this sense of crisis that 
creates opportunities for new frontiers of development and accumulation (Swyndgedouw 2013). 
This recognition of Bangladesh as “disaster’s homeland” both facilitates the acquisition of 
resources for and catalyzes the transformation of rural spaces into laboratories of adaptation.  
 
 Memoirs of ‘The End of the World’ 
Much of the work of the adaptation regime, then, involves imagining what the future will 
look like, and that often has a dystopian quality (Swyndgedouw 2010). Khulna is the perfect place 
to carry out this work of imagination because many researchers and development practitioners 
already regard it as a sort of dystopia. "Munshiganj is the end of the world," said an American 
consultant hired by USAID to lead their flagship adaptation program in the Southwest, known as 
“CREL” (for “Climate-Resilient Ecosystems and Livelihoods”). I had just returned to Dhaka from a 
visit to the union of Munshiganj, home to several of CREL’s "model villages." I interpreted this as a 
comment on the remoteness of this area. Munshiganj is the southernmost union of Khulna 
Division, considered widely to be the most vulnerable region of the world's most vulnerable 
country. The Southwest is cut off from Dhaka and the rest of Bangladesh by the Padma river; 
traveling there takes the better part of a day, involving a variety of different modes of 
transportation. Munshiganj in particular is where the road ends, bordered to the south by the 
Sundarban mangrove forest and to the west by India.   
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However, besides conveying remoteness, this statement reflects a deeper anxiety often 
expressed about the uncertain, risky, and dystopian future of the southwest. This anxiety is often 
marked by the imaginative geographies that Farbotko has characterized as “wishful sinking” 
(Farbotko 2010b). That much of this landscape is already experiencing an ecological crisis 
facilitates a vision of Khulna as climate dystopia, and the sense that it may even already be upon 
us. Climate change experts facilitate the imbrication of this region in the adaptation regime by 
circulating time-lapse maps of its coastline being inundated by sea level rise; these are among 
perhaps the most widely disseminated images of the country globally. Visiting researchers and 
consultants make day-long field visits to see settlements precariously perched on embankments 
(See Figure 18 and Figure 20). They accompany their accounts of these visits with photographs of 
erosion and post-cyclone cleanup efforts. These narratives offer a prophetic slippage between the 
present and future tenses of this climate dystopia, auguring the climate crisis that will come, or that 
may have already arrived. The imagination of Bangladesh’s dystopic future has become “common 
sense”41 (Gramsci 1971), by drawing on this imagery of the coastal region today. Yet, this 
ambiguity about Khulna’s present and future dystopias allows for a spurious insinuation: that the 
challenges faced by coastal communities today are the direct result of climate change.  
The texts produced by these field visits are semiotically rich, and both shape and are 
shaped by the way the region is understood in relation to climate change. One donor quipped to 
me that "there is not a single document in this country that does not start with 'Bangladesh is the 
most vulnerable country in the world to climate change.'"42 His comment reflected not only the 
awareness of this sense of vulnerability, but also awareness of its hyper-proliferation. In addition to 
																																																						
41 By “common sense,” Gramsci refers to the practices of cultural hegemony through which the political and 
ideological status quo is perpetuated. 
42 On the performance of vulnerability in service of climate change adaptation, see Farbotko 2010a; 
Haalboom and Natcher 2012; Webber 2013. 
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the vast body of grey literature, visiting interns, journalists, consultants and others working in the 
adaptation industry produce a body of literature we might call climate crisis memoir, which 
appears in blogs, NGO websites, local and international English language press, and 
undergraduate and graduate theses.43 In these memoirs, authors recount stories of desperate 
people whose homes they have visited, and who have most likely been displaced by some event 
that the author links to climate change. Stark photographs depict signs of ecological change, such 
as erosion, cracked earth, barren landscapes, absent explanations of local political ecologies or 
broader context.  
	
Figure 18. A Reuters file photo published with a story on climate change in Bangladesh, depicting riverbank erosion. 
Source: (Islam 2016) 
Among the more evocative climate crisis memoirs produced about Bangladesh can be 
found in two episodes of an Emmy-award winning television show called Years of Living 
Dangerously. In the show, celebrity hosts travel around the world looking at the impacts of climate 
change and the scientists who are confronting it. At the end of the first season, Michael C. Hall, 
star of the popular television show Dexter travels to Bangladesh, visiting slums in Dhaka as well as 
																																																						
43 E.g. Oxfam 2010; Mifflin 2013; Voysey 2015; Derrington 2015; Kroodsma 2015. 
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villages in Khulna, talking with some of the country’s foremost leaders in climate change and 
adaptation planning. Through these experiences, he explores climate change as a driver of a series 
of demographic, economic, and ecological concerns. He starts the first episode by giving us a tour 
of the Dexter film set, while he explains in a voice over: 
“Inside the air conditioned, air brushed world of Hollywood, climate change isn’t 
something you have to think about too much, unless you really want to. But I know I am 
living in a bubble, and I know there are places outside my bubble where climate change is 
impossible to ignore. At the top of that list is Bangladesh, where I’ve heard that climate 
change is a matter of life and death.”  
 
After spending a couple days in Dhaka, he heads for Khulna, describing Southern Bangladesh as 
“the front line in this country’s battle against climate change.” Traveling around Khulna by boat 
and seaplane, with ominous orchestral music in the background, he tells us “I’ve heard people call 
Bangladesh a land of rivers. But that didn’t prepare me for what I’m seeing. There’s water. 
Everywhere.” He is particularly intent on learning about climate migration, which we are told is 
causing Dhaka’s growing slums to swell. He has a handful of conversations with people who have 
been displaced within rural communities, asking them questions about how cyclones and climate 
change have impacted their lives, and whether they think they’ll be able to stay in Khulna. After 
visiting a family whose home had been severely damaged by river erosion and cyclonic winds, he 
reflects that “while these people may not want to leave, soon they may not have a choice… Seeing 
these remnants of people’s homes makes it hard to grasp why they try to stay. Especially because 
all of this will eventually be under water.”  
Hall’s interviews are punctuated by foreboding depictions of the deltaic landscape, 
implying links between what we’re observing in the video images and climate change itself. At 
one point we are following behind him on a ferry, watching him look unnerved as he brushes his 
teeth, staring out at the river, while he tells us in a voice over,  
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“As I make my way through Southern Bangladesh, what I’m seeing is hard to take in. Half-
submerged trees. Houses built on stilts to keep them above the rising water. There’s 
something apocalyptic and other-worldly about it all.”  
 
	
Figure 19. Michael C Hall in Khulna. Still from the television show Years of Living Dangerously 
 
One might respond that the trees of Hall’s dystopia are mangroves (half-submerged by their very 
nature), and building houses on stilts is a common feature of the region’s vernacular architecture 
(Rashid and Ara 2015). These concerns would seem to be beside the point. Rather, Hall’s 
depictions present us with a rich imagination of a dystopic future that the people of Khulna are 
already experiencing in the present. Their context beyond global climate change is immaterial to 
the narrative. The larger stakes of these threats become more apparent when he later interviews 
the then-US ambassador to Bangladesh, Dan Mozena, with whom he discusses the serious security 
threats posed by the climate refugees who will (and, in this frame, already are) pouring out of this 
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region. We hear that “Southeast Asia [sic]44 is already a politically volatile region. To understand 
how climate change could create even more conflict, just look at a map.” Ambassador Mozena 
tells Hall that “A failed Bangladesh, a Bangladesh that has not adapted to the impact of climate 
change, a Bangladesh that implodes – that’s a tremendous security risk to the region, and to us.” 
Then the screen cuts abruptly to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman interviewing 
Barack Obama about how the impacts of climate change in “poorer countries” are one of the 
greatest security threats facing the United States. The narrative arc of Hall’s climate crisis memoir 
thus comes full circle in rendering America itself as the subject of these threats of climate change.  
In another memoir, entitled “The Unfolding Tragedy of Climate Change in Bangladesh,” 
published as a blog on the Scientific American website, Robert Glennon, a University of Arizona 
law professor, writes, 
“In some places, the impact of climate change is obvious. In others, scientists predict that 
climate change will occur based on elaborate computer models. In Bangladesh, it is 
already happening at a scale that involves unprecedented human tragedy. I witnessed this 
in December 2016, when I visited Bangladesh to give some talks at the University of 
Chittagong. 
 
“December 9, 2016. ‘How do they survive?’ I kept wondering as I walked the alleys of Old 
Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, a country with a population of 164 million on a 
landmass the size of New York State. People seem to be everywhere in Dhaka, in a 
churning frenzy of rickshaws, CNGs (Compressed Natural Gas Vehicles), taxis, buses, 
horse-drawn carriages and people—16 million and rapidly growing. The newest arrivals, 
mostly climate change refugees, end up in decrepit slums. 
 
“December 18, 2016. ‘What will the sea do next,’ I thought when I visited the remote 
village of Premasia, Bangladesh, at the junction of the Sangu River and the Bay of Bengal, 
south of Chittagong. The schoolchildren greeted us with spontaneous joyfulness, full of 
hope, despite the visible aftermath of Cyclone Roanu, which struck in May 2016, washing 
away homes and permanently ruining croplands from salt deposits. Their three-story 
concrete school, raised on stilts, served as a cyclone shelter during the storm. Isolated palm 
trees, now surrounded by water and beach, are haunting reminders that here once stood 
someone’s home. Rising sea levels are turning land into sea bottom, driving some people 
farther inland. Others rebuild repeatedly, just as Sisyphus kept pushing the rock up the 
hill.” (Glennon 2017) 
 
																																																						
44 Bangladesh is located in South Asia. 
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Glennon’s account of his visit to Bangladesh reflects a particular common literary device in these 
texts, in which the memoirist recounts their own speculative apprehension about the survival of 
the communities they have visited. This speculation reflects both a disquiet about the present 
living conditions of the community, as well as anticipation of crisis in an uncertain future. 
Other memoirs highlight these anxieties about the coastal landscape alongside descriptions 
of the lives of the people who inhabit it. A sense that the people of the Southwest are merely being 
"kept alive," in the words of one donor, pervades conversations about the development of the 
region. "These people are doomed," their lives are "shit," in the words of others. "You get this grim 
feeling that they have no future," explained one researcher to me, about her visit to Khulna, "you 
just think 'you guys are fucked.'" These comments convey a sense not only of future threats, also 
the notion that Khulna is already a kind of dystopia. What they elide is the assumptions about 
what exactly it is that makes the lives of Khulna’s inhabitants so "shitty" (a word I heard repeatedly 
in this context throughout my fieldwork). While the threat of rising waters is usually at the forefront 
of these kinds of reflections, they often blend into more nuanced descriptions of the experts' own 
imaginations of the challenges of rural livelihoods – that it is not only climate change, but the 
difficulties of the agrarian livelihood in Bangladesh generally that make these people’s lives 
miserable. The "backbreaking" work, in the words of one official from the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), of being a farmer in the remote, hot and crowded swamp that 
these people call home is a cause of great concern for many development practitioners and other 
visitors. Their comments articulate a broader assumption that climate change adaptation experts 
working in Bangladesh express repeatedly. That is, that the objects of their adaptation programs 
are people who have no hope, and are living on the brink. They are people who are in need of 
alternative pathways out of their current lives and livelihood conditions, and that these are 
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pathways that development agencies are uniquely positioned to provide. The realities of climate 
change are in many ways incidental to this imagination of desperation and need for development. 
Fundamental to these perceptions of agricultural livelihoods is a linked assumption that 
farmers do not want to continue being farmers, and that climate change adaptation therefore offers 
them an opportunity to move out of agrarian livelihoods. At a public lecture entitled “Addressing 
the Climate Challenge in Asia: Role of Finance ++,” Dr. Bindu Lohani, the Asian Development 
Bank’s (ADB) Vice President for Knowledge Management and Sustainable Development addressed 
this directly in response to how the ADB thinks about population and land issues. He said, “Who 
is going to do farming? The sons of farmers don’t want to do it. They have the same aspirations as 
you and I! Agriculture will have to be looked at totally differently. In the future, we’ll look at the 
farmers instead as the CEO of the farm.” Indeed, Lohani’s assumption that farmers have the same 
aspirations as a room full of donors and development practitioners is foundational to the 
discourses of the adaptation regime. Testimonies from farmers in Khulna examined in Chapters 5 
and 6 controvert these assumptions, indicating continued aspirations to agricultural livelihoods. 
These memoirs construct climate misery as an object of development, serving to justify 
development interventions in the name of adaptation. They operate as memoirs not only in the 
sense of biography, but also in the sense that they memorialize an anticipated loss of life, an 
anticipation which is an artifact of their own design. The memoirist becomes the subject of the 
narrative, with the residents of the coastal region serving as their object. What is most troubling 
about the narratives is their incongruence with the stories of the residents themselves about the 
complex historical and contemporary dynamics shaping their communities. Climate crisis 
narratives often suggest, either directly or obliquely, that residents don’t understand the changes 
re-shaping their landscapes. One memoirist wrote, “climate change is the buzzword of the 
decade, and yet the very people who live on the coasts of Bangladesh, directly impacted by global 
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warming, rarely understand the term” (Khanom 2016). On the contrary, my own ethnographic 
research suggests that not only can most residents of these communities supply a clear scientific 
description of climate change and its global geopolitics, but they can also offer a detailed, 
nuanced perspective on its articulation alongside a range of other dynamics shaping the region’s 
pasts, presents, and futures. 
	
Figure 20. Photo of riverbank erosion in Bangladesh. Source: (Braasch 2005) 
	
Defining Climate Hotspots 
Adaptation regimes define the geographic scope of projects, mapping which interventions 
are possible or desirable where. Extensive reference to and analysis of climate "hotspots" infuses 
discussions of the areas that should be prioritized for research and intervention. In Bangladesh, the 
southwest is universally identified as a hotspot, owing to its vulnerable location in the delta as well 
as on the coast (BRAC 2013; RMMRU and SCMR 2013; CDMP II 2014; de Heer 2014; COAST 
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2015). Sometimes the identification of a hotspot is based on “expert opinion,” meaning that if 
development practitioners involved in adaptation interventions say that a place is a hotspot, then 
that makes it a hotspot (Kabir, Jahan, and Chowdhury 2015). Identification of which areas are 
more “hotspot” than others can also involve complex methodologies, sometimes employing 
advanced mathematical equations, producing detailed rankings and maps. One researcher, 
presenting findings from one such study, explained in June 2015 that "Deltas are hotspot. But 
within the delta, some areas are much more hotspot.” Determining factors are primarily physical, 
reflecting vulnerabilities to salinity, erosion, storm surge, and fluvio-tidal flooding, which are 
considered static ecological conditions.  
Yet, "adaptive capacity," a category intended to reflect social dynamics, is also often 
considered a factor in determining hotspots. In the “hotspot” study mentioned above, the indicator 
of “adaptive capacity” was road density, which the researcher explained could be considered a 
proxy for market access. Khulna’s remote but relatively dense road network has expanded over the 
past several decades along with the rise of shrimp aquaculture. Community members say that 
expansion of the road infrastructure is linked with the shrimp industry, because shrimp requires 
relatively quick transport to processing facilities to prevent spoilage (Salam, Ross, and Beveridge 
2003).45 Thus, if Khulna’s road density can be understood to correlate at least in part with its 
expanded shrimp industry, then its “adaptive capacity” is also closely linked with its shrimp 
industry. In this sense, Khulna’s hotspot status is rooted not only in its coastal geography, 
vulnerable to saline intrusion and cyclonic storm surges, but also due to its growing integration 
into the national export economy through the production, processing, and transport of shrimp. 
Khulna’s perpetual hotspot status thus reflects the epistemic and normative dimensions of defining 
																																																						
45 As a point of comparison, the roads in Polder 22 (where they have never cultivated shrimp commercially) 
are unpaved, whereas the roads in every surrounding polder, where shrimp cultivation is ongoing, do have 
paved roads. 
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climate hotspots. Khulna is a hotspot not only due to its current and projected geophysical 
characteristics, but also due to the imagined expansion of capitalism throughout its rural coastline. 
 
Experimentation 
"Bangladesh is the experiment for the future of the world." – Senior administrator at a major rural 
development agency in Dhaka, 2 April 2014 
 
Much of the enthusiasm among adaptation experts in Bangladesh is centered on the 
successful transformation of the coastal zone into a "laboratory" in which innumerable 
experiments can be carried out to test what adaptation to climate change might look like (cf. 
Knorr-Cetina 1992; Tilley 2011; Hennessy 2013). One expert explained that Bangladesh is "the 
place where the rest of the world comes to learn how to tackle climate change." Consultants, 
planners, and researchers celebrate the development of Bangladesh as a landscape of "innovation," 
where the very fact of destruction creates opportunities for experimentation with new ideas and 
technologies. As the idea of Bangladesh as "adaptation laboratory" is developed and celebrated by 
foreign and Bangladeshi adaptation experts alike, it becomes clear that this success has less to do 
with the promise of any particular intervention or set of interventions, than it does with forging a 
landscape of experimentation. These interventions are thus considered successful as experiments 
even when they participate in the production of crisis.  
To catalogue potential adaptation experiments, NGOs and research organizations have 
begun to compile “inventories” and “checklists” that list a wide range of technical interventions 
that they have identified as possible responses to climate change, available for replication in 
climate-vulnerable communities around the world.46 Inventories are documented in reports and 
spreadsheets which are circulated among various agencies and presented in seminars in Dhaka. 
																																																						
46 See also Bassett and Fogelman (2013). 
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Some examples include an (unpublished) Adaptation Technologies Matrix developed by the Asia 
Pacific Adaptation Network, a table of “Adaptation Measures” published in the USAID report, 
“Adapting to Coastal Climate Change” (USAID 2009), and a Climate Change Adaptation Inventory 
developed by the “DEltas, vulnerability and Climate Change: Migration and Adaptation” 
(DECCMA) project, a consortium of researchers from Bangladesh, India, Ghana, and the UK. The 
latter, among the most robust iterations of such inventories, contains 122 “documented examples 
of observed adaptation” from Bangladesh, India, and Ghana, including “any choices or 
adjustments to climate variability and change. These adjustments may be in response to, or in 
anticipation of, real or perceived climate stressors” (Tompkins et al. 2017, 5). At a “Dissemination 
Workshop” for this inventory in Dhaka in 2015, researchers explained that they had identified 
possible adaptation options for the inventory using keyword searches for both academic and grey 
literature in Google, Google Scholar, Academia.edu, and other academic databases. In this way, 
potential adaptation strategies come to be understood tautologically as any actions that someone 
has already called adaptation strategies. At the workshop, researchers noted that they had 
confronted an analysis problem that some adaptation options are considered successful by some 
but unsuccessful by others. All adaptation options made their way into the inventory, regardless of 
this interpretive analysis. What the inventory also misses are any ways that people navigate their 
changing environment that are not referred to as adaptation strategies. 
In an exemplary demonstration of such inventories, the NGO WorldFish created a 
“Climate Smart House” for a single family in one coastal village (see Figure 21). Raised up on 
concrete stilts, the Smart House is stocked with technical fixes to match every climate-induced 
problem WorldFish could imagine, from the “sanitary” latrine on the roof to the rain-fed fish tank 
underneath (Hossain, Nurun Nabi, and Kaminksi 2015). When I visited the Climate Smart House, 
its residents generously gave me a tour of its many features, most of which were in various stages 
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of disrepair. One WorldFish staff member a colleague and I interviewed in Dhaka in December 
2014 noted, however, that “it’s not for community replication, it’s for the donors,” continuing that 
it exists now principally “for the website.” I interpreted this to mean that the power of the Smart 
House is more ideological than material, to the extent that it served as a demonstration of possible 
modes of experimentation, ideally to garner additional funds for future projects to be implemented 
by World Fish itself. It is in this epistemic sense that the Smart House serves the adaptation 
regime.47 
	
Figure 21. An image of the Climate Smart House from WorldFish promotional materials. Source: (WorldFish 2014) 
Some NGOs are developing adaptation "technology parks," where assemblages of possible 
interventions are collected and modeled (e.g. Siddique 2015). In describing one such park (and 
inviting me to visit), a European consultant responsible for developing the project explained in 
																																																						
47 On the Climate Smart House as a spectacle of securitized visions of climate futures, see Cons ND. 
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June 2015, "we have the space to play around, and to invite other organizations to play around 
with us." Sexy high-tech experiments like "geosynthetics" (polymer sheets used to stabilize eroding 
coastlines) and "ultra-violet disinfection" (used to purify drinking water) sit neatly alongside more 
systemic interventions such as coastal zoning and saline aquaculture expansion. Adaptation 
becomes common sense through this proliferation of interventions and the selection, 
appropriateness, and geographic targets of interventions begin to appear self-evident. An 
adaptation expert at one UN agency explained to me in March 2015, when I asked her about the 
scope of their work on climate change, "we don't define adaptation, we just implement adaptation 
projects." It is through the adaptation regime, then, that the interventions that can be considered 
"adaptation projects" are determined, and adaptation is rendered technical (Li 2007). In this way, 
adaptation is pursued devoid of a political analysis of the multiple possible futures that any 
particular intervention or selection of interventions may promote (Grove 2016). 
These geographies of experimentation are managed through the spatial governance of 
interventions by various development agencies. One World Bank consultant shared with me a 
map of the coastal region that he said was replicated in almost every internal report or proposal 
circulated within and among development agencies conducting adaptation work in the coastal 
zone (See Figure 22). The map depicts a color-coded diagram of all of the 57 polders of the 
southwestern region highlighted in various neon shades, with a key indicating which polders had 
been claimed by which development projects, and which were "available" for new proposed 
experimental interventions. The map recalls those produced at the Berlin Conference during the 
Scramble for Africa, as do frequent comments by representatives of various agencies referring to 
their project sites in the possessive case (e.g. "that's one of our polders"). 
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Figure 22. Map of distribution of development interventions across polders by agency. Source: (Blue Gold 2012) 
The threat and discourse of the dystopic future of the southwest becomes both rationale for 
experimentation and excuse for its failures. The spatial imaginary of a landscape that is already on 
the verge of annihilation allows planners to treat the southwest as an adaptation tabula rasa. One 
donor discussed this approach as a policy of "no regrets," suggesting that if the landscape is going 
to be destroyed anyway, or is not "worth" saving, then there can be no regrets in conducting 
experiments with uncertain and potentially destructive results. When it comes to the expansion of 
shrimp aquaculture, practitioners contend that any production in a landscape that they deem to be 
on the verge of collapse is a success of adaptation (in the absence of any alternative possibility for 
comparison). If shrimp aquaculture takes the place of rice agriculture (and the livelihoods and 
communities that are dependent on it), then the idea that the latter is not viable, or will not be 
viable in the near future, reframes this dispossession as a fortuitous bonus. 
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One manifestation of this landscape of experimentation is the constant dissemination of 
information through "evaluations" of NGO development projects, a body of knowledge production 
that exists in its own methodological and epistemic plane (see also Ferguson 1990). When it 
comes to climate change adaptation, these evaluations often serve to demonstrate more that an 
experiment was conducted, rather than any particular result it may have garnered. Adaptation 
options are produced for the sake of "demonstration," a category that indicates an experiment 
sitting outside of any particular social context. The problem is that many such experiments are 
exactly just that - experiments. The administrator of one UN agency described to me his frustration 
with the discrepancy between a small "test plot" with a signboard in English and a technology that 
"actually works" in the field and that farmers are adopting. Throughout rural Bangladesh, 
seemingly every possible space, from drinking wells and convenience stores to many agriculture 
and aquaculture fields and fertilizer factories, are dotted with such colorful signboards 
emblazoned with conspicuous logos indicating the NGOs that have implemented and the donors 
that supported the project (see Figure 23). That these signboards are frequently printed in English, a 
language unlikely to be read fluently by a single resident of any given Bangladeshi village, 
indicates their function as symbols for donors on site visits (or for pictures for promotional 
websites, as one NGO staff member pointed out to me). However, this administrator explained to 
me that particularly in the case of agricultural adaptation experiments, the results of these test plots 
are often much better than they are if and when farmers implement them in their own fields. 
"We're promoting or pushing technologies without really understanding what's going on," he 
remarked to me. It is precisely, then, the role that such projects perform in shaping the geography 
of experimentation that constitute them as adaptation strategies. 
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Figure 23. Examples of NGO signboards with donor logos in Khulna 
 
Dispossession 
The discourse of Khulna's dystopic future often begins and ends with a question, 
articulated succinctly by one World Bank administrator: "is it even worth keeping people there?" 
Of course the answer to this question is deeply normative. Who gets to ask a question like this, 
and who gets to answer it? And what happens if the answer to that question is negative? These 
speculative calculations and the results of responding to them reflect a process of dispossession in 
the adaptation regime.  
 
Garments, Shrimp, and Dispossession 
Thanks in no small part to the significant presence and role of international donor agencies 
in Bangladesh, the official discourse and paradigm of development in Bangladesh since the 1980s 
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has strayed very little from neoliberal development orthodoxy. This synergy is illustrated by the 
government's own "Vision 2021," an election manifesto of the ruling Awami League party 
promising that Bangladesh will become a "Middle Income Country" by the year 2021, the 50th 
anniversary of the country's independence. Vision 2021 has become a mantra of both government 
officials and donors, promising that Bangladesh will become “the next Malaysia” (Mozena 2014; 
Hasina 2015). This vision represents a mandate for export-led growth and accompanying social 
and economic transitions. For the World Bank, achieving this vision will require a concerted 
transition of Bangladesh’s labor force into the non-farm sectors (Muzzini and Aparicio 2013; Path 
to middle-income nation  2014; World Bank 2014a).48 The World Bank’s 2013 World 
Development Report singled out Bangladesh’s export garment sector for contributing to an 
urbanization rate of 30 percent, double the rate in 1980 when the garment sector was still in its 
infancy (World Bank 2012, 197). The sector has grown from an annual export value of US$300 
million in 1983 to US$10.7 billion in 2008 (Mottaleb and Sonobe 2011, 70), and today accounts 
for more than three-quarters of all exports from the country (World Bank 2016, 36).  
Yet, the growth of the frozen shrimp export industry is also central to this vision, both in its 
contribution to export diversification, as well as its role in transforming the agrarian economy. This 
export-led vision of market growth sees shrimp as contributing to Bangladesh’s economic 
autonomy, as reflected in a slogan outside the Fisheries Department compound in Khulna, 
translated to “an autonomous Bangladesh cultivates more fish” (see Figure 24). With shrimp 
exports valued at US$550 million in 2014, it is the fastest growing agricultural sector, with an 
average expansion of 6.2 percent annually between 2011-16 (Ovi 2014; World Bank 2016). It is 
seen as critical to the expansion of “non-crop agriculture,” which the World Bank regards as a 
more productive sector, and therefore necessary to the growth of Bangladesh’s economy (World 
																																																						
48 In 2015, 66% of the population was rural, down from 95% in 1960 (World Bank, 2017). 
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Bank 2016). Between 1984 and 2015, the area under shrimp and prawn cultivation in Bangladesh 
grew from 64,246 ha to 275,274 ha (Pokrant 2014; Belton 2016). 
	
Figure 24. Slogan outside the Fisheries Department in Khulna. 
Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly, the “productivity” gains garnered through the 
growth of shrimp aquaculture have precipitated significant rural-urban migration (Adnan 1993; 
Datta 2006; Paprocki and Cons 2014; Pokrant 2014; Belton 2016).49 This availability of a 
																																																						
49 Reliable demographic statistics for migration from Khulna are difficult to ascertain largely because of the 
wide variety of both formal and informal migration patterns, including both circular and permanent out-
migration. For example, while ethnographic evidence clearly indicates significant migration to India, the 
Bangladeshi government officially denies this migration flow, owing to the contentious border politics 
between the two countries. One foreign researcher told me that he and his team knew from their surveys in 
Khulna that there was significant out-migration and they suspected many of these migrants were going to 
India, but in the absence of cross-border demographic study, they couldn’t tell how many. Two other 
Bangladeshi researchers from different research institutes told me that their organizations had survey data 
indicating significant migration from Khulna to India, but that they would not publish this data because of 
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seemingly endless supply of cheap migrant labor from rural areas has contributed to the vigorous 
growth of Bangladesh's garment industry (Siddiqi 2000). As one World Bank report explains, 
"improving rural productivity by modernizing agriculture and diversifying nonfarm activities, in 
order to free up manpower for use in more productive activities, is also essential for growth" 
(Muzzini and Aparicio 2013). The transition from rice agriculture to shrimp aquaculture has 
motivated a loss of agricultural livelihood opportunities, contributing to this process of “free[ing] 
up manpower.” Precise figures are unavailable due to the diversified and seasonal nature of 
agrarian livelihoods, though respondents interviewed estimated that shrimp cultivation requires 
somewhere between 90-99 percent less village labor as that of rice cultivation (these numbers are 
explored further in Chapter 5). Moreover, this transition also accounts for the loss of other 
economic and subsistence activities, such as poultry and livestock rearing, native fish culture in 
homestead farms, homestead fruit and vegetable cultivation, and gathering of cooking fuels (Datta 
2006). These losses are largely due to rising soil salinity resulting from long-term shrimp 
aquaculture, with the salt from ghers steadily encroaching into homesteads, making even land left 
for small garden plots largely infertile (see Figure 25).50 In this context, the question cited above of 
whether it is “worth keeping people” in villages in Khulna is inflected not only by the awareness of 
the certain and uncertain threats of climate change, but also by an existing political economy of 
development that is driving dramatic social, ecological, and demographic transitions. Indeed, 
																																																						
the aforementioned politics between the two countries. The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in their 2016 
study of international remittances reports that Khulna received the lowest average remittances in the country, 
but among the rankings of countries from which migrants send remittances back to Bangladesh, India is not 
even listed (BBS 2016a). However, the net population decline in Paikgachha reported between 2001 and 
2011 (from 249,000 to 248,000) suggests that shrimp farming is contributing significantly to rural out-
migration (BBS 2016b). I examine further the politics of knowledge about out-migration from Khulna in 
Chapter 4. 
50 These findings are confirmed by the author’s own research, as well as Datta (2006), among whose 
respondents 90.7% cited decreases in vegetation due to shrimp cultivation.  
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shrimp aquaculture drives agrarian dispossession whether it is promoted as a climate change 
adaptation strategy or otherwise.  
	
Figure 25. Shrimp ponds in Khulna 
Promoting Migration 
It is in this context that the discourse of migration as a strategy for climate change 
adaptation has emerged. Through the adaptation regime, climate migration has been embraced as 
an opportunity for a particular vision of development in the coastal zone and the country in 
general. This emerging vision of migration as adaptation is not unique to Bangladesh (Tacoli 2009; 
Farbotko 2010b; Felli and Castree 2012). Linking visions of uninhabitable rural spaces with those 
of the economic opportunities offered by migration, this narrative proliferates both through 
discourses surrounding climate refugees, as well as particular development strategies carried out in 
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the name of adaptation (Hartmann 2010). This narrative is embedded with the fundamental 
assumption that people living in coastal communities in the southwest don't want to remain where 
they are and that migration is desirable.  
Many donors have developed programs that aim to promote this idea directly. At one event 
in April 2014 at a large, frigidly air-conditioned hall in Dhaka, approximately 50 representatives of 
major donors, NGOs, research and government agencies gathered to discuss the advantages of 
such an approach. Each attendee was greeted at the door with a complimentary coffee mug 
bearing the words, in bright green and red: "LIVELIHOOD MIGRATION: Not a threat, A tool for 
climate change adaptation." During the seminar, a film was screened featuring interviews with 
men who had moved from the southwest to Dhaka and were working as rickshaw pullers. One of 
the men interviewed pled to the camera (in Bengali), "I pray to God that I am able to go back to 
my village and farm again." That this statement contradicted the upbeat message the organizers 
were trying to convey seemed to be lost on most of the workshop's attendees. An official from 
DFID, commenting after the film ended, discussed the need for greater recognition among donors 
and government agencies of the "Climate Change Migration Dividend." By this, he explained he 
meant the benefits to national development of creating a workforce of people who have migrated 
out of climate change affected areas, into urban areas where they can participate in the industrial, 
export-oriented economy. This understanding of the development potential of climate migration is 
embraced by the Bangladeshi government in addition to the donor community; the 2009 
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, citing the impending displacement of 20 
million people in the near future, explained that “migration must be considered as a valid option 
for the country. Preparations in the meantime will be made to convert this population into trained 
and useful citizens for any country” (MoEF 2009, 17). The implication of the government (here 
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diverging from most donors) is that countries of the Global North must accept migrants from 
Bangladesh who are threatened by the impacts of climate change. 
This Climate Change Migration Dividend theory reflects the growing discourse within the 
adaptation regime that agrarian dispossession is both inevitable and desirable. An executive at 
another large international donor agency funding climate change adaptation programming in 
Bangladesh explained to me during one of his brief visits the potential he saw in the contemporary 
moment in Bangladesh to shift away from the logic that he had observed in his career, which had 
previously focused on rural development, meaning improvement of rural livelihoods in situ. He 
contrasted this view with a more recent movement that he saw as grounded in the acceptance of 
the risks of climate change, coupled with a recognition of a broader fundamental and inevitable 
rural to urban economic transition. He explained that his own interpretation of the need for 
climate migration had more to do with the desires of rural inhabitants to relocate because they 
would prefer an urban livelihood. He explained, 
“There are a lot of people moving because it [life in rural communities] is absolute shit and 
they want to get out of it. If you look at it economy-wide, and sort of, you’ve got to stand 
back and look at the demographic transition that’s occurring in any country, I don’t mean 
the population, I mean the transition of the economy from a rural to an urban one is 
something that’s happening and will go on happening.” 
 
This comment reflects the synthesis of an awareness of the impacts of climate change with a 
normative perception of the value of agrarian livelihoods in a rapidly transforming economy and 
ecology.  
The donor continued by expanding on the role of experts in promoting this transition away 
from an agrarian economy, "I do think that when you're working on climate change, it's about 
trying to introduce that vision of what the future will look like." This comment suggests the broader 
function of adaptation experts in securing the hegemony of the adaptation regime. The regime 
itself is contingent on the articulation of Khulna as a space without a future. To that end, many 
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donors have developed programs to support off-farm employment and urban development as key 
components of their climate change adaptation portfolios. Some examples of programs cited by 
donors and NGOs for off-farm employment generation include training in rickshaw repair, 
garments manufacturing, and shrimp value-chain work (such as shrimp net building and assembly 
line processing). One researcher described this work as part of a broader vision to develop 
"alternative mega-cities" in Bangladesh to which migrants can transition, explaining that “Khulna 
has the potential to become a huge mega city” because of its port and the Special Economic Zone 
(PowerPac) in nearby Mongla. The expansion of major export processing zones in peri-urban areas 
throughout the country is seen as a necessary step in this planned urbanization. 
While public discussions about the use of migration as an adaptation strategy focus on the 
benefits of these urban and peri-urban transitions, in private many donors speak more openly 
about what they consider the necessary dispossessions in rural communities that will effect such 
migrations. For example, a representative of USAID's largest adaptation program explained that 
the approach of their work is to get people to move away from their rural communities (as 
opposed to supporting sustainable development within them). Another donor representative 
discussed the ways in which their "resilience" approach was fundamentally at odds with a rights-
based approach, which insists that people have a right to stay in their homes, describing this 
alternative approach to resilience as a "brutal" but necessary logic. To that end, he asked "why are 
we going on investing in these places without a hard-nosed analysis of whether these places are 
worth saving?" This, then is the explicit articulation of the implicit assumption of the necessity of 
dispossession to the adaptation regime. That is, that rural livelihoods will play a diminished role in 
the future of development under climate change.  
Indeed, many practitioners focus directly on the role of these migration patterns in 
promoting development in Bangladesh. One member of a panel on climate migration at a 
  109 
conference on climate change in Dhaka in 2015 described development policies that help people 
to stay in their communities of origin as a “policy disaster.” She continued, 
“Voluntary migration of some members of the family should be used as a tool for climate 
change adaptation. If we are too romantic in thinking about helping people to stay in their 
places of origin, then we are trapping them in chronic poverty… One has to think big. 
Instead of looking at migration as a problem of urbanization, we need to recognize that 
development will never happen if we don’t encourage migration.”  
 
As this declaration of the benefits of climate migration highlights, despite the trauma implied by 
dystopian imaginations of climate change in southern Bangladesh, experts I spoke with were 
surprisingly sanguine about the future. Even as it draws attention to the catastrophic potential of 
climate change, the adaptation regime proposes that the crisis of climate change should be treated 
as an opportunity. The notion of turning threats into opportunities has virtually become the mantra 
of the adaptation regime. This is a foundational logic in many proposed climate change adaptation 
strategies. It is a strategy that closely resembles what Naomi Klein calls disaster capitalism: 
"orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the 
treatment of disasters as exciting market opportunities" (Klein 2008, 6). Klein situates disaster 
capitalism more broadly in relation to neoliberal capitalism, in particular the intensified post-9/11, 
post-Katrina neoliberalism that is marked by a sense of uncertain but perpetual crisis (see also 
Gotham 2012; Adams 2013). 
In Bangladesh, the notion that those rural livelihoods most vulnerable to climate disaster 
are already obsolete facilitates this focus on the opportunities that are opened up via climate 
change. Experts express (to one another, at conferences and meetings, and in newspapers and 
other public fora) the need to be "positive" about the potential benefits that can be derived from 
climate change, not to be afraid of change or of experimentation, and, indeed, to have the 
"courage" to do so. The discourse of “opportunity” shifts the focus onto the positive impacts of the 
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inevitable destruction that will take place due to climate change, reframing dispossession as 
progress.  
 
Conclusion 
The adaptation regime reshapes Khulna’s social and physical landscape through a 
dialectical exchange between, on the one hand, material interventions in the landscape and the 
communities which inhabit it, and on the other, the epistemic construction of the limits of 
possibility for its future. Practitioners wield the threat of a future dystopia under climate change 
while at the same time responding to a contemporary rural political economy characterized by a 
state of development which they already regard as dystopic.  
To return, then, to the parable with which we began at the Paris climate conference, 
development practitioners who celebrate “deep structural transformation of economies” are the 
actors who perform the work of imagination, experimentation, and disruption that constitutes the 
adaptation regime. The village whose inhabitants will be “working in a garment factory down the 
road” is the landscape upon which the work of the adaptation regime is imagined and performed. 
Perhaps their rice paddies have given way to shrimp ponds, or the embankments protecting them 
have been torn down, and the land has disappeared altogether. Yet the geography of this 
adaptation regime is not restricted to these villages. Much of the work to forge the regime itself 
takes place far from Bangladesh’s coast – in Paris, Dhaka, and elsewhere. It is through the 
dialectical exchange between the ongoing transformations of the coastal ecology and the 
epistemic rendering of what its future can and should look like that the region itself is transformed.
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CHAPTER 3  
 
ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO THE BAY: ON ANTICIPATORY RUINATION 
 
 
The shaping of Khulna as a zone of climate crisis through the adaptation regime is an 
active and ongoing process, involving both epistemic and material dynamics. The mobilization of 
shrimp aquaculture in this landscape as a tool for climate change adaptation is integral to the 
dynamics of what I call anticipatory ruination, a discursive and material process of social and 
ecological destruction in anticipation of real or perceived threats. I use the concept to explore not 
only the dynamics taking place in Khulna in particular, but also the ways in which climate crisis is 
dialectically constituted (epistemically and materially) more generally. While anticipatory 
ruination is an important dynamic of how the adaptation regime is manifested in Bangladesh, 
either might occur independently in other contexts. 
My understanding of ruination draws on the work of Ann Stoler and contributors to her 
volume Imperial Debris (2013), who explore ruination as an act, condition, and cause, each with 
its own temporality. As Stoler writes, "ruin is both the claim about the state of a thing and a process 
affecting it. It serves as both noun and verb" (Stoler, 11). Turning to ruination as a verb, as opposed 
to an analysis of ruins as inert objects, denaturalizes the dynamics of destruction: who is the agent 
of ruination? How, why, and when does it take place? Thus, examining ruination as an ongoing 
process is to investigate claims of drivers of dispossession as remote, inevitable, or complete. 
Stoler and colleagues also direct attention to the historical dimensions of ruins, not as dead 
material artifacts of destruction, but as ongoing political projects that continue to have real effects, 
linking the exercise of power in past and present. As such, I understand anticipatory ruination in 
Khulna as an ongoing act with both histories and futures, that links climate change to the longer 
ecological history of this region: to shrimp production, land use changes, and visions of adaptation 
and inevitable displacement. Understanding ruination in this context is to question the notion of 
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climate crisis as a spatially or temporally distant possibility - rather, to understand it as one that is 
actively produced in particular places through modes of power that operate at multiple scales.  
Moreover, I draw on a growing literature that examines new forms of governing through 
analysis of the politics of anticipation (Adams, Murphy, and Clarke 2009; Amoore 2013; Anderson 
2010; Braun 2015; Cross 2014; Zeiderman 2016). This literature understands anticipation as a key 
technology of policing in a new world of increasingly securitized governance (Stalcup 2015), and 
identifies ways in which anticipation precipitates certain forms of violence. Anticipatory ruination 
itself is entailed in sociotechnical imaginaries which “elevate some imagined futures above others” 
(Jasanoff and Kim 2015). 
In Khulna, shrimp cultivation has not only resulted in social, economic, and physical 
dispossession of many of the most vulnerable members of rural communities, but it has also 
produced ecological degradation that visually invokes quite literal ruination. In an interview I 
conducted with one donor in Dhaka, she compared the landscapes that are produced by this 
degradation to T.S. Elliot’s wastelands. The salt hanging in the air leaves a faintly dry and sticky 
residue on one’s skin. The feeling of ruination in this space, irrespective of an analysis of its drivers 
and histories, is inescapable. These dynamics of degradation and dispossession through shrimp 
production in Khulna will be explored in greater detail below. The continued centrality of shrimp, 
through the shifting development landscape from the structural adjustment of the 1980s to the 
contemporary focus on climate change adaptation illuminates the broader context of anticipatory 
ruination in this region. 
Climate change adaptation in Khulna involves an imagination not only of the opportunities 
embedded in the expansion of shrimp aquaculture, but also the erasure of other possible futures. 
Shrimp production becomes an opportunity as other modes of production are imagined as 
unviable. The transition from rice agriculture to shrimp aquaculture is rendered inevitable through 
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anticipatory ruination of the modes of production and social reproduction through which 
communities in this region have historically sustained themselves. As Stoler writes, "ruins draw on 
residual pasts to make claims on futures. But they can also create a sense of irretrievability or of 
futures lost" (Stoler 2013, 21). The sense of inevitable crisis thus dialectically anticipates and 
produces ruination. 
While my examination of anticipatory ruination is firmly grounded in Khulna’s particular 
historical and political geography, its reach extends much more broadly. To better understand the 
broader dynamics of anticipatory ruination through climate change adaptation that I explore in 
Khulna, I extend my ethnographic scope to international discourses on new modes of 
development decision making in the time of climate change. I thus examine the dynamics of 
anticipatory ruination at multiple scales. I begin with an exploration of the work of anticipatory 
ruination and the discourse of climate crisis at a global scale, examining the implications of 
generalized global adaptation decision making models to coastal Bangladesh. I then investigate 
the process of imagining the future of Khulna by donors and development practitioners in Dhaka, 
then focus in on the particular dynamics of how this imaginary is carried out through shrimp 
aquaculture in rural communities in Khulna. Finally, I extend the temporal scope to an emerging 
proposal for planning and enacting this ruination in the region more broadly. Collectively, these 
explorations illuminate how the logic of anticipatory ruination works, as well as how that logic is 
manifested in a particular place. By shifting between temporalities and geographic scales, I thus 
explore how the anticipation of the future actively shapes the politics of the present. 
 
Robust Decision Making 
In the fall of 2014, I observed these dynamics clearly at a conference in Rotterdam, "Deltas 
in Times of Climate Change," hosted chiefly by a group of Dutch government, private, and 
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research agencies. In one workshop, a Senior Economist with the World Bank's Climate Change 
Group used a board game called "Decisions for the Decade" commissioned by the World Bank 
and the RAND Corporation to demonstrate a decision making tool they developed known as 
“Robust Decision Making.”51 The World Bank and RAND encourage policy makers to use this tool 
in contexts of "deep uncertainty,"52 such as climate change. The board game is intended to 
demonstrate to participants how decision makers identify "robust options" for investments which 
are less precarious in the context of uncertainty. The goal is not only to shape the way that 
decisions are made, but to structure understandings of the future that will shape different kinds of 
decisions.  
Participants in the workshop, a variety of NGO development practitioners, researchers, 
and government civil servants primarily from Europe, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia, 
gathered around tables in a large conference room at Rotterdam’s World Trade Center. We were 
given game boards and handfuls of beans and red pebbles as the economist explained the rules. 
We were told that our role in the game, representing provincial governors and national policy 
makers, was "to create a prosperous province and nation," which is sought in the game through 
decisions between investments in development or flood and drought protections. In the context of 
the game, these decisions are based not on information about the the fictional communities to be 
protected, but on anxiety about the risks and potential outcomes of the random roll of the dice. As 
we began, the World Bank economist encouraged eager game players, irreverently quipping, "let's 
reward the winners, but also shame the losers!" Faulty decisions produce natural disasters, or 
																																																						
51 The game itself was developed by the Office of the Chief Economist of the World Bank in collaboration 
with the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, with additional support from the German development 
agency GiZ (Suarez et al. 2015). 
52 I examine the politics of uncertainty in Bangladesh in greater detail elsewhere, but suffice it to say that the 
mobilization of uncertainty is not incidental to the work being done here. Architects of Robust Decision 
Making trace their attention to “deep uncertainty” back to Frank Knight, a founder of the Chicago School, 
whose “Knightian Uncertainty” differentiates economic risk from uncertainty, proposing that the latter is 
essential for profit (Hallegatte et al. 2012, Knight 1921, Lempert, Popper and Bankes 2003).  
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"crises," determined by a random roll of a die, dubbed the "probability density function."53 In each 
round, ersatz provincial governors for whom the "probability density function" produced a "crisis" 
were made to stand up from their seats and announce animatedly to the room: "Oh No!" In an 
online video about the use of Decisions for the Decade and associated games developed by the 
same group, one player describes this moment in game play, “all of a sudden a flood hit. And I 
died. So… Well, I was washed away to a local slum town and have been subsisting off of leftover 
banana peels and whatnot.” As this glib takeaway highlights, the point of the game is to allow 
players to imagine the kind of profound ruination from which there is no return. The player knows 
that their decision-making failure has resulted in an unspecified dystopic future (in which dying 
and living in a slum are equated, but the distinctions between them are immaterial). In the context 
of the game, this anticipation is pervasive – unless the player chooses the “robust option,” the 
threat of ruination is always present. Moreover, the anticipation of this ruination is understood to 
exist without geographic boundaries. Notably, the “provinces” we represented bore no signs of 
any particular place. Indeed, we were supposed? to imagine that they might stand in for any given 
province anywhere in the world. Likewise, the game sought to help us comprehend equally 
boundless decision-making tools, intended to be applied universally, without specification.  
 In the second round, a twist was introduced: instead of making decisions between standard 
investments in development and protection, players were offered a "robust option," by which their 
investments would be protected from any climate-based variability. The economist explained, "Say 
you can invest in something, for example, industry, that would guarantee [returns] without any risk 
of flood or drought." So there it is, the robust option: industry. It's not vulnerable to droughts and 
flooding, unlike antiquated investments in things like agriculture and coastal embankments in rural 
																																																						
53 Though this term seemed to be used somewhat ironically here, presumably it was also a reference to the 
need for mathematical modeling tools that offer planners logical, evidence-based solutions. 
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areas. The economist lamented that robust options are expensive, and "not easy," presumably a 
euphemism for their unpopularity with the fictitious constituencies of the game players. He 
exhorted sympathy (is this tongue-in-cheek?) for the "poor World Bank that needs to hand out all 
the money for all these development projects to make it all robust." Game players were inclined to 
agree with him, then, when he chided those investing heavily in protection that "you're pointing 
your countries on a less prosperous path!" By the last round of the game, when the standard die 
was replaced with a floppy piece of paper taped together, labeled "the cone of uncertainty," 
(apparently intended to represent the enhanced and profound uncertainty of the future under 
climate change), players already understood the moral. That is, ruination in the future will be 
inevitable; it will be necessary to make decisions that anticipate this ruination; these decisions may 
involve a normative shift in values, and will radically change landscapes. 
 Decisions for the Decade thus facilitates the kind of "magical vision" (Tsing, 133) that 
conjures the empty, exposed space required for making decisions that appear neutral and rational. 
Robust options are appropriate to this new dynamic of anticipatory ruination, for landscapes 
which do not yet exist, but will. The economist explained that he and his World Bank colleagues 
play this very game with policy makers all over the world in order to instill these same feelings of 
deep uncertainty and encourage reflection on Robust Decision Making. Such tools are intended to 
help policy makers determine appropriately robust decisions, involving quantitative, long-term 
policy analysis, and the use of modeling software to generate possible scenarios of this uncertain 
future.  
What the board game and the discussion of the Robust Decision Making model mask is the 
profoundly normative nature of these decisions and the discussions informing them. They present 
decisions as technical where they fundamentally involve the devaluation of certain futures and 
livelihood strategies. Specifically, the devaluation of rural futures in favor of urban ones is a 
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common feature of these imaginations. This devaluation is accomplished through what the 
economist described in a lecture he gave at this same conference as "framing," a critical priority on 
which he encouraged all gathered participants to focus more. He explained that a more positive 
framing of the decisions about what needs to happen in anticipation of climate change is 
important, with the caveat that "just this difference in framing doesn't change anything about the 
content," though it does facilitate cooperation. For example, while standing in front of a slide 
depicting an image of Mumbai's infamous Dharavi slum, he noted that "for a lot of people in rural 
areas, these places are opportunities for better jobs and higher salaries, better schools for their 
kids, access to health care." Framing a migration from a rural community to Dharavi, then, as an 
"opportunity" for a more robust livelihood is critical to this process of imagining and creating 
different futures. Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that reports on Robust Decision Making often cite 
out-migration from rural to urban areas as a key example of potential "robust options" (Hallegatte 
et al. 2012; Lempert et al. 2013). As the economist's comment about the rural migrants to Dharavi 
indicates, whether agrarian futures are "robust" or not, they are not understood to be normatively 
positive outcomes of development investment.  
Therefore, decisions about what should be done as opposed to what could be done are 
quite different. The difference reflects the normative assessments and framings of what an ideal 
future might look like. In this way, Robust Decision Making, as a process of anticipatory ruination, 
creates opportunities for certain futures, while foreclosing others. In Bangladesh, the same logic 
can be observed in the planning discourses concerning the future of the coastal region. I turn now 
to an examination of these particular dynamics, and their impacts in Khulna.  
 
Imagined Futures 
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Imagining the future of coastal Bangladesh is a critical moment in the process of 
anticipatory ruination, and one that development practitioners refer to often in discussions of how 
to plan development interventions in the coastal zone today. Through this work of imagining the 
future, notions of risk and uncertainty, along with normative evaluation of appropriate response, 
enter into the planning process. Framing the region's future crisis involves claims to the need for 
both 1) general acquiescence and 2) specific authority by development practitioners. Each claim is 
explored in turn below. The expansion of shrimp aquaculture in Khulna plays a pivotal role in the 
region’s anticipatory ruination, shaping both its context and realization. The effects of climate 
change, shrimp production, and the complex histories of dispossession tied up in development 
since the colonial period, are all part of the same interconnected dynamics of the spatial 
governance of the region. 
Calls for acquiescence to the changes climate change will require are the beginning of this 
process of anticipatory ruination. Experts explain that while the future is uncertain, they assert the 
need for candid discussions about the possibility that ruination is inevitable, as well as the need to 
proceed in the absence of clear scientific data assessing this inevitability. Finding solutions will be 
difficult, as one expert explained, because "all solutions are bad solutions for some people."54 
Thus, as another explained, echoing a common refrain among development practitioners working 
in this field, the adaptations that will be deemed necessary "will make us feel uncomfortable" but, 
she continued, "we need to move forward despite feeling uncomfortable."55 The need to resign 
ourselves to the discomfort of the inevitable destruction is critical to this discourse. As one expert 
explained in a seminar at the Asian Development Bank office in Dhaka, “accepting failure” of 
adaptation, instead of denying it, is critical to forging strategies for what to do in response to 
																																																						
54 Comments made by an adaptation practitioner at a public lecture in Dhaka, 23 December 2014. 
55 Comments made by foreign researcher and planning professional at a conference in Dhaka, 1 January 
2015. 
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climate change.56 Another expert, working on a climate change project for one UN agency, 
explained more specifically (referring to plans to support the growth of shrimp aquaculture instead 
of adaptation of water management to support rice farming systems), “we are not going to make 
things better with [river] dredging or water management, but there is definitely going to be shrimp 
farming.” In this way, the expert explains that shrimp farming can be the only alternative to the 
inevitable failure of other strategies for addressing environmental problems. By rejecting the 
possibility of strategies for effective mitigation of contemporary water management challenges, the 
practitioner effectively forecloses the possibility of an agricultural future for the region. These 
comments speak to an important paradox at the heart of anticipatory ruination - that is, despite our 
lack of knowledge about what will happen (explored further in chapter 4), there is a discursive 
construction of the inevitability of ruination; moreover, despite the tremendous energies being 
committed to devising solutions, it appears already known that the only possible solutions will not 
preempt inevitable ruination of landscapes and communities. Discussion of spaces and livelihoods 
that experts claim are "uninhabitable" and "unviable" bolster this language of inevitability, 
collectively naturalizing ruination.  
Development planners and practitioners respond to this language of inevitable ruination 
with claims to the necessity of their own authority in devising responses. "We need to create a 
vision for the future," explained the expert concerned with discomfort cited above, precisely 
because of the need for uncomfortable solutions. Another adaptation expert explained to me that 
in this context, "no one can know what they'll be doing in three or ten years down the road, 
including us, so as researchers and professionals, it's our job to figure out what that future will 
look like and then to introduce people to it so they can begin to adapt."57 This quotation speaks to 
																																																						
56 Comments made at seminar at ADB office, 27 October 2014. 
57 Interview with the author, 30 April 2014. 
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a particular understanding of governance through knowledge production. Specifically, that the role 
of experts is first to imagine (in the absence of knowledge) what the future could or should look 
like, then to introduce it, and then to create it. The articulation highlights the normative and 
dialectical nature of anticipatory ruination, combining both epistemic and material dynamics.  
The normative dimensions of this discourse are most commonly articulated as an 
afterthought, while the difference between what is possible and what has been deemed preferable 
remains ambiguous. A program manager at one UN agency explained to me his project's support 
of shrimp aquaculture programs (and thus inundation of agricultural lands with saline water): "in 
those areas, it's probably better to adapt to water. Water will come. It's probably much more 
beneficial than agriculture."58 In this case, it remains murky whether the practitioner’s assessment 
of the superiority of aquaculture to agriculture is due to its suitability to the ecological context, or 
some other normative claim about the relative economic benefits of shrimp vs. rice. What exactly 
is driving the change ("water will come") is also left unspecified. The active nature of the decision 
to bring water onto the land is obscured in such discourses. Similarly, a practitioner with one 
German-supported development agency objected when I asked him a question about why his 
program supported shrimp instead of rice production, by explaining "no, shrimp is the major 
export earner, so we must support it." But he then continued, "in 10 years, who knows what will 
happen? We have no idea."59 In both cases, the practitioner's own assessment of the economic 
importance of shrimp nullifies the question of the kinds of production systems which are and will 
be possible in the region in place of normative assessments of the production system which is most 
desirable. Moreover, the role of programs like his in shaping the answer to this question of what 
will happen in 10 years, is also obscured. Yet, this developmentalist economic logic, which sits 
																																																						
58 Interview with the author, 18 May 2014. 
59 Interview with the author, 12 November 2014. 
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outside of an assessment of climate impacts, is overlain on the evaluation of what “should” be 
done, to produce the logic of anticipatory ruination.  
Thus, whether the inevitability of ruination is due to the imminence of climate change or, 
alternately, a particular analysis of economic imperatives, remains an unlikely and unnecessary 
question. The anticipated future of the region is the same in either case. Development practitioners 
regularly refer to Bangladesh as a “model,” “leader,” and “pioneer” in adaptation, in the sense that 
the very act of imagining the ruination of this region creates possibilities for its transformation and 
ruination as forms of adaptation in themselves.60  
 
Depolderization 
Finally, I turn to a nascent proposal for landscape engineering that suggests a potential 
logical extreme for the anticipatory ruination already being pursued in the region. This incipient 
imaginary is known loosely as “depolderization.” Though no concrete designs for depolderization 
have yet been produced, early proposals describe the potential for addressing the threat of sea 
level rise throughout the coastal region by physically dismantling the large network of 
embankments that surround the islands throughout the coastal zone.61 Removing the 
embankments would allow tidal waters to inundate the area within, either completely or partially 
for certain times of the year or an extended period of several years. At this point, the concept of 
depolderization exists more as an ideological project than a concrete paradigm for land and water 
management. However, its ideological power is significant. It not only shapes possibilities for the 
future, but it also holds sway in conversations about what is possible and desirable in the present 
																																																						
60 On a longer history of the use of Bangladesh as a paradigmatic development “laboratory,” see Hossain 
2017. 
61 The islands surrounded by these embankments have come to be known as “polders,” referring to the 
Dutch term for low-lying land surrounded by protective dykes, within which water levels can be controlled 
through a combination of inlet and outlet channels and pumping equipment. 
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and immediate future. In this sense, it plays a significant role in the future and present of 
adaptation in the region. 
Depolderization has been embraced most earnestly in Bangladesh by the World Bank, and 
has received critical support on both sides of the border from the India bureau of the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF).62 The relevant programs of each agency encompass two concrete goals. 
The first involves mitigation of the geomorphological problems created by the embankments in the 
first place, including subsidence of land and sedimentation of rivers, both of which are 
exacerbated by the threat of sea level rise. The second goal of depolderization involves espousing 
a particular vision of development in the coastal region - in particular one that embraces the 
opportunities of a transformed economy. In Bangladesh specifically this means expansion of 
commercial shrimp aquaculture and the expansion of an urban-based, industrial economy.  
The physical and social implications of depolderization are dramatic, entailing a complete 
landscape transformation. Before embankments were built, the natural tidal pattern involved the 
inundation of coastal lowlands twice per day during certain parts of the year. Human settlements 
were established on highlands, with homes often built on plinths, while low-lying wetlands were 
used either for fishing or cultivation of traditional rice varieties (which not only tolerate this 
periodic flooding, but were also fortified by mineral-rich tidal sediment deposits) (Datta 1998; 
Duyne 1998; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1972b; Westland 1874). 
Discourses proposing depolderization suggest a "return" to such a hydrological regime. However, 
the polders in Bangladesh have dramatically transformed the landscape such that by obstructing 
the tidal deposition of sediments onto the lowlands, combined with subsidence of the land and 
																																																						
62 These plans are expounded in a WWF report (Danda et al. 2011) and World Bank proposal (The World 
Bank 2015) described in detail below. I expanded my understanding of the vision and implications of 
depolderization through several interviews with staff and consultants at The World Bank, WWF, and 
Bangladeshi state agencies concerned with water management. 
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relative rise of riverbeds surrounding them, in many cases the land within the polders has become 
lower than the low-tide level of the surrounding rivers. Thus, removing the embankments today 
would likely cause complete inundation of entire islands, and the necessary displacement of the 
communities that inhabit them. Depending on the scale of depolderization, the populations 
affected could be tremendous: one World Bank expert suggested "millions and millions" of coastal 
inhabitants. 
The World Bank has long provided financial lending support for water infrastructure in 
Bangladesh, including for the construction and re-construction of the coastal polder system. Most 
recently, the Coastal Embankment Improvement Project (CEIP), which the World Bank cites among 
their chief climate change adaptation programs, is focused on improvement of a series of pilot 
polders across the coastal zone. While the goal of the CEIP is ostensibly to fortify the 
embankments, it has also provided the grounds for discussions about whether the polders should 
exist at all. One of the components of this project proposes? to engage an international consulting 
firm to devise a "sustainable polder concept" proposal for long-term engineering and management 
of the coastal landscape (World Bank 2015). World Bank employees and consultants whom I 
interviewed about this project referred to it as "Polders 2.0," a concept that they explained must 
involve the possibility of depolderization. Thus, even as the Bank invests millions in reconstruction 
of the polders, according to one Bank staff member in a presentation to a group of foreign donors, 
"much of the money" will go toward generating this new long-term vision for physical, social, and 
economic transformation. 
Wherever depolderization is discussed (by consultants, donors, and practitioners), it is 
talked about as an integral component of a broader vision of development for the region. That is, 
the anticipation of climate crisis combines with and brings about a normative vision of developed 
futures. These imagined futures entail the end of rural livelihoods in the delta, replacing them with 
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a highly stylized (and age old) vision of development where the rural population transitions into an 
industrial labor force.  
The normative dimensions of this vision are fleshed out in much greater detail in a report 
published by WWF in Kolkata in 2011 (Danda et al. 2011), funded by a World Bank project 
working to pioneer and integrate a new vision for managing and transforming this landscape on 
both sides of the border. The first four chapters of the report, entitled "Indian Sundarbans Delta: A 
Vision," detail the environmental hazards produced by a variety of different social and physical 
drivers, including sea level rise and other effects of climate change, overpopulation, and improper 
construction and maintenance of coastal embankments, dating to the colonial period. The fifth and 
final chapter details a phased strategy for depolderization and depopulation of an area 
encompassing over 200 villages. A World Bank Strategy Report entitled "Building Resilience for 
Sustainable Development of the Sundarbans" describes a similar vision, providing even greater 
detail about roll-out of particular interventions through which the vision will be accomplished 
over a period of 5-30 years. "Sustainable" economic development will be promoted in new peri-
urban centers through vocational training for the future economy of the Sundarbans region, which 
involves tourism and "modernized aquaculture," and so that residents might "successfully integrate 
themselves into cities" (219). In the latter phases of the strategy, remaining residents will be 
induced to migrate through the elimination of support for basic services and infrastructure. Experts 
at one workshop in Kolkata focused on this strategy for Sundarbans development speculated that 
farmers, fishermen and their offspring currently living in the Sundarbans region would be much 
better off if they could be prepared for a transition into India's booming urban IT industry. "Give 
them proper skills," one World Bank expert implored, "they will run away!" In this development 
narrative, the IT industry represents the New India – the vision of an urban future for which the 
  125 
World Bank and other development agencies are striving. Responding to climate change is just 
one plank in pursuing this vision of development. 
A reproduction of a painting included in the final chapter of the WWF report illustrates this 
vision evocatively. The painting depicts a bird's eye view of the Indian Sundarban region, with the 
tall buildings of the Kolkata skyline at the far edge of the horizon. In the foreground, one can see 
the clear lines of the islands along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. A broad swath of these islands 
further inland, however, appear to be vanishing into the water. At the edge of the Sundarbans, 
three small cities have sprung up, depicted by a few skyscrapers highlighted within bright red 
circles. One of the report's authors described to me his conversation with the artist from whom he 
commissioned the painting for the report, proudly displaying the original full-size piece framed in 
his office. He gave the artist a current map of the Sundarbans, he explained to me, but specified 
"you have to make some of the islands disappear, and portray that nature is taking it back, and 
portray that we have made some arrangements for these people." Here, then, is the vision for the 
future of the Sundarbans: vast tracts of islands vacated of their agrarian populations, who have 
relocated to industrial centers where they have been trained for their new urban livelihoods. 
The report's author described to me the enthusiasm with which this vision was received by 
the World Bank. A standing-room only crowd at the World Bank headquarters in DC was excited, 
he explained, about new opportunities for investments in the "new" Sundarbans, for example in 
Tata Housing,63 which presumably was depicted by the tiny cities of the future in the report's 
painting. The vision is a powerful one. And while no concrete steps have yet been taken toward 
active resettlement, WWF has received financial support toward the dissemination of this vision 
																																																						
63 Tata Housing Development Company is one of India’s largest real estate development firms. It is a 
subsidiary of the Tata Group, a multinational conglomerate which claims annual revenues in excess of US 
$100 billion. They are known for their investments directed at India’s growing urban middle class market; 
hence, Tata Housing would be an ideal developer for the imagined future cities on the periphery of the 
Sundarbans. 
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from GIZ and DFID, in addition to the World Bank. Dissemination takes place through 
conferences and workshops, gratis field visits to the region for journalists, donors, government and 
NGO officials, and public consultations with residents of the Sundarbans themselves. Clearly these 
diverse constituencies have responded to the vision quite differently. The report indicates that in 
preliminary consultations concerning the vision, only about 5 percent of current inhabitants 
expressed an interested in such migration entailed in the vision. The report speculates that this lack 
of interest may be due to reflection on "the experience of involuntary displaced people in other 
parts of the country" (40). 
Experts who propose this displacement do not do so without awareness of the political 
implications of proposing resettlement at such a massive scale. At one workshop in Kolkata in 
January 2015 for development planners from both Bangladesh and India at which a number of 
reporters were in attendance, World Bank and WWF experts repeatedly corrected one another for 
using the words "migration" and "resettlement," which they acknowledged were "dirty words." One 
expert, responding to such a chastisement, noted "we don't need to call it migration, we can call it 
'gaining a higher standard of living.'" The concern indicates an acute awareness of the profoundly 
contested history of displacement and forced migration for development projects in India. 
However, experts affirm, climate change offers an opportunity for changing this narrative about 
development's displacements. In the context of climate change, development-induced migration 
should be seen as a (now-necessary) opportunity, instead of a threat. One researcher expounding 
the economic potential of migration out of Bangladesh's coastal region to a workshop on climate 
change adaptation in Rotterdam entreated the audience, "don't think of resettlement... think of all 
kinds of connectivity!" The strength of the state and its capacity for carrying out such activities is 
also a factor inflecting the legitimacy of such visions. One World Bank planner in Bangladesh 
explained to me that the potential for depolderization currently seems much more feasible in 
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India, where the government has a "much greater capacity for these kinds of massive resettlement 
projects." Even as development practitioners on both sides of the border are clear that active 
resettlement will be the responsibility of the government (as opposed to non-state actors such as 
the World Bank), there is no question that it can be supported and pursued through the work of 
development and climate change adaptation carried out by NGOs. 
 
Conclusion 
The anticipatory ruination of Khulna through the expansion of shrimp aquaculture follows 
the same contours of epistemic intervention as those promoted globally through development 
planning in response to climate change, including through the Robust Decision Making model. In 
Khulna in particular, this logic operates as a progression, masking the histories of each of its 
elements: uncertain future ruination becomes an explanation for the inevitable unviability of 
agriculture, shrimp aquaculture is proposed as an alternative, experts conclude that it is preferable, 
anyway, and should be embraced immediately as an opportunity. This entails a clear vision of 
what an ideal future is for communities in Khulna, divorced from those communities' own visions 
of what is possible or desirable. Climate change becomes a post-facto justification for a process of 
ruination through the planning of particular development interventions both historically and into 
the future.  
Examining the dynamics of anticipatory ruination in Khulna sheds lights on the stakes in 
succumbing to the teleologies of climate crisis in their material and epistemic dimensions. By 
understanding the production of anticipatory ruination, we are better able to understand not only 
the dynamics of dispossession, but also the alternative futures that are obscured in Khulna and 
elsewhere. The efforts of local communities and social movements (such as the one mentioned 
above composed of local farmers fighting against shrimp) to highlight these dynamics of ruination, 
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helps us to understand both their antecedents, as well as to suggest the possibilities of alternative 
futures. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
OPPORTUNITY/CRISIS: ON THE POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
“As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there 
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” – Donald Rumsfeld64 
 
In March 2014, The New York Times ran a cover story with the provocative title "As Seas 
Rise, Millions Cling to Borrowed Time and Dying Land" (Harris 2014). The article examines what 
it calls the "uncertain future" of coastal communities in Bangladesh's southwestern delta region. It 
weaves together scientific projections of sea level rise and climate change impacts in the region 
with intimate stories and photographs of villagers grappling with an increasingly volatile 
landscape. The author laments the "millions living on borrowed time in this vast landscape of river 
islands, bamboo huts, heartbreaking choices and impossible hopes." These "hopes," the author 
explains, are primarily pinned on the possibilities of staying in (or returning to) villages in the 
coastal belt that the author describes as "doomed." The article thus demonstrates a common refrain 
about this region and its inhabitants that circulates in popular media, academic, and development 
policy discourses. The uncertainty of environmental change evinces the impossibility of a future of 
this landscape and the communities that now call it home. 
The images in the article, taken in Bangladesh’s Dacope sub-district, on an island nestled 
alongside those where my own field sites are located, and that I have visited several times, were 
familiar to me, but the narrative (though not surprising) was incongruous with those I myself have 
heard there.65 The photographs depicted vast grey landscapes degraded through salination by 
commercial shrimp aquaculture, which over the past three decades has taken over this and 
																																																						
64 Cited in Morris (2014). 
65 For a more extended discussion of the particular agrarian political economy in Dacope and and 
mobilization against shrimp there, see Afroz et al. (2017).  
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surrounding islands through rampant, unchecked land grabbing. However, though these vast tracts 
of shrimp ponds were depicted prominently in the article’s photographs, and the effects of their 
cultivation were evident in the lack of vegetation and visible salt deposits, the article failed to even 
mention the presence of aquaculture in the area, its grave impacts on the ecology, or the deep 
imbrication of these concerns with those related to climate change. It is clearly far more 
compelling to think of Bangladesh's coastal region as a space that is "disappearing" than a space in 
which the social dynamics of production have been transformed through global export markets, 
thus causing social and ecological devastation.  
While these apparent omissions in this piece appear stark, they are not anomalies. Indeed, 
the piece both contributes to and draws on a narrative about this region, the southwest of 
Bangladesh, that frames a particular understanding of its ecological past, present, and future. The 
article is representative of the ways in which what is known, thought to be known, or currently 
being investigated about the ongoing ecological changes taking place in the southwest are taken 
as scientific facts, and specifically that these "facts" suggest that the region is, in the author's own 
words, "doomed." The article also represents the limited frame within which these ongoing 
ecological changes are understood, the kind of narratives that are mobilized, as well as those that 
are elided. 
In what follows, I explore the politics of knowledge that shape scientific and popular 
narratives about this region, along with the normative assumptions that inform them. I examine 
how uncertainty is practiced to shape landscapes and communities. Uncertainty is not a static 
condition. It is mutable and negotiable. It changes as it traverses different research programs and 
policy dialogues. It is often both cause and result of contestation. Confronted with the existential 
threat of ecological collapse, how do the politics of uncertainty shape decisions over where and 
when there is no hope and no possibility of return? I suggest that uncertainty can be practiced in 
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both the presence and absence of information. Between different processes of producing and 
acting on knowledge, uncertainty emerges often as the result of deliberate choices. In what 
follows, I explore how these politics and practices of uncertainty are manifested in a series of 
programs at the interface of research and intervention. 
This work builds on a robust literature in Political Ecology and Science and Technology 
Studies investigating the social context and epistemological politics of climate science (Jasanoff 
2010; Demeritt 2001; Günel 2016; Barnes and Dove 2015; Miller 2004). Beyond this focus on the 
social relations that govern the production of knowledge, I am concerned primarily with the 
circulation of knowledge about environmental change, its drivers, and possible responses. This 
latter focus highlights the ways in which the production and circulation of knowledge are 
intertwined with one another. The politics of uncertainty emerge through this relationship between 
the two. 
 
Understanding the Ecological Crisis in Southwestern Bangladesh 
Among the broad reflections of scientists studying the drivers of change in the southwest, 
two clear analytical themes emerge. The first is that at the local level, it is not possible to 
analytically separate the effects of climate change and sea level rise from other drivers of change, 
such as shrimp farming, large-scale engineering projects, and cross-boundary water-sharing issues 
- there is no way of knowing, these scientists explained to me, the relative importance of any of 
these dynamics in driving the ecological changes most often attributed to climate change.66 The 
second, relatedly, is that while it is difficult to parse these various drivers, it is clear that climate 
																																																						
66 What is known, however, is that these dynamics are embedded in broader secular dynamics of social and 
biophysical change in the delta, which is in an active state of dynamic transformation. 
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change is not the only driver of these transformations, and, most insisted, it is probably not the 
primary driver of change.  
A third related concern that many stressed in both public and private conversations, was 
that the scientific data about ecological change in the delta is often misunderstood. Many cited 
concerns about their own data or that of their colleagues being mis-quoted, mis-interpreted, or 
oversimplified, leading to flawed narratives about the scientific evidence of present or future 
change. One prominent social scientist whose work has drawn considerable attention to the 
challenges posed by climate change to communities in the coastal region, expressed dismay about 
the "stylized" way in which these impacts are discussed, particularly in popular media portrayals of 
climate science. He explained that this "stylized" narrative about the threats of climate change to 
Bangladesh reflected basic misinterpretations of the geomorphology of the region.  
A combination of interconnected ecological problems poses threats to production and 
habitation of rural areas throughout the southwestern coastal zone (Nicholls et al. 2015). For the 
reasons described above, it is not my intention to mediate between narratives highlighting these 
various drivers of ecological change and strands of reasoning that exclude any of them in 
understanding the transformations currently taking place in the southwest. Rather, I emphasize that 
each has played an important role, and examine the dynamics through which knowledge about 
various drivers of change are elided. 
Some aspects of the region’s environmental characteristics and challenges faced in water 
and landscape management were examined in Chapter 1. These historic patterns continue to be 
manifested in the coastal region today, but have taken on new significance in relation to climate 
change. The predominant environmental concerns in the coastal region are related to patterns of 
tidal activity at the shifting interface of land and water. Because of the proximity of these dynamics 
of tidal activity to concerns related to sea level rise, there is often ambiguity or uncertainty about 
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the precise causes of change, and about the boundaries between them. This also generates spaces 
of uncertainty about the role of human intervention at this interface of different drivers of change.  
Soil salinity is an important example, as it is a constant subject of debate among 
researchers and development practitioners. During the wet season from June to October, the 
monsoon rains gather along the rivers from upstream; as they flow into the estuary, they push the 
brackish tidal waters back down toward the saline Bay of Bengal. During the dry season from 
November to May, with less water flowing down through the rivers, the tidal waters push back up 
the rivers and creeks, bringing salinity with them. The result is a salinity frontier that moves up and 
down throughout the year in the coastal region (Lázár et al. 2015; Clarke et al. 2015). Crops are 
selected for cultivation in large part based on their tolerance to the level of salinity at a given 
location. Sea level rise is likely to impact this frontier by causing the tides to move further inland, 
thus linking soil salinity to climate change (Dasgupta, Kamal, et al. 2014). However, sea level rise 
is not the only factor driving this shifting salinity frontier. When India built the Farakka Barrage, 
much of the water from the Ganges was diverted away from Bangladesh.67 While these numbers of 
disputed, the Bangladeshi government claims that the barrage reduced the Ganges water flow by 
70% (Hossen and Wagner 2015). The withdrawal of upstream water flow resulted in increased 
salinity in the coastal region, as tidal waters moved inland (Ito 2002; Chapman 2007; Bradnock 
and Saunders 2000). Finally, as explored in Chapter 2, shrimp aquaculture has been perhaps the 
clearest human-induced driver of increased soil salinity, as land is intentionally inundated with 
saline water in the dry season to flood ghers for shrimp cultivation (Clarke et al. 2015; Afroz and 
Alam 2013; Haque 2006). Salinity from the rivers affects crop production when it gets into the soil 
																																																						
67 There is a great deal of uncertainty and contestation about the effects of the Farakka Barrage, with analyses 
of its physical impacts being fairly firmly divided between India and Bangladesh. The Indian government, 
public, and scientific community largely dispute the impacts claimed by their corresponding communities in 
Bangladesh. India built the Barrage initially in order to bring more water to the Port of Calcutta, which was 
experiencing excessive siltation due to decreased flows, obstructing the traffic of ships to the port. 
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– this can happen through accidental inundation (when the embankments are breached), 
intentional inundation (for shrimp aquaculture), or through excessive use of saline water for 
irrigation. Salinity is leached out of the soil annually when the land is flushed with monsoon rain 
(Clarke et al. 2015). However, if salinity seeps into the underground aquifer, which can happen 
either through the the continual inundation for aquaculture (Barraclough and Finger-Stich 1996), 
or through groundwater depletion (through excessive withdrawal by deep tube wells for irrigation) 
(Davis and Ali 2014), then it is a much more serious concern. Though this salinization of aquifers 
is already happening, it is believed that sea level rise could also contribute to saltwater intrusion 
into the aquifers (Clarke et al. 2015; World Bank 2010; Huq, Ali, and Rahman 1995).  
These drivers of salinity are also closely linked to other environmental changes in the delta. 
Water logging, discussed in more detail below, is closely related in the sense that persistent 
inundation with saline water drives salinization of soil and groundwater. Sporadic and chronic 
water logging has several different causes and drivers, all of which are a source of ongoing debate. 
In discussions about climate change, the most important of these is sea level rise, which is 
consistently invoked as the greatest threat of climate change to Bangladesh’s low-lying delta. The 
rise of the river levels relative to land levels is a topic of considerable attention by the community 
of scientists working in this region (Nicholls et al. 2013; Kay et al. 2015; Brown and Nicholls 
2015; Pethick and Orford 2013). Yet, the term “sea level rise” is often used as shorthand to refer to 
to absolute sea level rise, the increase in the absolute volume of the oceans as a result of climate 
change-induced factors such as the melting of polar ice caps. Absolute sea level rise is thus tied to 
global patterns of environmental change (Ballu et al. 2011). Relative sea level rise, however, 
referring to the observed difference in sea and water levels in a particular coastal landscape, is a 
dynamic that can only be observed locally, as it interacts with the vertical movement of coastland 
and a variety of local drivers of change. Nicholls and Goodbred argue that there has been an 
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“over-emphasis on the issue of global-mean sea-level rise, versus other possible changes,” 
highlighting a variety of human-induced drivers of relative sea level rise in the GBM delta 
(Nicholls and Goodbred 2004, 11). In Bangladesh, land subsidence (related largely to the polder 
system, as explored in Chapter 1) is a major contributor to this relative sea level rise (Darby et al. 
2015; Auerbach et al. 2015a; Brammer 2012; Brown and Nicholls 2015).  
	
Figure 26. Land erosion and accretion between 1984 and 2007 across the southern coast of Bangladesh. Source: 
(Brammer 2014a)  
Land erosion is another dynamic of physical transformation that is often conflated with 
absolute sea level rise (Ahmed 2011; Brammer 2014a). As discussed in Chapter 1, the GBM delta, 
being exceptionally active in its ongoing formation, is in a constant state of erosion and accretion. 
As observed in the New York Times article discussed at the beginning of the chapter, this land loss 
related to erosion is often attributed to climate change-induced sea level rise. Hugh Brammer, a 
physical geographer with over 50 years of experience working in Bangladesh, refers to these as 
“wildly mistaken assertions” (Brammer 2014b, xvi), highlighting the historic nature of the process 
of constant erosion in the GBM delta. There is also scientific consensus, however, that relative sea 
level rise will exacerbate existing patterns of coastal erosion (Wong et al. 2014). Despite land loss 
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in many parts of the delta, Brammer’s analysis suggests that between 1984 and 2007, the Meghna 
estuary alone experienced an annual net land gain of 19.6 km2 (see Figure 26). This augments 
Allison’s findings that between 1792 and 1998, the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta saw an average 
annual net land gain of 7.0 km2. Building on an analysis of similar trends, Darby and colleagues 
project that climate change could result in a net increase in these rates of land accretion, as the 
rivers may carry an increased sediment load to the delta form the melting Himalayan glaciers 
(Darby et al. 2015). This would suggest that, contrary to ominous predictions of Bangladesh 
disappearing, climate change could in fact cause the country’s land mass to grow larger. 
Finally, increasing vulnerability to cyclonic flooding and storm surges is also considered a 
significant consequence of climate change in Bangladesh (Dasgupta, Huq, et al. 2014; Akter and 
Mallick 96), with a wide variety of drivers. The notion of “vulnerability” itself reflects a range of 
social, political, economic, and historical dynamics (Watts and Bohle 1993), and thus vulnerability 
to cyclonic activity in Bangladesh must be understood as a complex relationship between a variety 
of transformations. In the physical sense, however, this increased vulnerability in Bangladesh is 
also the result of transformations in the landscape. Specifically, the deforestation of the 
Sundarbans, both related to recent shrimp farming and other historic patterns explored in Chapter 
1, has diminished the critical buffer against storm surges that the mangroves provide (Rahman and 
Rahman 2015; Barua, Chowdhury, and Sarkar 2010; Islam and Haque 2004). 
In recent years, all of these dynamics have been attributed primarily to climate change, 
and, indeed, their intensity and amalgamation have amplified the sense of climate crisis. Yet, they 
are each embedded in complex histories and political economies of the region (Brown et al. 
2014), histories that are masked by narratives of ethical neutrality and scientific credibility of this 
new climate science consensus. Recognizing or assigning relative weight to these various drivers 
of change is a significant source of uncertainty among scientists and development agencies alike. 
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While most scientists recognize that each of these drivers play a role, not all development 
practitioners do. For example, many practitioners involved in shrimp aquaculture programs 
suggest that shrimp farming is a response to, rather than a cause of, salinity; the implications of this 
disagreement are examined further in Chapter 3. 
Reflecting on this broad spectrum of drivers of coastal environmental change, a group of 
leading natural scientists wrote in a Commentary in Nature Climate Change in 2014, “Herein lies 
a paradox: economic and population growth can increase risk, but economic growth and 
prosperity promotes adaptive capacity” (Brown et al. 2014). The paradox outlined by these 
scientists is at the heart of contestations over understandings of vulnerability to climate change in 
Bangladesh and potential adaptation responses. Even as they recognize that certain human 
interventions might transform landscapes in ways that increase vulnerability to climate change, 
they also suggest that those same human interventions might increase the ability of communities to 
respond to those transformations. Decisions about how to navigate this paradox are thus political 
decisions based on normative visions of the future under climate change. Uncertainty both 
emerges from and becomes a key instrument in navigating these contentious politics. 
 
Who are the Climate Scientists in Bangladesh? 
My approach to this interpretation of ecological change is motivated by interviews and 
participant observation with researchers studying the ecological and geomorphological impacts of 
climate change in the southwest. This work is carried out by a wide variety of researchers of 
different nationalities, institutional positions, and areas of disciplinary expertise. My intention was 
to understand who these people were, how they did their research, what it showed, and how it 
engaged with and impacted development policy. The diversity among and collaboration between 
researchers working in this field makes it difficult to neatly categorize them. I spent time with 
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Bangladeshi and foreign researchers, university faculty, staff of NGO research centers, and 
consultants hired by donors and NGOs for specific projects. These people frequently occupied 
several of these categories simultaneously or at different points in time. In particular, the 
boundaries between foreign and local knowledge and expertise are not clear, as many scientists 
have worked and been trained both in Bangladesh and abroad. Moreover, foreign researchers with 
little experience in Bangladesh often rely heavily on their Bangladeshi counterparts for 
fundamental information about the country both within and beyond their own areas of expertise. 
One instructive example of the range of different kinds of disciplinary expertise being 
applied to these questions in Bangladesh is a major collaborative research project called ESPA 
Deltas (ESPA stands for Ecosystem Services for Poverty Alleviation). I had heard about this project 
repeatedly in Dhaka from several development agencies that intended to put its findings to use in 
the design of their adaptation programs, and I came to know it better when I met affiliated British 
researchers at a climate change adaptation conference in the Netherlands. ESPA Deltas was 
composed of a multi-disciplinary and multi-national team of researchers studying ecosystem 
services and poverty alleviation in the GBM delta. Supported by a group of British research and 
development agencies including DFID and ESRC, the goal of the program was to support policy 
makers in understanding ongoing environmental change in the delta and the role of policy in 
shaping it. Like much of the scientific research being carried out in this area, the program did not 
exclusively address itself to climate change, but instead took climate change as one of many 
drivers of change affecting the region that it intended to understand collectively. 
The consortium of which ESPA Deltas was composed included faculty from major British 
research universities with expertise in coastal and environmental engineering, ecological 
economics, hydrology, water policy, and geology, among many other disciplines. Several of them 
have been lead or contributing authors to the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
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Change (IPCC).68 These researchers partnered with a broad spectrum of Indian and Bangladeshi 
researchers, including several faculty from the Institute of Water and Flood Management (IWFM) at 
the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET). IWFM is Bangladesh’s premier 
institution for expertise in water engineering, and its faculty are almost universally enlisted in 
studies or program design concerned with hydrology or water engineering in the country by the 
Bangladeshi government, foreign aid agencies, and donors and development practitioners alike. 
While its faculty have exceptional expertise and experience with hydrology and water engineering 
in Bangladesh, they rarely if ever have funding for implementing independent research of their 
own design and conception. Although one IWFM Professor was a Co-PI on the ESPA Deltas 
project (no doubt contributing immensely to research design and execution), the funding and 
conception of the study in the UK certainly shaped the research, the makeup of the consortium, 
and the products of the collaboration.  
When I interviewed one Bangladeshi government water planning official about the World 
Bank Polders 2.0 program (discussed in Chapter 3), he brought up IWFM in the course of talking 
about the kinds of expertise that could be employed in conceiving of a strategy to address the 
technical problems with the design of the polder system. The World Bank’s Terms of Reference for 
Polders 2.0 stated explicitly that only an international consulting firm could be hired to carry out 
this work (one World Bank administrator explained to me later that this was the result of a legal 
technicality in the World Bank’s procurement policies). The government official lamented to me 
that IWFM faculty had the knowledge and expertise to do this kind of work, but they were never 
given the chance, always included as the subsidiary consultants to teams of researchers from 
outside Bangladesh. If they were given the funding and opportunity to think creatively about what 
																																																						
68 The IPCC produces reports reflecting the international consensus of leading climate scientists and 
participating governments about the cause and impacts of human-induced climate change, as well as 
options for adaptation and mitigation.  
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a new “sustainable polder concept” could look like (the stated goal of Polders 2.0), would they 
come up with something entirely different from a foreign firm?69 In speculating broadly on his own 
question, the official supposed to me that if there could be a water engineering strategy inspired by 
indigenous water management systems and the GBM delta’s unique tidal landscape, the scientists 
at IWFM would be the best people to devise it. Nevertheless, he speculated, the politics of 
research funding in Bangladesh are such that they would not be given this opportunity.70  
In addition to these faculty, staff from other government and NGO research institutes were 
also included in the consortium, such as the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, the 
Center for Population, Urbanization and Climate Change at the International Centre for Diarrhoeal 
Disease Research of Bangladesh, and the government’s Water Resources Planning Organization 
(WARPO). Finally, these agencies also develop partnerships in Khulna with local NGOs whose 
primary work involves connecting non-local researchers and development agencies with local 
communities through the identification of research field sites, organizing brief visits to the region, 
coordinating logistical details, and even giving presentations on the social and cultural contest of 
the area under study. While this last category of program partner would not be classified by the 
rest of the project team as scientific researchers, they play an important role in shaping the 
researchers’ understanding of the region – who they talk to, what they see, how they see it, and the 
contextual information that informs their experiences.  
																																																						
69 Given the ambiguity discussed elsewhere between “foreign” and “local” forms of expertise, this seems to 
me to be an open (nevertheless critical) question. All of the faculty at IWFM are of Bangladeshi origin, yet 
most of them earned their degrees abroad, primarily in the Netherlands, so their own knowledge and 
expertise is fundamentally transnational. 
70 These unbalanced relations of collaboration reflect a broader pattern in the production of climate 
knowledge observed by Corbera et al. (2015). The authors find that the collaborative relations in the IPCC 
Working Group III report on mitigation reveal persistent, unequal collaborative relationships between 
researchers in the Global North and Global South, with authorship dominated primarily by institutions and 
scientists in the Global North. 
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For example, I joined the ESPA Deltas project team on a field visit arranged by one such 
local partner that involved a tour by boat into the Sundarbans. On the way, we stopped at a 
massive shrimp farming operation, unlike any other I had seen in Khulna. Owned by a 
businessman in Khulna, the Sundarban Shrimp Private Limited enterprise spread out over 25 
hectares, surrounding by high fences and lamp posts (see Figure 27). We were introduced to the 
manager of the operation, the only worker in slight, who told us about the operation’s impressive 
productivity and economic returns. When we re-boarded the boat and were served giant Khulna 
tiger shrimp for lunch, I wondered aloud to some of my companions who had lived in that village 
before Sundarban Shrimp Private Limited had arrived. I wondered this again after lunch when the 
boat made a stop at a small settlement of landless people living on an embankment, who had 
apparently been displaced from their homes following a recent cyclone. They now worked 
collecting shrimp larvae with nets in the river.  
The decision not to introduce these researchers to communities where agriculture has 
persisted (or been reintroduced), or to communities where residents remained to share different 
perspectives on shrimp aquaculture, certainly shaped the way they understood Khulna and the 
livelihoods of its inhabitants. The implications of this were demonstrated to me later in the day 
when one ESPA researcher studying out-migration from Khulna explained their research question 
to me as “what makes people stay in a shitty place?”71 This researchers’ identification of Khulna as 
“shitty” was evidently shaped by these relationships between research partners and interlocutors. 
Examining this broad spectrum of actors involved in the production and dissemination of 
knowledge thus facilitates an understanding of what is known, thought to be known, and uncertain 
about environmental change and life in Khulna today.  
 
																																																						
71 I expand on this discourse of “shitty” lives in Khulna in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 27. Sundarban Shrimp Private Limited 
The most important thing I learned from the ESPA Deltas researches was about the 
interactions between climate change and other drivers of environmental change, and how they are 
being actively shaped in the present. As one of the scientists involved in the project explained to 
me, even as people who have “built careers on” the study and dissemination of knowledge about 
climate change (“we’re no climate change deniers!” one of them remarked to me), they also see it 
as critical to recognize that there are a lot of other social and environmental processes taking 
place, all of which are important to recognized collectively. Most importantly, they explained to 
me, there are things that can be done to mitigate the impacts of climate change (and, indeed, other 
environmental transformations) and that decisions are being actively made right now that shape 
the landscape now and in the future under climate change. 
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In addition to this work being done inside Bangladesh, there is also a great deal of research 
being done about Bangladesh by researchers outside the country, using computer modeling 
methods and remote sensing data. One leading environmental scientist at Columbia University 
who has worked in Bangladesh for several years recounted to me a story in which he presented a 
paper at an academic conference based on satellite data of Khulna combined with repeat visits to 
the region to verify the analysis and understand it better. Environmental scientists call this kind of 
work “ground truthing,” and I found among those I interviewed in Bangladesh that they regarded 
this component of their research methodology with varying degrees of seriousness, ranging from 
casual sightseeing visits to sincere and insightful ethnographic interest, as I found to be the case of 
this scholar at Columbia. The paper he was presenting concerned dynamics of environmental 
change in the Sundarbans, and revealed that he and his colleagues had found no evidence of 
recent forest degradation there. After his presentation, two other scientists who had separately 
conducted studies of the region, but never visited Bangladesh, using different methods from the 
Columbia team to analyze remote sensing data, stood up to challenge his findings, arguing that 
they had each found that there was extensive degradation in the Sundarbans. He responded that 
they had seen no evidence of this degradation either in their satellite data or in their field visits; the 
dissenting scientists, who he described as “very emotional,” were incredulous with disbelief, 
certain that this region must be experiencing degradation. His impression was that they had 
already formed assumptions about the certainty of degradation in Bangladesh, and that because of 
these assumptions, they were unable to consider the possibility of alternative data or analysis. 
“How could you be so confident when you had never even been there?” the Columbia scientist 
said to me. I asked him if he had observed this kind of dissent, involving certainty of degradation, 
relating to other regions or any of the other field sites where he works. He responded that “it is 
definitely the worst in Bangladesh – and you know why, right? Because Bangladesh is the poster 
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child.” While contestations over scientific analysis are certainly nothing new, his experience and 
reflections reveal the role that anticipation of climate crisis in Bangladesh can play in shaping 
scientific data about the region, and how those assumptions are circulated and reproduced within 
and between scientific and popular discourses about environmental change in Bangladesh. 
 
Circulations of Climate Science in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, as elsewhere, conversations about climate change perpetually invoke 
climate science, and are eager to discredit denialists. Yet, my research on policy making 
surrounding how to address climate change in southwestern Bangladesh revealed extensive 
questions about what claims are supported by this "science," and, indeed, strong (though usually 
discreetly articulated) concerns about the need for better or "real science" in policy making.  As 
one donor working on climate change issues in Bangladesh explained to me: 
“Of course there's an interest in calling everything 'climate change' right now, because 
that kind of puts you into this category of being 'the most vulnerable country to climate 
change…' But I think we're very, very weak on the science. We have a lot to do. One of 
the things we often say to the government is that we actually have to become better in that, 
because just saying that you are the most vulnerable country to climate change and that 
there will be 30 million climate refugees in the future and that, you know, most of the 
country will be gone, is probably not enough to keep the pity going for a very long time. If 
there are questions about what has really caused it, and where is the money going, the 
money can dry up very very quickly. Which is also sad, because, you know, I think climate 
change is happening.” 
 
As this donor's apparent unease suggests, there is a gap between what is said and what is known 
about climate change in Bangladesh, and this gap has potentially significant implications for how 
climate change is addressed.  
The comments of the donor examined above are are not exceptional. Throughout my 
research, I frequently encountered questions among donors and policy makers about what claims 
are supported by "science" and the need for better or "real science" in policy making. There is also 
concern among some scientists about the invocation about scientific expertise where evidence is 
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deemed to be insufficient or excessively politicized; as one environmental scientist explained to 
me, “there’s been a proliferation of scientists – or people who call themselves scientists. Climate 
change is hardly even a scientific question anymore.” While this scholar would certainly not 
dispute that there is a great deal of critical and rigorous scientific research ongoing about the 
causes and impacts of climate change, his comments reflect frustration with the ways in which 
discourses about scientific evidence are deployed in ways that distort its findings to bestow 
credibility for political purposes. Instead of arbitrating what science is "real" or what claims are 
most accurate, relevant, or valuable, in this chapter I examine what is broadly understood about 
the science of ecological change in the southwest, in order to demonstrate how that knowledge is 
circulated to make particular claims about possible or desirable futures (and to diminish others). I 
examine not only what scientists, policy makers, and development practitioners respectively 
believe is "known" about ecological change and the future, but also their own perceptions of the 
utility and circulation of this knowledge within regimes of adaptation and development. 
One staff member working on climate change adaptation projects at USAID in Dhaka 
estimated that approximately 50% of the funds they spend are related to knowledge production, 
knowledge management, or knowledge training, and told me that among his colleagues at USAID 
and other donor and development agencies, this production, management, and dissemination of 
adaptation knowledge is their primary interest in relation to climate change. The result is the 
amassing of a great body of data that frames the challenges and possible interventions in the 
southwest in relation to climate change. Yet, as the actors and relationships within ESPA Deltas 
demonstrate, knowledge about ecological change in the region and knowledge about appropriate 
interventions to address it are at once distinct and also mutually constituting. The imbrication of 
the two through the production of environmental knowledge alongside development interventions 
thus shapes how the changes are understood as well as how they are addressed. Stott and Huq 
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confirm this in their study of Community-Based Adaptation72 practitioners in Bangladesh, finding 
that the circulation of knowledge about climate change and adaptation is both limited and 
textured by existing power relations within and between global, national, and local scales (Stott 
and Huq 2014).  
A paper published in 2016 by two researchers at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at 
Columbia University highlights important ways in which these circulations of dystopic imaginaries 
about Bangladesh might intersect with the production of scientific knowledge about climate 
change in the country (Chiu and Small 2016). The paper uses data collected from tide gauges 
managed by the Bangladesh Inland Water Transportation Authority (BIWTA) to measure the actual 
tidal activity at 15 different locations throughout the coastal zone during cyclones occurring across 
the past four decades. It compares the observed data of storm surges (meaning the amount of sea 
level rise at a particular moment in time associated with atmospheric storm activity) with a series 
of studies that have examined these storm surges using computer modeling methods. The paper 
responds to widespread reports of up to 7 meters of storm surge heights in “a considerable body of 
literature” on the region, which the authors note has attracted considerable interest in the field due 
to the vulnerable nature of the delta. These reports of dramatic storm surge heights have garnered 
particular attention in the aftermath of Cyclones Sider and Aila (in 2007 and 2009, respectively), 
and have been linked with increased frequency and severity of cyclonic activity related to climate 
change. The authors note that “the focus of these studies is often to provide recommendations for 
decision makers rather than present new data on storm surge associated with cyclones” (Chiu and 
Small 2016, 1150), reflecting the fundamentally policy-oriented and political orientations of many 
																																																						
72 Community-Based Adaptation (CBA) refers to a particular field of practice involving its own series of 
publications, transnational networks of practitioners and researchers, and conferences (the first of which was 
held in Bangladesh in 2005). Forsyth sees CBA as part of a broader trend to link climate policy with 
international development practice (Forsyth, 2013). In this sense, CBA plays an important role in the 
adaptation regime. 
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studies of cyclones in Bangladesh. However, contrary to popular reports and these modeled 
results, the authors find that maximum storm surge heights of Sidr and Aila were approximately 2.6 
meters, and that in many locations during cyclone Sidr, the storm height actually decreased. These 
data can be observed in Figure 28, which indicates evidence of considerable increases in wind 
speeds at the point of each storm, but significantly lower storm surge data than reported, and in 
the case of Sidr, even some cases where the tidal gauges recorded a decrease in tidal levels. 
	
Figure 28. Water level records (red), modeled astronomical tides (green), water-level residuals (blue), and wind speeds 
(black) for cyclones Aila and Sidr. Source: (Chiu and Small 2016). 
In the Discussion section of the paper, the authors take up the question of why their 
analysis of storm surges based on observed data could depart so conspicuously from previous 
studies based on modeled data. They propose that these analyses of higher surge heights of 2 to 7 
meters could be based on models derived from reports of storm surges after the cyclones, rather 
than observed data based on in situ measurements. If Chiu and Small are correct in their analysis 
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of their own data, and its discrepancy with the findings of others’, what we see here is the 
existence of (and a latter challenge to) a scientific consensus based on computer models derived 
from reports of a particular driver of catastrophic event which may have hardly existed, resulting 
from researchers creating models to fit catastrophic popular reports instead of observed changes. 
This is not to deny the very serious impacts of each of these storms; indeed, together they were 
responsible for thousands of deaths, and the damage they inflicted on the embankments and other 
coastal infrastructure caused incalculable harm. The Daily Star newspaper reported that Sidr killed 
around 4,000 people and affected around 1.2 million, while Aila killed 190 and affected around 
3.7 million (Ahmed 2017). Yet, if these impacts were the result of wind speeds as opposed to 
storm surges, the discrepancy between these studies is significant. It indicates how a scientific 
consensus can emerge around the circulation of a particular imagination of a dystopic 
environment, whether or not that imagination is born out in reality. 
 
Politics of Uncertainty 
The diverse, intertwined drivers and dynamics of change, are defined by a sense and 
discourse of uncertainty over their relative importance in relation to one another - what changes 
they will cause, how they will do so, under what timeframes, and how they are interrelated with 
one another. This uncertainty is so central to the discussion of this region that it has itself become 
an important driver of change. While the specter of climate change and the uncertainty over its 
impacts on the future draws greater and greater attention to the region, it also draws attention 
away from the region’s history and political economy, and their ongoing relationships with 
ecological transformations. To be clear, the uncertainty that marks the decisions about how to 
manage this space is real. But the way in which it is claimed, generated, and mobilized toward 
particular futures is marked by inequitable power relations. These unequal relations of power give 
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shape to the politics of uncertainty examined below. 
Discourses and practices of uncertainty in relation to climate change are often associated 
with inevitability, though they are distinct from one another. However, these practices of 
uncertainty highlight how the sense of inevitability emerges out of discourses of uncertainty, and 
the modes of governing that result. Indeed, as Ann Stoler and contributors to her volume, Imperial 
Debris examine, degradation thrives on “the opacities which imperial formations produce” (Stoler 
2013, 9). I examine below uncertainty as a politics and a set of practices, in both discursive and 
material formations. I focus on these practices to draw attention to the ways in which uncertainty 
is an active, rather than passive or incidental relationship to knowledge. Modes of governing 
emerge out of interactions with uncertainty by particular actors and through particular epistemes.73 
 This politics and practice of uncertainty takes many forms, of which I am concerned 
particularly with the following: 1) How uncertainty is claimed. By this I refer to the interface of 
science and politics: why and how particular uncertainties are identified. 2) How uncertainty is 
generated. Here I refer to the active production of a sense of uncertainty through ignoring and/or 
undermining that which is already known but that is seen as politically inconvenient. 3) How 
uncertainty is mobilized. This concerns the politics of what is done in the name of uncertainty, and 
how it is used to pursue particular ends in policy and development. In what follows, I explore 
each of these interconnected practices of uncertainty, and the ways in which they shape the 
dynamics of production and social reproduction throughout southwestern Bangladesh. 
 
Understanding and Addressing Water Logging 
 Though recent years have seen a significant increase in attention to the southwest and the 
																																																						
73 I refer here to Foucault’s usage of episteme as “the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of 
the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterized as scientific” (Foucault 1980, 
197). 
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particular ecological challenges it faces today, these concerns are not new, and neither are 
interventions seeking to address them. For the past 20-30 years, donors in Bangladesh have 
provided significant humanitarian relief funds for communities in the southwest affected by 
seasonal and persistent water logging, assistance that has grown steadily in its scope and 
magnitude. One European donor estimated that in the previous few years (prior to 2015), 
approximately 30 million euros had been spent on humanitarian aid related to water logging, 
remarking “what do you get for that? Well, you get a few people who have been kept alive, they 
might have a few more tarpaulins.” In 2012, a group of these donors, motivated by a growing 
demand for funds to address this chronic crisis, and emboldened by “resilience” frameworks, 
which they said helped them to examine overlapping development challenges and objectives, 
joined together to investigate the “root problems” of water logging in the southwest. This 
investigation, managed by the FAO Bangladesh office on behalf of this donor consortium, came to 
be known as the “Mapping Exercise on Water Logging.” Water logging is a specific and concrete 
problem, which in Bangladesh is often claimed as a particular manifestation of sea level rise. Yet it 
also sits at the intersection of a wide range of social and ecological issues, and thus the Mapping 
Exercise took up water logging as a kind of proxy for investigating these compounded concerns 
throughout the region. 
The discursive and epistemological morass that grew out of the Mapping Exercise is an 
object lesson in the politics of uncertainty in Bangladesh, particularly in relation to the practice of 
claiming uncertainty within the adaptation regime. By the time I began asking questions about the 
study in spring 2014 in private conversations and interviews with donors and consultants 
participating in the process, it was already clear to all of the donors and development practitioners 
involved that they had inadvertently wandered into a tense and awkward political terrain for 
which, a draft report claimed, “no elegant solution exists” (FAO 2015, 92). “Elegance,” in this 
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sense, is a euphemism for political convenience, not for scientific or physical capacity. At the 
heart of this tension are the paired uncertainties over what exactly is causing water logging and, 
subsequently, what the solution is. 
	
Figure 29. Map of water logged area in Khulna as of November 2009. Source: (FAO 2015) 
 The Mapping Exercise motivated a series of uncomfortable conversations about what is 
really driving water logging and disagreements over what the actual problem is. Though 
sedimentation of rivers and subsidence of the land inside the polders has facilitated water logging, 
impediments to drainage are usually related to conflicts between rice agriculture and shrimp 
aquaculture. Specifically, irrigation and drainage canals are often blocked by shrimp producers in 
order to keep saltwater inside embankments, and the canals themselves are often grabbed for use 
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as shrimp ghers (ponds), preventing farmers from flushing out stagnant water.74  The land use and 
tenure arrangements involved in these conflicts are marked by tremendous inequity, compounded 
by the fact that in most cases those involved in occupation of land and canals for shrimp 
cultivation are political and economically influential and enjoy the support of political elites and 
often NGOs.  
 The political economy of land tenure and water management in these communities thus 
drives the water logging problems they are experiencing. It also shapes the way the issue is 
understood. While water logging is a significant problem for some - specifically agriculturalists, 
day laborers dependent on rice cultivation, and those displaced from homes in lower-lying 
floodplains - for others, those who benefit financially from the expansion of shrimp, it is an 
opportunity and a boon. So, while water logging has been identified as an intractable 
humanitarian crisis, the Mapping Exercise revealed that the failure to address these underlying 
political economy issues was what has prevented a solution from being reached. The conversation 
over water logging itself became contentious because it entailed identifying political issues that 
donors and policy makers did not want to discuss openly. One consultant acknowledged to me 
that the “big issue” was how to have a “straightforward” conversation, “because this is not about 
rational solutions to water logging. This is about who owns what.” Indeed, the Mapping Exercise 
revealed uncertainty and disagreement over whether water logging itself is even a problem - one 
project member told me “our aim is not solution minded,” explaining that they intend to address 
“the negative consequences of water logging, not water logging itself, per se.” I understood this to 
mean that if the “root causes” of water logging were found to be politically inconvenient, then 
donors would respond by instead finding ways to manage the fallout of the decision not to address 
																																																						
74 There is also evidence that rapid deforestation for shrimp farming has contributed to increased erosion 
along the river banks, resulting in an increased sediment load in the rivers and resulting in increased siltation 
in the distributary channels around the polders (Deb 1998). 
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those “root causes.”  
 The practice of claiming uncertainty became a primary strategy through which donors 
managed this uncomfortable political landscape. Despite recognition among most if not all 
participants that these political economy dynamics were driving the ongoing water logging issues, 
they retained a shared account of uncertainty to avoid a collective recognition of this. Even as the 
research conducted under the Mapping Exercise illuminated the role of shrimp aquaculture in 
causing and exacerbating water logging, claims of uncertainty coupled with references to climate 
change allowed donors and practitioners to ignore these apparent drivers of change. While donors 
have continued to refer to their associated activities in the southwest as “climate-related,” if not 
specifically designating them as climate change adaptation projects, in private conversations they 
often question this official narrative, and recognize non-climate drivers. One donor described to 
me a private meeting among EU member states in Bangladesh to discuss the ecological challenges 
facing the southwest in which participants discussed the role shrimp aquaculture plays in 
generating degradation. According to this donor, the discussion involved an examination of 
whether the fact that the EU imports roughly 50% of Bangladesh’s shrimp exports means that the 
EU, both through trade and support through development programs investing in aquaculture 
expansion, bears some responsibility for ongoing environmental transformations. However, such 
analysis makes no appearance in any public reports or statements, and when I asked other 
participants in this private meeting about this discussion, they were evasive (without denying the 
conversation or the concerns). The conversation at this private meeting, then, and the donor’s 
comments to me afterward, represent moments of fissure in these practices of uncertainty. 
The draft report of the Mapping Exercise mentioned above languished as a “DRAFT FOR 
CONSULTATION”, with some participants saying it would always be referred to as a “draft” 
indefinitely to allow space for such equivocation. Nevertheless, it provided a roadmap for 
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planning and coordination of activities among concerned agencies in subsequent phases of the 
Mapping Exercise. Toward the end of the report is a table mapping the responsibilities of various 
agencies and activities that could be undertaken to fulfill them, summarizing the key conclusions 
of the exercise overall (see Appendix A). The table, regularly referred to obliquely by participants 
as “the matrix,” reflects these fundamentally contradictory activities and objectives. This is 
manifested most clearly in its simultaneous recognition of aquaculture’s role in water logging 
along with proposals for facilitating aquaculture expansion. For example, it (somewhat obliquely) 
recognizes the problematic blocking of public drainage canals for aquaculture ghers where it lists 
government responsibilities as “removing illegal and unplanned structures” and “adopt policy to 
limit leasing of rivers/canals, and implement.” This also reflects the challenge faced in addressing 
water logging that government authorities are often complicit in blocking drainage to create 
shrimp ghers, either overtly leasing them out, or implicitly authorizing them through non-
interference with “illegal” dam structures. Yet, it also lists a series of potential aquaculture support 
interventions, such as “create ‘clusters’ covering enhanced ‘agro-aquaculture,’” and “adoption of 
other suitable technologies in the crop shrimp.” These contradictions reflect disagreement over 
what the problem is and tension over mandates and conflicting goals. Moreover, in suggesting that 
local government authorities could take responsibility for mitigating these legal or illegal land and 
canal occupations, the Matrix ignores the imbrication of political and economic elites. In the text 
of the report, it lists local Members of Parliament, Union Parishad Chairmen, and other local 
political leaders and civil service officials as among those opposing certain water logging 
mitigation efforts, due to their investments in shrimp aquaculture.  
These contradictions are inherent in the approach of the report itself in explicitly avoiding 
the politics driving the water logging crisis in the southwest. “The matrix does not analyze,” one 
consultant told me. Importantly, it fails to provide a coherent vision for eliminating the water 
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logging problems that the Mapping Exercise theoretically aimed to address in the first place. By 
retaining a collective account of uncertainty concerning the drivers of water logging, donors thus 
are able to avoid taking steps toward mitigating them. 
	
Figure 30. Map of Waterlogging in Khulna and Shatkhira Districts. Source: (Awal 2014) 
The Mapping Exercise illuminates the role uncertainty can play in the process of what 
Tania Li refers to as “rendering technical,” the enframing of a field of intervention appropriate to 
the kinds of solutions that experts already have to offer (Li 2007). The Mapping Exercise rendered 
technical the problem of water logging by understanding what the problem was only in relation to 
available solutions. Crucially, uncertainty was employed to evade available solutions that these 
experts deemed to be undesirable. As the problem of climate change is rendered technical, the 
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constant production of scientific knowledge about its effects in the southwest produces a particular 
field of intervention. Yet, where the normative developmentalism of the adaptation regime limits 
the scope of possible strategies for addressing these changes, uncertainty is deployed to delimit a 
broadly vision of possible futures for the region. 
I gained firsthand insight into how these competing concerns around water logging are 
negotiated through a project managed by UNDP. I had originally gone to meet with a staff 
member there involved in the Mapping Exercise, to learn about the UNDP’s work with the study 
and interventions designed to mitigate the impacts of water logging. While I was there I learned 
about a pilot program they were calling “TRM++,” which they planned to implement in Khulna’s 
Tala subdistrict (see Figure 30: Tala is bordered to the east by the subdistricts of Paikgachha and 
Dumuria, field sites explored in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6). TRM stands for Tidal River 
Management, which refers to a vaguely defined set of strategies for mitigating water logging 
impacts within the polders, broadly targeted at temporarily opening up sections of embankment to 
selectively reintroduce tidal flow. The goal is to raise up the land elevation by facilitating the 
accretion of sediments on lowlands through intentionally flooding with sediment-rich tidal water. 
The history of TRM strategies are generally traced back to an incident in Beel75 Dakatia, a 
marshy lowland in Polder 25 that in 1982 began to suffer from drainage congestion and chronic 
water logging related to technical issues with the polder system (described in Chapter 1) (Rahman 
1995). By 1990, Adnan writes that 40,000 acres of land and homesteads in Beel Dakatia were 
continuously under water (Adnan 2009, 113). In response, local farmers, having identified the 
problem’s relation to the embankments preventing tidal sediments from being deposited on and 
building up their land, organized a mass mobilization to breach the embankment and allow the 
																																																						
75 There are several words in the Bengali language used to refer to marshy lowlands or wetlands, including 
beel, haor, baor, and jheel. There is little technical difference between them. “Beel” is the word primarily 
used to refer to such lowlands in southwestern Bangladesh. 
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water from the river to flow inside the polder. Their strategy was at least partially successful – with 
tidal activity resumed, sediments flowed freely into the polder, rapidly building up the land. By 
1992, Adnan observed, at least 2,500 acres of land had resurfaced, and farmers had resumed rice 
production (Adnan et al. 1992, 52). Shortly thereafter, however, the government stepped in with a 
new intervention to address the infrastructure and drainage issues in Polder 25, which involved 
plugging the cuts that farmers had made in the embankment.  
Subsequently, TRM has gained a kind of cult status, celebrated as a potential remedy for 
problems created by the polders that relies on unique local knowledge (Khadim et al. 2013; 
Shampa 2012; Hossain, Khan, and Shum 2015). The pioneering work of farmers in Beel Dakatia to 
forge this experiment makes it a popular idea with activists, while it is also occasionally discussed 
in development circles as a potential low-cost compromise to address the problems with the 
polders without completely dismantling them. However, this celebration of the potential of TRM 
notwithstanding, widespread adoption in development planning has been thwarted due to the 
challenges of replicability. Not every water logged area is physically suitable for TRM, dependent 
largely on the proximity and path of the river channels to the area to be raised (if the water has to 
come too far or take a circuitous route to the lowland, the sediment won’t make it all the way, and 
therefore won’t result in successful accretion). The process of translating the TRM experience into 
transferable engineering principles has also jettisoned the social and political particularities that 
made the experience in Beel Dakatia successful (Islam and Kibria 2006). Its implementation is very 
slow, messy, and requires concerted efforts at collective deliberation and action. These 
characteristics make TRM difficult to translate into concrete development programs, with their 
strict and limited timeframes and predetermined goals and objectives. Specifically, farmers in Beel 
Dakatia had forged a consensus on returning their land to rice cultivation, and TRM facilitated the 
change in water regime required for this. However, a lack of consensus on what to produce may 
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also involve a lack of consensus on the amount and scheduling of water availability. As noted in 
the discussion of the Mapping Exercise, those interested in cultivating shrimp may regard as 
favorable the same flooded conditions that rice farmers regard as inimical to production. 
Moreover, attempts of development agencies to put TRM into practice have been confounded by 
the challenges of how and who to compensate for lost production revenues during the period 
during with the land is forcibly inundated (van Staveren, Warner, and Khan 2017). These 
challenges and limitations of TRM in particular places have led researchers and development 
agencies to focus their energy on pursuing other more “comprehensive” water management 
strategies with broader potential for replication (Auerbach et al. 2015b). 
The UNDP’s TRM++ project intended to address these deficiencies in previous attempts at 
replication. The program’s official documentation listed the intended outcome of the program as 
“By 2016, populations vulnerable to climate change and natural disaster have become more 
resilient to adapt to risks” (UNDP 2014). In the early stages of implementing the project, they 
asked me to go visit the village where they were implementing it, as they were looking for 
assistance in documentation and analysis of the process. Extoling the project’s innovative features 
before I went to see for myself, the UNDP staff told me at length about the “community 
consultation process” focused on the landless and the poorest villagers. They described their 
intervention as primarily “social mobilization” with “some physical aspects.” The idea was 
essentially to choose a suitable TRM site, and then through consultation with the community to 
financially compensate the landowners for the crop loss during the seasons when the land had 
been intentionally flooded, but to allow the poorest community members (landless people and 
sharecroppers) to fish in the flooded wetland while it was under water. Thus, the landowners 
would be compensated for the lost earning potential from their crops, while the agricultural 
laborers would be compensated for the lost wages through earnings from fishing income. One staff 
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member explained to me “our key interest is around the social engineering of it,” and in 
demonstrating to the government that they can “get more social feasibility out of TRM.” While I 
was apprehensive about the conflation of “social engineering” and “social mobilization,” as I 
understood it, the goals of the program were to address the environmental impacts of the polder 
system with sensitivity to their intervention’s social impacts. I agreed to go check it out. 
UNDP had commissioned physical, environmental, and socioeconomic baseline studies of 
the proposed project sites prior to initiating work there, carried out by faculty from Dhaka and 
Khulna Universities (Khulna University 2014; University of Dhaka 2014). Having read their richly 
detailed reports before arriving, I had learned that there were two sites being considered for the 
TRM++ project. The physical baseline study clearly demonstrated that one of the proposed sites 
would be a suitable option for implementation of TRM, as it is located directly adjacent to the 
river, and the velocity of the water flowing in from the river would carry a substantial amount of 
sediment to the currently water logged lands. The other site under consideration, according to the 
report, was not suitable for TRM, as its physical geography separates it from much of the tidal 
influence. It is located 770 m from the river, and water would be forced to travel to the site 
through a narrow canal with several angles, all of which would reduce the velocity of the water 
and its capacity to carry sediment to the beel (University of Dhaka 2014, 26). However, the reports 
also indicated that while local agriculturalists (landless laborers, sharecroppers, and land owners) 
in the suitable site were in support of TRM, as it would restore their lands for rice cultivation, the 
plan faced opposition from a small group of elites, who had leased the waterlogged lands (in some 
cases forcibly) to cultivate shrimp. These people, referred to in the reports as gher businessmen or 
gher owners, opposed the project because raising the land to make it viable for agriculture would 
undermine their ability to continue cultivating shrimp (Khulna University 2014, 38). As observed 
in the Mapping Exercise, for some people in this community, waterlogging was a threat to their 
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livelihoods, while for others, it was a source of economic opportunity. The site that was unsuitable 
for TRM didn’t suffer from these same conflicts because they didn’t have ghers there. Being so far 
from the river, it was difficult to transport sufficient saltwater there for shrimp cultivation. This 
made agriculture the only option. 
 Given this assessment of the technical feasibility of the intervention, I was somewhat 
surprised to find out when I arrived in Tala that only the site determined unsuitable for TRM had 
been selected for its implementation. The local staff explained to me that they had decided not to 
pursue the work in the suitable site because “there was a lot of complexity.” As I probed further, I 
learned that there were about 100 land owners in the suitable site, all of whom were in support of 
the TRM intervention, but there were also 10-15 gher businessmen who were not landowners but 
who leased all of the waterlogged land for shrimp cultivation. “The businessmen didn’t want to 
stop their gher business. They were also very influential,” I was told. Faced with this opposition 
from influential businessmen, the project staff decided to give up on the suitable site, and 
redirected their efforts to the other site, despite the prior determination that its physical conditions 
made it unlikely that TRM would succeed there. “Ok, it is true,” the project staff explained to me, 
“the canal will get silted up [again] within a few years, so it is not a permanent solution.” 
Nevertheless, the TRM intervention would be more political convenient there because there were 
no gher owners opposing it. 
Before I went to visit the project site, the staff told me about Bablu, a resident of the village 
who was described in turns as a local farmer and the founder of a social welfare NGO that sought 
to help the village’s poor residents. Because of his position, he was the primary contact for the 
project staff, and was organizing local residents who would become its beneficiaries. When I met 
Bablu on the way to the beel, I immediately noticed his watch, his unblemished attire (including 
pants, not the traditional lungi sarong of a farmer), and his motorcycle. There could be no doubt 
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that he was not a member of the landless population I had been told about before I came. Both 
Bablu and the program staff were clearly unsettled by my request to spend the day walking around 
the village alone talking to people. They wanted to serve as intermediaries, and didn’t think more 
than half an hour would be necessary to see everything. It shortly became apparent to me why this 
was the case, as my conversations in the village revealed serious discrepancies between the 
project’s implementation and its vision as it had earlier been described to me. The inconsistencies 
were clearest when I crossed the canal to a patch of land where I found the humblest homes in the 
village. While the beel itself was flanked by brick pucca houses on large plots, often with gardens, 
the houses on the other side of the canal were all constructed of mud and corrugated metal, in 
various states of disrepair. This was where the landless people lived. Most of them worked as 
agricultural laborers and supplemented their income with other migratory work, such as working 
in brick fields and collecting honey and other resources from the Sundarbans. A clear consensus 
emerged as I walked from house to house talking with these residents – most of them had not 
heard of TRM or of the UNDP project. “No, they haven’t talked to us,” one man explained to me, 
“the NGO people come talk to the boro lok (elites), then they make decisions, do whatever they 
want.” Those who had heard about the TRM project and those who I told about it were convinced 
that the poor would not be its beneficiaries, as had been described to me at the UNDP office in 
Dhaka. When I asked about Bablu’s social welfare work, several of these residents laughed at me – 
“he doesn’t help the poor, he is just a large landowner,” one man explained.  
This unilateral exclusion of the village’s poorest residents was confirmed at the end of the 
day when the UNDP staff arranged a meeting for me with the people they described as program 
beneficiaries taking part in the “social mobilization” process. Of the approximately 25 
beneficiaries present, none of the landless people or day laborers I had met during my day in the 
village were in attendance. I asked them to go around the room and tell me what kind of work 
  162 
they did. They were all landowners. Several of them were businessmen, including two jewelry 
store owners, and proprietors of a meat shop and a convenience store. As we discussed the plans 
for economic activity in the beel during the wet season when it would be flooded through the 
TRM intervention, they said they planned to lease it out for others to fish in. When I asked what 
they thought the landless people (who were not the program beneficiaries) would do during this 
time, they looked back at me blankly. They could take microcredit loans, one man suggested. 
It would be easy to dismiss this as a case of faulty program implementation and elite 
capture of a development intervention. However, the decision to reject the first site suitable for 
TRM and the role of Bablu and wealthy landowners in the second site suggest that accepting (even 
entrenching) the power of local elites was foundational to the program itself. Despite obvious 
concern in the program’s conception and formation for the impacts of waterlogging on the 
poorest, the program repeatedly declined opportunities to directly address local power 
imbalances. In refusing to unsettle and ultimately choosing to work within these existing power 
structures, the program failed to mitigate the effects of these unequal agrarian political economies, 
despite the obvious interest of the poorest residents of both communities.  
A couple months after my visit to Tala, I saw a Bangladeshi friend who works at a 
university in Dhaka and has also conducted research for several years in Paikgachha. He told me 
that he had been hired for a consultancy to evaluate the TRM++ project. I told him that I had 
visited the project site in Tala myself, and began to convey some of my concerns to him. He 
interrupted me, saying he didn’t want to know what was wrong with the project. Reminding me 
that many faculty members at Bangladeshi institutions are paid so little that they depend on 
consulting contracts to supplement their livelihoods, he told me that my perspective on the 
problems with this project was a luxury he couldn’t afford. He said he felt that if he articulated 
these criticisms about the program, he may not be hired for further consulting contracts in the 
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future. When I pressed him on this, saying I thought we both had a responsibility to sharing with 
each other, and to the transparent dissemination of information about development interventions 
in our shared field site, he abruptly got up and left the room. Once I got past some self-righteous 
indignation about his refusal to recognize my concerns, I realized that my friend’s point about the 
unequal structures of research funding and compensation was fundamental to the dynamics of 
knowledge production in Bangladesh today. Indeed, these dynamics, of who has the choice to say 
what and know what, fundamentally shape the politics of uncertainty.  
This example of the TRM project speaks to a wider concern with the exercise of knowledge 
about designing and implementing effective intervention, and with the politics of adaptation. As 
the diverse experiences in Beel Dakatia and Tala demonstrate, TRM itself, like any technical 
intervention or adaptation strategy, does not possess a fundamental politics. Its politics is shaped 
by the communities where it is practiced, the relationships within them, by whose interests it does 
and does not serve. It is only through decisions about how to respond to these dynamics that the 
politics of TRM is manifested. In choosing to ignore the role of these socio-economic factors, the 
program also failed to effective address their environmental consequences. As the knowledge 
about the potential for TRM in Tala traveled (from the historical experience of Beel Dakatia 
through the baseline studies carried out by researchers at Dhaka and Khulna Universities, to 
program design and implementation), details about what success would look like and how to 
achieve it were both eliminated and transformed. Through this process of translation, uncertainty 
was mobilized to shape the use of TRM in a particular way, ultimately failing to address the social 
and economic factors that might have made the TRM++ approach successful in mitigating both 
waterlogging and inequality together. 
 
Timeframes 
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One of the primary ways that the sense of inevitability of climate change is produced is 
through the uncertainty concerning timeframes of potential and predicted impacts of change. The 
uncertain timeframe bleeds into a muddled sense of how these "inevitable" changes will take 
place. Are they already happening now? If so, is there anything that can be done about them? 
What are their antecedents? Are they, too, inevitable? 
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Figure 31. Summary of SRES: global scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions with projected global average surface 
warming and sea level rise by the end of the 21st century. Based on Storylines and data extracted from (Stocker et al. 
2013; IPCC 2007; Nakićenović et al. 2000) 
Uncertainty over timeframes of change is the result of uncertainty over both global and 
local dynamics of environmental change. In accounting for global climate change, most studies 
employ the greenhouse gas emissions scenarios produced by the IPCC in the Special Report on 
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Emissions Scenarios (SRES).76 The four scenarios produced by the SRES reflect different possible 
global futures in the time of climate change, which it characterizes as divergent “storylines.” These 
different storylines are distinguished by trajectories of global geopolitics, demographic, economic, 
and technological change, and accompanying projections of greenhouse gas emissions. A 
summary of these different scenarios in Figure 31 demonstrates the translation of global and 
regional political regimes into specific metrics of aggregated global environmental change 
(including average surface warming and sea level rise). 
When these four different future emissions scenarios are applied to projections of future 
conditions at the local level, their impacts are often quite different. An example of projections of 
future salinity in the coastal region is instructive. Researchers and practitioners studying these 
changes in the coastal region often create maps of the movement of the saline frontier (examined 
above). Salinity is measured in parts per thousand (ppt); it is considered sustainable to irrigate with 
water up to a salinity measure of 4ppt without excessive adverse impacts on crops, still allowing 
for monsoon leaching without residual soil salinity (Clarke et al. 2015). One group of ESPA 
researchers mapped projected salinity fronts in the year 2050 of 2ppt (considered “slightly saline,” 
but sustainable for agriculture) and 4ppt (considered the highest possible salinity level for dry 
season irrigation.77 These researchers selected SRES scenarios B1 (which they consider most 
benign) and A2 (which they consider aggressive and extreme). As shown in Figure 32, the worst 
case scenario of A2 affects a much larger region in the 2ppt map, while the salinity front is 
relatively similar in all scenarios in the 4ppt map. Relative to the current salinity conditions, the 
																																																						
76 In 2013, a new IPCC report replaced the scenarios outlined in the SRES with new Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RPCs), which reflect a larger set of mitigation scenarios, emissions, and associated 
warming (Stocker et al. 2013).  
77 These studies map the sustainability of dry season agriculture, not monsoon season agriculture. The latter, 
which is the most common crop in the coastal region, is considered less susceptible to these salinity fronts, 
given the availability of abundant fresh water for irrigation during the monsoon. 
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most benign scenario of B1 represents a relatively minor difference from current conditions in both 
the 2ppt and 4ppt maps. 
A World Bank blog post on the topic of climate impacts in coastal Bangladesh used the 
same data to produce the map in Figure 33 (Dasgupta 2015).78 The map features only the 2ppt 
saline front (considered sustainable for continued dry season agricultural cultivation), in which the 
worst case A2 scenario projects relatively dramatic change. These different depictions of similar 
data demonstrate how global climate change projections can be applied to suggest different 
possible futures for coastal Bangladesh. In this case, the scenarios suggest different perceptions of 
the possibility of continued agricultural production in much of the region. 
However, analysis of potential timeframes of change becomes more more complex when 
models attempt to account for the broad range of local drivers of change that affect the same 
dynamics. As described earlier in this chapter, soil and water salinity in the coastal region is 
impacted by myriad other local patterns, which have the potential to interact with these global 
scenarios in a wide variety of ways. Thus, potential future scenarios proliferate rapidly in attempts 
to integrate global and local scenarios of future change. In another ESPA study, a group of 
researchers attempt to model local transformations (such as crop simulation and demographic 
changes) at different temporal scales, from daily to decadal time periods, and use these models 
alongside the SRES projections. Accounting for these local dynamics, they project limited change 
in agricultural production in the period until 2050, largely due to projected productivity increases 
of hybrid seed varieties (Lázár et al. 2015). The study highlights that global projections do not 
necessarily interact with local projections in predictable ways, and thus understanding timeframes 
of change is subject to uncertainty about the future at multiple scales.  
																																																						
78 Both studies employed data produced by a study carried out by the World Bank (Dasgupta, Kamal, et al. 
2014). 
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Figure 32. Dry season salinity fronts in southwestern Bangladesh under best and worst case global greenhouse gas 
emissions scenarios B1 and A2. Source: (Clarke et al. 2015) 
	
Figure 33. World Bank blog map of possible salinity frontiers in the year 2050. Source: (Dasgupta 2015) 
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For donors and development practitioners, however, the details of these local scenarios of 
likely change are less relevant than timeframes for action. When they speak of timeframes, it is in 
relation to investment and risk. Thinking in terms of different timeframes suggest different frames of 
action. Thus, one DFID official described the timeframe for incremental adaptation (explored 
further in Chapter 6) as 0-5 years, meaning that they anticipated limited long-term impact of these 
interventions. In contrast, while talking with a World Bank administrator about the depolderization 
examined in Chapter 3, he explained to me “if you don’t think about it in the 100-200 year 
timeframe, you’re just going to be thinking about building up the embankments. But most of our 
work is about thinking in the long-term.” For these donors, each of these timeframes for imagining 
the future results in dramatically different kinds of possible intervention. 
The fuzziness over whether or not we are already observing the effects of climate change 
in the coastal zone facilitates perhaps the greatest opportunities for claiming uncertainty about the 
ongoing ecological changes in the region. Sometimes specific data are pointed to in order to 
indicate that it is already happening, such as current rises in salinity being taken as an indication 
of climate-induced sea level rise. Other times, however, the same data is interpreted (often by the 
same people) as indicative of what the effects of climate change will be when they do take place 
sometime in the indefinite future. These different interpretations are a matter of constructing 
narratives about how to think about climate change, and employing available data about 
environmental change in service of these different narratives. In this case, the claim that "it hasn't 
happened yet, but it will happen" takes on new force through the assertion that the southwest is 
currently experiencing changes like those that will result from climate change, and therefore we 
can know what will happen and how people will be effected regardless of the real drivers of 
changes currently being observed. 
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If this convoluted logic is difficult to follow, its implications are more clear when it comes 
to planning particular interventions in light of these uncertain timeframes. In the case of converting 
land use from rice to shrimp, the claim of uncertain timeframes lends weight to the argument that 
even under predicted scenarios in which rice agriculture comes under threat due to climate 
change in some 50-100 years, it is important to begin preparing communities now for changes that 
will inevitably come later. In the case of shrimp, this process of preparing for the "inevitable" 
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, when aquaculture produces the ecological impacts for which it 
is proposed as an adaptation solution. 
What is more, the opportunities afforded by adaptation are themselves offered as an excuse 
for uncertainty, and rationale for avoiding attribution of drivers of ecological change. One scientist 
working for a large development agency involved in promoting shrimp aquaculture explained to 
me that in the southwest, "there is an incredible amount of adaptation going on constantly," 
continuing that whether degradation through salinity is caused by rising sea levels or the 
intentional flooding of land for shrimp production, "it almost doesn't matter, as long as people can 
adapt." Clearly whether it matters or not is a political rather than "scientific" concern. 
 
Rice, Shrimp, and Migration 
As uncertainty about ecological change in the southwest is often claimed, it is also actively 
produced through particular development discourses and research practices. Though claims to 
uncertainty as described above also clearly serve a purpose, in this section I refer to those 
practices through which uncertainty is produced through the act of knowledge production itself. 
Uncertainty about conflicts over shrimp production and uncertainty over rural out-migration are 
two areas where these practices are manifested most clearly, and I turn my attention to them 
below. 
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While donors, development practitioners and researchers claim uncertainty over the 
interface between the ecological impacts of shrimp aquaculture and those of climate change, 
when it comes to the social implications of shrimp, uncertainty is actively produced by these same 
actors. Often this production takes place in the interstices of claims to authority over decision 
making and gaps and evasions of translation between local and international actors. 
Though the conflicts between shrimp and rice are usually actively ignored by concerned 
donors and policy makers, when they are raised, these actors respectively demur, claiming a lack 
of responsibility or influence over the political economy of production in the southwest. Donors 
and foreign development practitioners claim that knowledge and responsibility concerning these 
conflicts lies with the government, while civil servants working for state agencies claim it is for the 
donors supporting aquaculture programs to investigate and address such claims. In one interview 
with an official at the Bangladesh Department of Agricultural Extension (DoAE), I was told that the 
the DoAE doesn't get involved in conflicts over rice and shrimp unless farmers are interested in 
making the shift to shrimp, in which case they may provide support. Otherwise, it is the 
responsibility of donors to assess the costs and benefits of shrimp production, as "assessment" 
requires money, which donors manage and allocate. The official claimed to me that the DoAE 
possesses technical expertise in production technologies, but does not have additional expertise in 
the kinds of "assessment" that require economists, sociologists, and other experts, work that he 
believed donors are uniquely suited to support and initiate. The official cited the Mapping Exercise 
as one example of donors funding and making decisions about what will be examined about 
ecological change and development, as well as how such assessments will be carried out. In this 
sense, the official highlighted how decisions over what will be understood and what will remain 
uncertain are actively shaped in the development planning process. 
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For their part, donors uniformly dismiss responsibility for evaluating or addressing the 
conflict between shrimp and rice, which one foreign development practitioner involved in a major 
USAID-funded shrimp aquaculture program referred to as "just personal local fights."79 In another 
conversation, when I asked a question about “land grabbing” for shrimp production, another 
practitioner corrected my phrasing by saying “you mean ‘multi-ownership.’” I subsequently heard 
this linguistic conceit of “multi-ownership” repeatedly – it is seemingly aimed at obfuscating the 
power dynamics embedded in these “multiple” claims to land at the frontier between shrimp and 
rice. This diminution of the significance of these conflicts and of the role they play in the 
expansion of aquaculture production reflects the selective mobilization of knowledge about land 
relations embedded in shrimp cultivation.  
Although the dynamics of land under shrimp cultivation in Bangladesh have long been 
brought to the fore by activists in public discussions both locally and internationally, development 
policy makers frequently refer to their lack of responsibility, certainty, or understanding of the 
dynamics of shrimp production to defend their support of it. The National Aquaculture 
Development Strategy and Action Plan of Bangladesh, a policy document developed by the FAO 
for the Bangladeshi government, provides an example of this slippage. Buried in an Annex deep at 
the back of the document is a "log frame”80 identifying the "assumptions and risks" of aquaculture 
																																																						
79 Development practitioners recognize these conflicts and their significance with varying degrees of 
concern, though with a common sense of lack of responsibility. One senior diplomat from the United States 
acknowledged the land conflicts related to shrimp with a chortle that seemed to absolve his own office’s 
support of the aquaculture expansion, exclaiming “well, the mafia down there has just messed everything 
up!” By “mafia” he referred to the reports of land grabbing, a practice he intended to claim was not inherent 
to shrimp production, which could be, he said, a billion-dollar industry, if not for the malpractice of this 
isolated cabal. By refusing to acknowledge the complicity of aid agencies, and indeed those supported by 
the United States government itself, in rural dispossession through shrimp aquaculture expansion, such 
comments produce uncertainty about the nature of agrarian change and its drivers. 
80 A "log frame" or "logical framework" is a methodology used by international development agencies for 
designing, monitoring and evaluating development projects. It is presented as a table, within which the rows 
list activities, outputs, purposes, and goals and the columns list project description, indicators, means of 
verification, and assumptions. It aims to convey a sense of rational and goal-oriented project planning. 
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development in Bangladesh (see Appendix B). The table indicates the assumption that benefits of 
shrimp aquaculture to the poor and landless are predicated on an "equitable land and water 
allocation system." Similarly, the risk embedded in spatial planning/mapping of zones (a process 
examined in further detail below) for aquaculture development is "that potential resource use 
conflicts are not resolved among the various agencies." In both cases, these are fatal assumptions. 
As one donor pointed out to me in a conversation about this Plan, in a functional log frame, both 
of these assumptions would be "deal breakers." The failure to acknowledge these flaws - 
specifically, that land and water allocation is not equitable, and that resource use conflicts have 
not been resolved -- suggests a particular relationship to how information is assessed and 
incorporated into development planning. Who is responsible for addressing these concerns, and 
fatal assumptions, is also, then, a matter of uncertainty. Even as the FAO itself created this national 
planning document, it produced uncertainty about the fundamental role of this planning in 
shaping the equity of land and resource distribution. 
Another example of this active production of uncertainty is in the epistemological politics 
of discourses over "climate migration," which both obscure and facilitate the dispossessions 
embedded in the conflicts discussed above (Hartmann 2010; Brammer 2009). In chapter 5, I 
explore in greater detail the normative orientation of development practitioners and donors toward 
promotion of climate migration as an opportunity for development in both rural and urban areas of 
Bangladesh. Here I examine how this is facilitated through the production of uncertainty over the 
drivers of rural out-migration from the southwest. Most significantly, migration that is said to be 
driven by climate change is also said to be inevitable (as discussed above), while migration driven 
by dynamics of development and land dispossession (through the transition from rice to shrimp or 
otherwise) suggests a different set of responses and solutions. Thus, claiming climate change as the 
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driver of rural out-migration without reference to other factors impedes possible responses to, and 
thus entrenches rural dispossession.  
One research institute in Dhaka widely celebrated by donors and practitioners, with a 
prolific record of publications and presentations concerning climate migration, offers an instructive 
example of this process of knowledge production. The work of this institute to propagate 
discourses surrounding climate migration serves to produce uncertainty about the nature of 
ecological change and the demographic shifts which accompany it. Climate migrant discourses 
are born out of the production of uncertainty over what constitutes "climate migration" as opposed 
to migration taking place for economic or other reasons. This institute regularly presents 
projections that between 2011 and 2050, as many as 16 to 26 million people will migrate from 
Bangladesh's coastal zone due to climate-related stressors. These figures are cited widely among 
donors, development practitioners and policy makers in Bangladesh as the best projections for 
understanding climate migration from this region (often cited as the region that will experience the 
effects of climate migration most dramatically).  
However, this projection, and the particular data analysis on which it is based, turns on the 
production of uncertainty about the drivers of migration. The methodology through which these 
figures were derived is based on the deployment of normative development objectives in place of 
clear investigation of available data. In this way, studies of migration come to be shaped by the 
researchers’ normative understanding of the fundamental desirability of migration. Another 
researcher affiliated with the institute described above asked a group of development practitioners 
at a private meeting in Dhaka, "if we are going to promote [migration] as a climate change 
adaptation strategy, how are we going to do it? Do we have enough research evidence?" Thus, 
establishing the "evidence" that might be used in service of these goals becomes the driver of how 
research and analysis is carried out. In one public presentation of their findings, researchers from 
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the institute acknowledged that only 10% of their respondents attributed the primary reason for 
their migration to climatic stress. This finding is clearly at odds with their conviction that climate 
stress and migration are definitively linked. However, they explained that climate migrants may 
not be aware of the role that climate change plays in their decisions to migrate. Therefore, an 
alternative methodology, wherein migrants are asked what climate-related stressors they had 
experienced, suggested that any migrant who had experienced a "climate-related stressor" was a 
climate migrant, regardless of their own attribution of what had driven this decision. This strategic 
methodological shift was confirmed in multiple conversations I have had with separate members 
of the research team.  
The implications of these methodological decisions to development policy are significant. 
Indeed, the effects of climate change are seen as intractable and beyond the control of local 
development policy. Therefore, if people are migrating due to climate change, there's nothing that 
can be done about it. That these migration patterns will only grow as the effects of climate change 
increase is assumed to be self-evident. And the need for people to escape these climate-vulnerable 
communities becomes equally self-evident. This uncertainty over the exact drivers of migration is 
ubiquitous in research examining climate migration around the world. The inability of researchers 
to ascribe any particular changes at this spatial or temporal scale to climate change leads to 
understandable uncertainty in drawing causal relations between climate change and multi-causal 
patterns such as migration. There is nothing fundamentally flawed about attempts to explore 
patterns in the face of such methodological gaps. However, it is necessary to be aware of the 
normative claims that may result from such assumptions, as well as particular practices that 
produce uncertainty about these dynamics. If, for example, these migrations were understood to 
be the result of the expansion of shrimp aquaculture, then the potential responses would be much 
more diverse, and perhaps less inevitable. The value of the landscape, and the communities which 
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inhabit it, thus shift along with the uncertainty over the biophysical dynamics shaping them now 
and in the future.  
 
Zoning 
One of the key tools cited by development practitioners in Bangladesh as essential to 
climate change adaptation is land use zoning in the coastal region. Referred to in the planning 
documents of donors, NGOs, and various government line ministries, project proposals, and in 
regular conversation among staff at these agencies, zoning is celebrated as a kind of panacea for 
all climate-related planning challenges. It is said to resolve uncertainty by rationalizing an 
otherwise unwieldy planning process, concretizing planning through the reconciliation of 
disparate aspirational visions through hard-nosed scientific data. Zoning is said to maximize 
economic benefits and to reduce conflicts of all sorts - between forests and human settlements, 
rural production and urbanization, and, critically, between rice and shrimp. In this sense, zoning 
serves to exculpate the promotion of shrimp aquaculture from critique of its negative impacts, and 
to insulate it from resistance. 
Yet, for all the celebration of zoning as the solution to a variety of adaptation planning 
dilemmas, further details about the process of rationalizing what should be grown where (and 
why) proved to be unexpectedly hard to come by. Over the two years during which I conducted 
fieldwork in Bangladesh, detailed accounts of the process of land use zoning became the veritable 
white whale of my research, a supposedly objective but ultimately furtive science with elusive and 
enigmatic methodologies. My adventures chasing the secrets of this science, I believe, ultimately 
taught me more about the nature of the development planning process than any particular zoning 
map or methodology could have. 
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Indeed, for all of the times zoning is invoked to explain away criticism of conflict, 
practitioners and policy makers I talked to only described its use in this ideological sense. These 
zoning measures are never implemented as strict land use policies, nor are existing plans detailed 
enough to be put to this further use. Several different government agencies and NGOs have their 
own unique zoning maps held internally but not necessarily shared with other agencies. An 
official at WARPO (a government agency tasked with high-level water management planning) told 
me that he knew of distinct zoning maps produced by the NGO WorldFish, the FAO, and the 
Bangladeshi Ministry of Land, and an independent group of university researchers. Yet, though 
each of these agencies may have used these maps internally to justify where they would carry out 
their own projects,81 they weren’t agreed upon and they often weren’t shared publicly.  
The official at WARPO described these zoning plans as necessary for curbing the incursion 
of shrimp into lands still suitable for agricultural production, but also potentially futile. The Coastal 
Zone Policy indicates zoning as the means of resolving conflicts between rice and shrimp. Yet, “it 
is almost too late,” he said to me, inferring that the conversion of land suitable for rice agriculture 
to shrimp aquaculture may not be able to be controlled through such governance measures. He 
continued, “everybody is afraid. Even the Land Ministry is skipping the responsibility. They are 
afraid of the moneyed people. Or they are benefitting from that money themselves.” In this way, 
he explained, the only role of the zoning documents would be to implicitly validate the expansion 
of the shrimp cultivation area, in the sense that they will not control it, but they may condone it.  
This is reflected in the Land Ministry’s zoning map for the Paikgachha subdistrict, which 
the WARPO official shared with me (see Figure 34). It indicates that Polder 23 (which has already 
been fully converted to shrimp) is zoned exclusively for shrimp, while Polder 22 (which is still 
																																																						
81 This likely for the first organizations listed, and less so for the independent researchers, although 
academics are often hired as individuals or departments for private consulting work, and in that context, 
such academic analysis can be used for project design. 
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entirely a rice farming area) is zoned for both agriculture and shrimp. The map thus indicates that 
agriculture is unviable in the shrimp zone, while suggesting that shrimp could also be possible in 
the rice zone. When I pushed the official for further details on the methodology for determining 
this land use suitability, he described with cynicism his familiarity with the process at the Land 
Ministry. “They were not at all serious about that,” he said, “there were some fishy things going 
on. [They were under] very much pressure because shrimp export is so lucrative.” The concerns 
cited by this official suggest that, contrary to being a tool of rationality and transparency, zoning is 
useful precisely in the opacity and uncertainty governing its production and utilization.  
	
Figure 34. Bangladesh Ministry of Land Paikgachha subdistrict land use and land zoning maps 
Though zoning came up repeatedly in my interviews with donors, policy makers, and 
practitioners, my inquiries into how zoning is carried out were frequently met with claims of 
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uncertainty about who is responsible, how it is implemented, and the kinds of metrics and data 
involved. One informant would direct me to another, who would direct me to another, and 
sometimes back to the original person, or more often a dead end. A project to establish a 
comprehensive adaptation plan for the entire delta involved developing a land use zoning policy 
about which no project team members I talked to could answer questions, until someone finally 
told me that the consultant responsible for this zoning was Dutch, based in the Netherlands, and 
would not visit Bangladesh (indeed, including the region being “zoned”) for the entire duration of 
the project.  
The development of the Master Plan for Agricultural Development of the Southern Region 
of Bangladesh is an instructive example. This document, officially produced by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, but prepared by consultants hired by the FAO, is just one of many “Master Plans” that 
seem to be constantly proliferating among NGOs, donors, and government agencies to facilitate 
coordination and planning for development intervention. I met several times with a senior official 
involved in the development of this plan, who many had described to me as an expert in zoning. 
Each of the three times I went to his office, I asked him to describe the zoning process, and he 
repeatedly told me to come back on another occasion before he was willing to say anything about 
how zoning decisions were made. He ultimately told me that the four major parameters used in 
shaping zoning decisions include biophysical feasibility, types of infrastructure already available, 
participant interest, and the market, though he noted that the market is usually the "first" priority. 
This account aligns with the discussion of zoning in the report itself, which says  
“For Khulna region, zoning for shrimp culture is important. This should be based on 
suitability conditioned by bio-physical characteristics of the land, current practices, 
emerging trends, long term market behavior, etc. Farmers can not be forced to follow what 
to do or what not to do. But their activities in particular areas can be regulated and 
streamlined through measures of incentive and disincentive.” (Ministry of Agriculture and 
FAO 2013, 68) 
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This note of zoning as opportunity for incentivizing and dis-incentivizing certain production 
practices is particularly important. It means that zoning can help identify areas for interventions to 
support shrimp cultivation (including, for example, provision of credit, subsidizing inputs such as 
feed and fertilizer, facilitating access to markets and government land), while maintaining the idea 
that the choices of what to produce rests with individual farmers. As the official explained to me, 
zoning became an opportunity not for making strictly scientific decisions about what was possible 
to produce where, but instead where development agencies might implement programs to 
promote shrimp based on this series of normative judgements about the desirability of shrimp 
production grounded largely in market logics. In this way, the zoning maps attempted to instill a 
sense of scientific rationality in an otherwise subjective process. 
	
Figure 35. Master Plan for Agricultural Development of the Southern Region of Bangladesh shrimp zoning map. Source: 
(Ministry of Agriculture and FAO 2013, 68) 
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If this zoning methodology in the Master Plan was uncertain and opaque, the map itself 
further entrenched the unintelligibility of these plans. Figure 35 depicts the shrimp zoning map 
included in the Master Plan report published on the FAO’s website. The indecipherability of the 
map’s legends and labels are a reproduction of their indecipherability in the original as it was 
distributed to the public and to other development agencies on their website. Of the several 
development practitioners who I talked about about the Master Plan and this critical but 
unintelligible map of suitable areas for promoting shrimp aquaculture, they all agreed that it was 
unreadable, but that they knew it suggested that most of the Khulna region was suitable for shrimp 
aquaculture. The WARPO official mentioned above told me it was his understanding from the map 
that 80-90% of the region was suitable for the promotion of shrimp aquaculture. 
These normative dimensions of the zoning process and the utility of zoning to 
development intervention was confirmed in an interview I conducted with a high-level 
government official in Khulna. After villagers in Polder 29 held a major protest against attempted 
land grabbing for shrimp and submitted a petition to this official asking him to intervene for 
protection, I had gone to his office to ask him whether and how he planned to respond. In the 
course of our conversation, I asked him whether the land had been zoned for shrimp or rice, and if 
this would have an impact on his decision. In response, he said to me “in your country, you have 
a lot of rules and laws. In our country, we have traditional ways of doing things. Like traffic laws – 
we do as we have always done. We use [zoning] publicly, but in process, we don’t actually use it. 
Zoning is for planning. The government’s role is to support the private sector with exports.” Far 
from being a neutral science grounded in the analysis of diverse and changing ecologies, my 
conversations with these practitioners and policy makers revealed the normative dimensions of 
zoning involving particular ideas about ideal production for the region.  
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Indeed, these conversations about zoning indicate that often the opinions of development 
and planning officials that shrimp should be produced were often conflated with the idea that 
shrimp was the only thing that could be produced (therefore justifying zoning particular areas for 
shrimp). Likewise, that which is produced, where shrimp is concerned, is usually conflated with 
that which can be produced, though the same is not true for rice, meaning that areas that currently 
are producing shrimp are always zoned for shrimp, while areas that currently produce rice are 
sometimes zoned for shrimp, if zoning officials determine that shrimp production is possible (this 
is also observed in the example above in Figure 34). One official told me that in some zoning 
attempts, areas where land is known to have been forcibly grabbed for shrimp production from 
rice farming has nevertheless been zoned for shrimp because "it has to be expanded because of 
the economy." In zoning maps produced by the CGIAR research consortium, large areas of Khulna 
where farmers are currently producing rice successfully have been labelled only "marginally 
suitable" for rice production, but "suitable" or "most suitable" for shrimp cultivation.  
Also critically, the interest of rural communities in continuing to farm rice is apparently not 
a determinant of the “suitability” for rice or shrimp production. What, then, is the purpose of these 
zoning plans? Despite claims of widespread uncertainty about how zoning is determined, I found 
that the idea that zoning exists through which rational decisions can be made conferred a great 
deal of power to development initiatives that claimed it. Zoning is held up almost universally as a 
rationale for how and where shrimp aquaculture is promoted. When I asked one senior USAID 
official about concerns over shrimp aquaculture increasing soil salinity (thus making land unusable 
for agriculture), he told me that they reserve shrimp aquaculture for areas where "it is already too 
late," citing zoning as the process through which they determine where it is and is not "too late" for 
agriculture. The disciplining work of zoning is demonstrated by a story that one former official at 
the Department of Agricultural Extension (DoAE) told me about a fight he had with an FAO 
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consultant from Rome. In planning a DoAE project that was being funded by the FAO, this 
consultant insisted that the DoAE promote shrimp aquaculture expansion in certain parts of Khulna 
where people were still producing rice (and where, the DoAE official said, farmers wanted to keep 
producing rice). The FAO consultant reportedly said that the decision had already been made to 
zone this area for shrimp because of the sense of its growing salinity, and thus uncertainty over 
whether rice would continue to be viable, and therefore that the zoning plans dictated a shift from 
rice to shrimp, despite the present or desired current production practices among the area’s 
inhabitants. 
As these examples indicate, ultimately, the power of zoning is more epistemological than it 
is practical in the sense of policy governance. Zoning inhabits a space of uncertainty over the 
possibility of future degradation. Within that space, it governs a transformation in production 
relations that is seen to be a frontier of accumulation facilitated by that gap in knowledge about 
the future. As zoning maps shape production transformations in the image of this dystopic future, 
they create the very conditions that they predict.  
 
Conclusion 
In his landmark essay, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,” Philip Abrams wrote, 
“Any attempt to examine politically institutionalized power at close quarters is, in short, liable to 
bring to light the fact that an integral element of such power is the quite straightforward ability to 
withhold information, deny observation and dictate the terms of knowledge” (Abrams 1988, 62). 
Abrams draws our attention to the critical point that power operates not only by producing 
knowledge, but also by withholding it. Like the state, the adaptation regime derives its legitimacy 
from the disruption and omission of knowledge about the social and political structures from 
which it derives its authority. At the nexus of science and development policy, the governance of 
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normative perceptions of what can and should be produced, rooted in particular understandings of 
the ecology and how it is changing, are shaping the landscape in southwestern Bangladesh. This 
dynamic is critical to the expansion of shrimp production in Khulna. The existence of social 
movements challenging these normative claims on the landscape’s production potential calls into 
question these politics of uncertainty.  
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CHAPTER 5 
  
AUTOPSY OF A VILLAGE 
 
 
I came to know Arjav when he followed me out of a tea stall. We had been sitting with half 
a dozen others, crowded together on a few wooden benches, drinking the smoky, wincingly bitter 
tea with which I began most of my mornings in this village, Kolanihat. Besides the proprietor of the 
tea stall, my companions were men who cultivate shrimp in small ghers, mostly a few acres in 
size. Arjav and the others were collectively lamenting the recent fall in the price of bagda (giant 
tiger) shrimp, which was already untenably low. Between December and the following April, the 
price they were earning at the market had dropped from 350 taka per kg to 300 taka per kg 
(approximately US$4.50 to $3.80). Just to break even, they need to earn approximately 500 taka 
per kg. "Loss hoye jabe" - there will be a loss this year. The mood was low and indignant. The men 
spoke sardonically about NGO field workers who had come to provide "demonstrations" to them 
of proper techniques for cultivating shrimp and improving their yields. One recent method, they 
quipped, involved scattering tea leaves on the surface of the gher (shrimp pond), in an attempt to 
kill off any lurking (and to the fieldworkers, unwanted) native species. The advice provided by 
these NGOs is not “practical,” they explained. These are techniques, they said, that are clearly 
dreamed up by people who have never cultivated shrimp before. 
Like the others, Arjav was frustrated about the shrimp export market, about the losses that 
the gher operators would suffer in its decline. But he wanted to talk about his larger concerns 
about shrimp production, and what it is doing to the village and its residents. We strolled slowly 
along a narrow path flanked on both sides by murky ghers. The late-April heat, already the hottest 
of the year, was unabated by shade, as most of the village's trees have died in the aftermath of the 
shrimp boom. This intemperate heat frequently made long days working in Kolanihat feel 
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oppressive, relative to the other villages in which I conducted research - both for myself (a 
relatively fatigable ethnographer prone to improbably high volumes of perspiration, as residents 
were wont to point out), as well as for laborers doing much more demanding work than wandering 
around chatting with people and sipping tea. These laborers often complained (far more defensibly 
than I) about the death of the trees, which they said used to provide shade to sit and take breaks 
from the mid-day heat. Without them, one man said, "how will we breathe?" 
Arjav has been participating in the shrimp business for about 30 years, he estimated. He 
lives in one of Kolanihat's few pucca (cement) houses, a relatively large one, which he told me he 
built shortly after the shrimp boom began in the 1980s with profits from a successful shrimp larvae 
trading business. Unlike many others in the village, Arjav has benefited materially from the 
transition to shrimp. His sons have continued in the shrimp trade, moving to the nearby town of 
Paikgachha, gaining more commercial success than Arjav himself had. They wouldn't be suited to 
working in the village anymore, he said--they ride around on motorcycles now and are "onek 
porishkar lok," very clean people, denoting their wealth and lack of inclination toward manual 
labor. More importantly, he explained, with the transition from rice to shrimp, without rice 
farming, there were no opportunities for them to work in the village, they couldn't have stayed. If 
his sons hadn't left, "bhat hobe na" literally "there wouldn’t be rice," meaning they wouldn't have 
been able to provide enough food for the family to eat, despite financial success. He also 
explained, with a sardonic smile, that his sons were better suited to the shrimp trading business 
than him because “tader puji dorkar,” literally meaning that capital is required for this work, 
although also implying the necessity of a capitalist sensibility. “Amar puji choto,” he said, 
explaining that he personally didn’t have this sensibility needed to thrive in the shrimp business. 
Although Arjav himself managed a relatively successful shrimp gher, the family depended on his 
sons' off-farm employment for their daily sustenance.  
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Figure 36. Arjav's empty rice gola (silo) 
Despite what would appear to be a story of success with shrimp production, he tells me in 
no uncertain terms that he wishes they, the whole village together, could all go back to growing 
rice. Sitting on the veranda of their house, staring at a stand of large bamboo rice silos in their 
courtyard that they said had been empty for at least a decade (see Figure 36), referring to the time 
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when rice was growing in their village, Arjav's brother said to me "during that time, there was 
peace here, but now there is no peace. The peace has died."  
Arjav is concerned not just about the shift this has caused for his own family, but for the 
entire community. He described a great exodus from the village of people leaving to find work, 
mostly to India: "daily, in the morning, at night, people are leaving--all the working people." This 
account of migration is confirmed by the rest of my research in this village and the surrounding 
area, as well as interviews directly with some of these migrants in Kolkata who have left this and 
surrounding villages. But Arjav's reflections on what this might mean for the future of the village 
were particularly ominous. When I asked him what he thinks the village will be like in 20 or 50 
years, he told me "if there isn't rice, the village people won't be able to stay." 
Arjav's story illustrates the dramatic agrarian transitions which are taking place throughout 
the shrimp cultivating region in Khulna. It highlights the effects of the transition from rice to shrimp 
not only for landless people and agricultural laborers, but also for landowners who have actively 
participated in the shrimp boom. It also exposes the paradox that, even as some smallholders have 
increasingly begun to participate in shrimp production, they see no future in it, either for their 
families or their communities. The resulting erasure of agrarian livelihoods and rural communities 
is thus a major driver of agrarian change in this region. The disappearance of rice is continually 
invoked to express the experience of this ruination of livelihoods. As Arjav did, residents discuss 
the disappearance of rice both as “dhan” and “bhat” meaning rice in its cereal form (raw or in the 
field) and in its cooked form for eating. In this way, they lament the ruination both of agrarian 
modes of production and social reproduction. As the agricultural crop at the heart of agrarian 
economies and production systems throughout the region, rice has sustained these communities 
for centuries. As the staple food of their diets, produced for subsistence as well as for selling, it has 
nourished their families and provided for their survival in the best and worst economic times. In 
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both senses, then, the continuation of shrimp aquaculture threatens the continued survival of the 
village and its inhabitants.  
The contradictions between shrimp cultivation and rice farming are at the heart of the 
social and ecological transitions taking place in Khulna. Though agrarian dispossession in rural 
Bangladesh has been a secular process since at least the colonial period, shrimp aquaculture has 
entailed a pivotal rupture of agrarian political economies in communities where it is practiced. For 
this reason, I intentionally avoid referring to shrimp aquaculture as "farming," which denotes a 
particular socio-cultural structure to which the cultivation of shrimp presents a stark contrast. In 
this chapter, I examine this contradiction between rice and shrimp through attention to stories of 
residents about this loss of rice (in its multiple dimensions), and the implications to lives and 
livelihoods. 
 
Chapter Overview 
In this chapter, I examine these agrarian transitions taking place at the nexus of two 
particular dynamics in Khulna: first, the transition from rice agriculture to export shrimp 
aquaculture; and second, the emergence of new visions of "developed" futures in the age of 
climate change. Besides existing in geographic proximity to one another in this region, shrimp 
aquaculture and climate change adaptation are closely linked to one another through the overlap 
of their respective social and ecological causes and effects.  
I explore these agrarian transitions through three key empirical interventions: First, I 
examine the ways in which shrimp and rice cultivation are antithetical to one another, and the 
implications of this tension to the political economy of agrarian change in this region in which 
they have collided. A transition to shrimp culture entails a radical transformation of the coastal 
landscape and the dynamics of production that have historically sustained its populations. Second, 
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insofar as shrimp production entails a radical reduction in labor requirements and thus people 
working in and inhabiting these communities, the result of the transition to shrimp aquaculture is 
the displacement of farmers and communities from this landscape. I explore this through an 
examination of narratives about this transition among those who remain, who have been impacted 
by the transition in diverse ways. Third, the resulting migrations out of the coastal zone reflect this 
process of depeasantization. I examine this migration through testimonies of people who have left 
Polder 23, now living in a slum in Kolkata populated by migrants from Khulna. I argue that the 
discourse around the impacts of climate change in this region, which has framed these migrants as 
"climate refugees," both obscures and facilitates these dynamics of agrarian transition. The chapter 
primarily draws on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Kolanihat, a village in Khulna’s 
Paikgachha upazila, in Polder 23. It also makes use of interview data gathered in the CBOT study 
carried out in 2013. 
Paikgachha is an important site for understanding the growth of the commercial shrimp 
sector in Bangladesh, both due to the proliferation of shrimp culture in the area, as well as its role 
in the expansion of shrimp culture throughout the region. In 1968, consultants for USAID 
recommended that the government establishment a shrimp culture research station in Paikgachha, 
explaining their site selection by citing the damage which the nascent polder system was already 
causing on local production there (Swingle et al. 1969b). The drainage and salinity problems 
generated by the polders would make Paikgachha the perfect site for experimenting with the 
opportunities afforded by this ecological crisis. In 1984, the World Bank approved funds for a 
National Brackishwater Research Station in Paikgachha, indicating that such an institute was 
necessary there to take over from a research institute in neighboring Satkhira district where shrimp 
culture had already caused salinity levels high enough that, they concluded, crop growth was no 
longer possible (World Bank 1984). In addition to having been identified as an important site for 
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researching the potential of shrimp aquaculture, Paikgachha has also been home to a great variety 
of donor and NGO-sponsored development programs aimed at expanding the reach of shrimp, 
including major programs sponsored by USAID, the World Bank, and the Dutch government. 
	
Figure 37. A billboard in Paikgachha for a program supported by USAID, WorldFish, and the Bangladeshi government to 
promote the use of shrimp post-larvae that are scientifically tested for the presence of viruses 
	
Kolanihat 
Kolanihat is one of 31 villages in Polder 23, and is home to a population of about 700 
people. It is located about 5 miles from Paikgachha city, a small market town of about 16,000 
people (BBS 2016b). Many of the residents of the village were landless people and marginal 
farmers whose livelihoods depended on sharecropping and agricultural day labor. A survey from a 
similar rice-producing village in neighboring Polder 22 in 1987 reported that over 50 per cent of 
households fell into this category of marginal laborers (Datta 1998, 31). Until the mid 1980s, most 
residents of Kolanihat report producing one or two agricultural crops per year, depending largely 
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on the elevation of their particular plot of land. Aman was historically the most important crop, 
with abundant yields resulting from the high fertility of the alluvial soil. Residents report that 
historically their aman yields were high enough to survive on the single crop throughout the year, 
if land was unsuited to more than the single monsoon growing season. This is confirmed by 
records from the colonial period that corroborate these claims of the historic importance of the 
aman yield in Khulna (Bengal Government 1898). In addition to aman, residents report having 
grown jute, sesame, mung beans, and a great variety of fruits and vegetables.82  
This agriculture was made possible by irrigation from the river that runs south of the 
village, which delivered fresh (non-saline) water for 6 months out of the year. During this time 
before shrimp, they could extend their growing season with canals fed by the river that could be 
damned up to store fresh water and extend its availability further into the dry season. Before the 
CEP, the village also practiced a traditional form of water management known as oshto masher 
badh, or “eight month embankments,” that was part of the historic village- and farm-level 
hydrological regime examined in Chapter 1.83 Oshto masher badh was a system used throughout 
much of the coast in which laborers would annually build up earthen embankments to protect 
agricultural lands from the river, and subsequently tear them down to allow tidal inundation for 
the remaining four months, facilitating sedimentation and fertilization with the nutrient-rich 
alluvium. The system extended the growing season by protecting land from salinity and flooding, 
while also not being so permanent as to prevent the mitigation of water logging. The system 
required a high degree of cooperation between landlords and sharecroppers, who generally 
undertook the embankment work as a condition of their tenancies. After Partition, when many 
																																																						
82 Elsewhere in Polder 23, elderly residents reported to me having grown up to three crops in a year, 
including an additional crop of aus rice, a shorter dry-season rice grown between the dry and monsoon 
seasons. Aus is typically grown on higher land, so it is less likely that it was ever grown in Kolanihat, much 
of which is relatively lower ground. 
83 Datta also discusses this system in a neighboring community in what is now Polder 22 (Datta 1998). 
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Hindu landlords migrated to India, the system began to break down along with the cross-class 
coalitions among the peasantry. Any remnants of the informal system that remained were finally 
ended after implementation of the CEP, when the permanency of the concrete polder infrastructure 
precluded the manual construction of such ad hoc mud embankments.  
In 1986, as Bangladesh’s shrimp export boom was taking off, investors from Khulna City 
started to arrive in Polder 23, interested in establishing ghers on agricultural lands. In Kolanihat, 
the largest among these was Wakil Saheb ("Saheb" denotes his wealth, power and high-status), a 
businessman in Khulna who today still owns a gher of approximately 1,200 bighas in size. Wakil’s 
gher is managed by Saiful, another outsider from the neighboring district of Shatkhira. Saiful lives 
in a large house in Paikgachha town, and he manages the guards, also outsiders, who stay in the 
village. Wakil himself is thus several steps removed from the actual work of shrimp cultivation in 
Kolanihat. His gher situated in a long strip running parallel to the river, Wakil has also installed his 
own sluice gate to regulate the flow of water in and out of the village (see Figure 38), which 
operates autonomously from the municipal sluice gate of the Bangladesh Water Development 
Board. Wakil's sluice gate is used to flood all of the land in the village, primarily during the dry 
season, when salinity levels in the river are the highest.  
Accounts in Kolanihat differ about the amount of force used to compel this transition to 
shrimp when Wakil arrived, as well as the amount of resistance that was proffered by local 
residents. Landless people described sentries84 hired by these outsiders either to force people to 
give up their land, or to guard the ghers once they were established. Accounts of the village’s 
wealthier residents and landholders deviate in varying degrees from these accounts of overt force 
																																																						
84 The Bengali word used to describe these guards hired from the outside is mastan, which translates to 
“goon,” “thug” or “mobster.”  
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used to compel the transition to shrimp. This ambiguity is likely due to their varying degrees of 
complicity and consent at different points during the transition, which I explore further below. 
	
Figure 38. Wakil's sluice gate 
Of particular concerns to all residents, though articulated most strongly by the poorest, is a 
common sense that these outsiders are guilty of harassing and committing violence against 
women. As one resident explained, “if it gets too late coming back from work, either cleaning 
moss or catching crabs from the shrimp ghers, you get harassed and insulted. And if a woman is 
found alone she gets raped, so the roads aren’t safe for women.” Though I did not hear any 
specific accounts of overt sexual violence, the concerns speak to a broader tension between local 
residents and outsiders hired to do work in ghers, whose task is to occupy and patrol a landscape 
that was formerly occupied much more communally. Another resident explained,  
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“The situation is such that there is gher after gher and there is very little road to walk on 
and even if you do walk, each gher owner on each side will accuse you of stealing from 
their gher. Sometimes people cannot get from place to place because they do not allow 
travel on those roads. They will accuse you of spread [shrimp] virus in the gher and 
causing him losses. I don’t want to get caught up in these troubles, so I try to stay away. 
Some have to travel on those roads, though. Most stay away. Those who do [walk past the 
ghers] have sometimes been physically assaulted.” 
 
This sense of occupation is exacerbated by the great extent of land that has been taken over by the 
ghers. Indeed, there is only one narrow path through the village where one can walk that is not 
adjacent to the ghers, narrowly winding between a canal and the thin strip of land on which most 
of the village’s homesteads are located. Thus, the feeling that the ghers have taken over the 
physical geography of the village, encroaching on the space not only for rice farming, but also for 
walking, gardening, playing, and inhabiting, exacerbates the sense among the village’s residents 
that they are being pushed out by shrimp cultivation. 
Now, when smallholders recount this period of rapid and overwhelming transition, it is 
often inflected with a sense of regret and confusion, as in "what could we have done?" Many 
smallholders were offered contracts to buy or lease their land, though they report rarely or never 
having been paid, nor having had a choice in whether they would give their consent. Some 
reported having their land stolen through different manners of legal maneuver, such as one man 
from the village next to Kolanihat who explained, 
“We had a lot of land, 18 bigha.  But there were complications with that land. A man 
named [Debjit Prachanda] from the neighboring village drew a fake document and we 
were forced to give him half of our land. 9 bigha. I had to give some from my share, my 
older brother had to give some from his share.” 
 
When residents describe this kind of legal mechanism of dispossession, it is often somewhat 
vague, expressed with emotions of simultaneous frustration and shame. The legal benchmark for 
literacy in Bangladesh is one’s ability to sign one’s own name. If one signs a legal document that 
one is not able to read, there is little recourse to remedy the consequences of having been 
deceived about the document’s contents. This particular shrimp industrialist, Debjit, is unlike 
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Wakil in the sense that he is a neighbor, a member of the immediate community, and someone 
who villagers are forced to interface with on a regular basis – not only in relation to these 
questions about land titles and cultivation, but also about any other issues that might arise in the 
village, such as arbitration in the village shalish (local court), organization of local pujas (Hindu 
religious festivals), or any other community concerns. Though this was his natal home, Debjit had 
been a businessman living outside the village until shrimp cultivation took off in the 1980s. When 
the shrimp boom began, he moved back to the village and began amassing a large gher made up 
of the former rice fields of neighboring residents. Now Debjit lives in the tallest and newest pucca 
house in his village, a conspicuous three stories high, the cement painted a lurid shade of bright 
chartreuse. Even as residents voiced their frustration about losing their land, they also expressed 
caution about wanting to avoid outright altercation with this very wealthy and powerful neighbor.  
While several residents describe this kind of overt land grabbing, many also report that 
they signed leases to allow the use of their lands for shrimp, though they also explain that they 
didn’t want to sign the lease, or that they felt that the terms of the lease were subsequently 
violated. Gorongo, a local schoolteacher and self-proclaimed cricket star, owner of a 10 bigha 
gher, chronicled this history for me one afternoon over tea: 
"Lots of guys came from the outside and took leases then. Our environment was so 
beautiful. Everything was green. We loved it! But then they came and took all the land. 
They gave 500-700 taka per bigha. It wasn't our choice. They did so well. They built big, 
beautiful buildings in their own areas. But we didn't develop here. We didn't get any 
benefit.” 
 
As Gorongo articulates it, the question of “choice” is fraught with ambiguity for smallholders 
throughout the region. They express regret over their initial assent, but anger over their inability to 
recover their land. Another resident of a neighboring village recounted his struggles over the terms 
of his lease, 
“These people are the ones who allowed the salt water to be brought in and they are now 
suffering. They are not able to push out the outsiders or get out [of the shrimp business] 
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themselves. It is the local people who made mistakes. They rented out their five bighas of 
land. Now I am in trouble because where I signed the deed for three years, he rewrote it to 
be twenty years. Mr. Wajed Ali85 came and made a lease for three years... Now when the 
three years elapsed, we did not want to renew it, but then he showed that the deed said 
twenty years. At that time, he was very powerful, you could say he was the government… 
We do not understand too much about the law, but somehow he showed that we had 
signed a twenty-year lease, whereas when we signed the document we knew it was for 
three years… He told us nice things and took our signatures on official paper and then 
wrote twenty years on the lease. What will you do? If you go to attack him, the police will 
come to take us away. They’ll say ‘didn’t you pay attention when you signed?’ What can 
we say now? If we complain to the administration, they’ll say ‘you signed there for twenty 
years. If you hadn’t signed, it wouldn’t have been twenty years.’ They harassed us into this 
situation.” 
 
As this smallholder describes it, he feels some sense of responsibility for having allowed the initial 
encroachment of shrimp into his village, but also regret over the feeling that he had been tricked 
into a permanent loss. Importantly, he also articulates anger of complicity between the local 
authorities and outsiders, and a frustration that this elite collusion that has entrenched the shrimp 
industry in their area. 
Beyond these specific disputes over land tenure, conflicts over water management became 
the primary arena through which contestations between rice and shrimp played out. Hydrological 
units within the polders must be managed collectively, as water intake and drainage are shared 
across broad areas, usually the size of a full village or larger.86 This means that control over the 
water regime results in control over the production regime of the same area. With drainage access 
to the river obstructed for interior smallholders like Gorongo, the rest of the land beyond Wakil's 
gher remains waterlogged year-round. Thus, Wakil has the power not only to continue farming 
shrimp on the 400 acres over which he has maintained control, but also to make production 
																																																						
85 Wajed Ali is a well-known shrimp businessman and notorious land grabber in Khulna. I use his actual 
name here because due to his public notoriety. He will appear again in the following chapter. 
86 Hydrological units are spatially, not politically delimited, with boundaries set by large embankments or 
major roads, and thus often pass through the borders of a village or other political unit. 
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decisions for the entire village. If Wakil wants to keep cultivating shrimp, then the village cannot 
return to rice farming, nor the social life and agrarian political economy associated with it.  
	
Figure 39. Sketch of Kolanihat. Drawing by Anders Bjornberg 
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This control over the hydrological system can be secured through political means, or by 
surreptitiously breaching the embankments dividing plots of land. In many communities, this is 
also achieved by boring holes in the embankments to install pipes used for water intake as an 
alternative to a full sluice gate. When farmers in Kolanihat describe their resistance to land 
grabbing for shrimp aquaculture, it is primarily these water management conflicts that they 
highlight. As one farmer whose land had been taken explained, 
“The salt water destroyed the roads and nobody fixed it. Slowly famine started to show. 
Business slowly started to break down. I would go to people and say ‘I am not even able to 
eat rice; how will I pay you back?’ I was born in the area, so I know that if I am unable to 
eat, how can I force someone else to pay me?... There has been fighting, cases have been 
filed [against] the businessmen who do ghers. There have been clashes with them. These 
people live in the city, some live in Khulna, Shatkhira. The rich people who control the 
administration have been torturing us. We seal the WAPDA [embankment]87 and then they 
go at night with police and they break it. When we go out in the morning they send goons 
hired from the city to attack us. They torture us. If we go to the police station, they make us 
file a General Diary [police report] and they say ‘we will look into it.’ They say they will 
look into it, but that very night the water is released into the gher again.” 
 
This testimony highlights both the physical force employed in compelling the transition to a saline 
landscape for shrimp cultivation, as well as the complicity of local government officials in 
exercising that force. Although Wakil operates his sluice gate independently, residents explain that 
this is done with the implicit support of local officials, who not only do not restrict the intake of 
the water, but also do not facilitate its drainage. Another resident explained,  
“If you want to bring in salt water into an area, you need permission from the local 
government to close the gate, to put in a channel. And if the rich people don’t decide on 
this, then people who don’t have much money or have no money can’t do anything about 
it. If the rich people decide to do it, they need to go get permission from Paikgachha thana 
(policy station) to open the gates so they can do shrimp cultivation. It takes 50,000 taka. 
People like you and me can’t go and get permission from the Paikgachha thana, we won’t 
even know anyone there or know what to say.” 
 
																																																						
87 As discussed in Chapter 1, the embankments of the CEP were constructed by the East Pakistan Water and 
Power Development Authority (WAPDA). The Bengali word for these major external embankments (“badh”) 
is the same as the word used for small earthen embankments between fields. As a result, in Khulna the 
embankments surrounding the polders are often referred to as “WAPDA badh,” or just “WAPDA” for short. 
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This unequal control over water infrastructure combines with the necessity of these decisions 
dominating the entire hydrological unit. Even where an embankment is not intentionally breached 
between fields, a shrimp gher adjacent to a rice field causes seepage of water and salt deposits, 
destroying the rice crop itself and causing increased levels of soil salinity. This prevents cultivation 
decisions from being made independently. Thus, control over the water management regime 
becomes de facto control over production decisions in the entire area.  
These conditions of conflicting water management paradigms have been foundational to 
the expansion of shrimp aquaculture throughout Khulna. In 1993, Adnan wrote that early analyses 
by development programs of the economic benefits of shrimp cultivation in Khulna were based on 
assumptions about effective and equitable water management allowing for the cultivation of both 
rice and shrimp (Adnan 1993). However, he explained, such assumptions were flawed due to 
these inequitable water management practices, “efficient management of water flows is only 
possible for those who own or operate the appropriate water control mechanisms – typically the 
large shrimp-growing business interests, rather than the poor or middle peasants whose lands have 
been inundated with saline water against their will, leading to involuntary shrimp culture” (Adnan 
1993). This involuntary shrimp culture is the circumstance in which smallholders in Kolanihat and 
elsewhere in Khulna now find themselves. It is the condition, in varying degrees, articulated to me 
by every smallholder gher operator I talked to in Kolanihat. 
 
Landscape Changes 
These transformations in the water and production regimes have been accompanied by 
similarly dramatic transformations in the local ecology. Among these changes, the death of most of 
the village’s great diversity of trees is most frequently cited as evidence of the transformed 
landscape. Villagers lament in particular the loss of the fruit trees, citing the former presence of 
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coconut, date palm, tamarind, banana, guava, mango, jackfruit, pomegranate, wood apple, jujube 
(kul), and plum (jaam) trees. Since the time that shrimp cultivation began, these trees have all died 
due to the soil salinity. The few trees that remain now are keora trees, a mangrove species that can 
survive in moderate to high soil salinity, considered more tolerant of highly degraded landscapes, 
though they don’t contribute to subsistence in the form of fruits or fuel wood.  
The loss of these fruits has contributed to an overall decline in subsistence production 
capacity in the village. The loss of farmers’ ability to grow and store rice for family consumption 
has had the most serious impact on subsistence. However, the ecological collapse that 
precipitated the death of the trees has had a range of other impacts that have shaped the ability of 
villagers to survive in this landscape. As the ghers expanded, moving closer and closer to 
residential plots, the salinity seeped into the soil surrounding their homesteads, affecting the plots 
where they used to cultivate gardens. These gardens formerly supplied a great abundance of 
vegetables that fed the families of the landless and land rich alike throughout the year. Many 
reported that not only were they able to grow enough to feed their families, but there was such an 
abundance that they would openly share with their neighbors these yields from their gardens. “It 
was not possible to eat all of them,” one man said, “we didn’t sell them, whenever someone in the 
area needed a particular vegetable, we would give it to them… Now it has become salt water. I 
myself have to buy all my vegetables, so how could we give to others?” Villagers mentioned 
cultivating okra, eggplants, pumpkin, string beans, radishes, potatoes, taro, and several different 
varieties of greens and gourds, none of which will grow now.  
The salinity seeping into the soil has also gotten into the drinking water supply. One staff 
member in Dhaka managing a WorldFish project supporting shrimp cultivation in Paikgachha 
once said to me “some people said ‘our drinking water is salty because of shrimp,’ but I don’t 
know how you can really prove that.” Indeed, as with many other aspects of ecological change in 
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Khulna, “proof” of what is driving up the salinity in drinking water in Paikgachha is elusive. People 
in Kolanihat trace the salination of their drinking water to the transition to shrimp cultivation. 
Previously, the primary source of fresh water in the village were ponds that were recharged with 
fresh water annually during the monsoon. The water from these ponds was used for a variety of 
household purposes – bathing, washing clothes and dishes, and drinking and cooking (they would 
boil the the water before drinking it). These ponds used to be situated near people’s homesteads, 
and would usually be accessed communally by neighbors from the surrounding area. Now that the 
domestic space has dwindled, contracting as the ghers have expanded, there are no more ponds in 
the village. There are also some tube wells from which people used to retrieve drinking water, but 
people say the quality is not good, as it has become saline, and is otherwise contaminated, making 
it unsuitable for drinking.88 They also collect rainwater for household use, and some have devised 
relatively elaborate systems of running ropes from troughs on the rooves of their homes into large 
earthen drums on the ground to collect the water. However, without larger receptacles for the 
water like the ponds, these home-based tanks usually don’t last more than a couple months. 
As a result, villagers are now forced to purchase all of their drinking water, which women 
and children carry in from outside. Some travel to a neighboring village about 10 miles away 
where there is a tube well that supplies fresh water, and some go to a pond in Paikgachha town. 
They pay 10 taka to fill a 10-liter aluminum vessel. Most members of the community travel by foot 
to carry water back, while those who can afford it pay an additional 10 taka to travel by 
																																																						
88 Some also report that the water has iron in it, which could indicate a more serious contamination. The 
presence of iron is visible as it leaves red deposits on the ground when water evaporates. Iron is also 
frequently co-occurring with arsenic, a major problem with tubewells in Bangladesh. As arsenic is invisible, 
people are more likely to detect a contamination with iron than they are with arsenic. Alexander van Geen, 
a geochemist at Columbia who studies arsenic contamination in groundwater in Bangladesh, told me that 
due to this visual evidence of iron deposits, people frequently identify problems related to arsenic 
contamination (such as reduced rice yields) to iron contamination. 
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nosimon,89 the most common means of motorized transport locally. Several people noted that their 
families generally needed more than one of these 10 liter vessels to meet their domestic needs in a 
single day.  
In addition to this water, villagers are also now forced to purchase cooking fuel from 
Paikgachha. Before shrimp, there were large areas in the village where cows could graze on grass. 
After shrimp cultivation began, these areas ceased to exist, as the communal spaces gave way to 
ghers and the grass died on the land that remained. In the absence of grass, the only way to raise 
cattle is to purchase hay from Paikgachha. In addition to providing milk, these cattle also supplied 
residents with the majority of their cooking fuel. The traditional fuel called ghute is made by 
gathering cow manure and patting it into round cakes or molding it around long sticks (usually the 
stalks of jute after their fibers have been extracted), which are then dried in the sun. Now that 
there are few cattle left in the village, residents purchase fuel from Paikgachha town for 160 
taka/maund90 (plus 10 taka for transport by nosimon). 
The enclosure of these commons also extended to the large canal running through the 
village that used to serve as the primary outlet for drainage and inlet for fresh irrigation water.91 In 
order to retain the water in for shrimp cultivation, the gher operators have blocked the canal and 
turned into into another space for shrimp cultivation. As one woman explained, 
“All the water bodies belong to someone [now], they won’t let you catch fish from there. 
Before, all the rivers, wetlands, and lowlands were open for everyone to go catch fish. The 
rich, the poor could all catch fish and eat them. No one would stop them… The rich 
people have paid money and taken land from the poor… All around is just water and 
water, we don’t have the beautiful, communal, and wholesome environment that we had 
before.”  
 
																																																						
89 A nosimon is a three-wheeled vehicle built by local mechanics using small, diesel-powered tractor 
engines. They can accommodate up to 10 people on the wooden flat bed in the back. They ply the major 
road through Paikgachha, making stops to pick up or drop off passengers at any point on the fixed route.  
90 One maund is equal to approximately 40kg. 
91 See also Paprocki and Cons (2014) on the collapse of common-access resources in Polder 23. 
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As this resident suggests, when the canals flowed directly from the river, they were full of a great 
diversity of wild fish that residents could capture for their own consumption (residents mentioned 
several native fresh water species, including rui, shoul, baila, boaal, taki, tilapia, carp, catfish, 
climbing perch, freshwater prawn, and crabs). Now that the canals have been closed off, access to 
fish has declined, and many report that they are unable to afford to purchase them to feed their 
families. Some allow tilapia fish to grown in their ghers along with shrimp, which they call 
“khaoar mach,” or “eating fish,” which they can’t sell, so there is sometimes access to these for 
local consumption. Several expressed frustration with this dwindling diversity, while one woman 
said “how many times can you eat the same tilapia fish?... I am fed up with having this tilapia fish, 
I don’t even like it anymore.” Several other residents also expressed dissatisfaction with an ironic 
state of affairs in which the expanded production of fish for export in their area resulted in a 
scarcity of fish for their own consumption (the Bengali word for fish, mach, is also used to refer to 
saltwater shrimp, which are called bagda mach). Another woman recounted, “we can’t always get 
fish. It’s like being thirsty when you’re in the middle of the ocean surrounded by water. We are 
surrounded by fish here, but we’re always craving it.” These active dispossessions combine into an 
assault on access to almost every means of subsistence previously available to villagers in this 
community. 
 
Tenure Transitions 
For about 10 years, this land tenure situation in Kolanihat went on in the same condition as 
when shrimp cultivation started, with Wakil massive gher that covering most of the village. As time 
went on, the smallholders whose land had been taken over received fewer payments, or rents 
ceased altogether, and those who had initially been open to the arrangement became more and 
more disillusioned with it. Then, in the mid 1990s, these land tenure conditions started to shift. 
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There is a very large but dilapidated colonial-era zamindar bari92 on a large and solitary plot of 
land on the opposite side of the canal from the rest of the village’s residential area. Today this 
zamindar bari is inhabited by Radhika, an elderly woman whose father-in-law lived there before 
Partition, along with four sons (who also have other residences outside the village), daughters in 
law, and several grandchildren. One of Radhika’s sons is a doctor, and another is a member of the 
Union Parishad committee, making him a very powerful member of the community. The family 
sleeps on wooden cots on the ground floor of this three-story mansion, and their plastic furniture 
and other modest and sparse fixtures suggest some deterioration from what was once presumably a 
lifestyle of great affluence and comfort.93  
Radhika told me that when Wakil first came to Kolanihat, they were enticed by the 
promise of a lucrative lease, and they agreed to rent out their large plot of 200 bighas to Wakil to 
incorporate into his gher. Like other large landlords in the village, they had previously let out most 
of this land to local sharecroppers. This assent of the wealthy local landholders gave Wakil a great 
deal of legitimacy and power in the village, and made it more difficult for those who owned just 
one or two bighas to resist the loss of control over their own land. After 10 years, however, 
Radhika’s family was only receiving 1,500 taka/bigha from Wakil, and they had become 
disillusioned by the deteriorating economic conditions and their limited share in the profits. 
Radhika told me she thought the rent should have been 10,000 taka/bigha (though most 
smallholders told me that the accepted rate for most people in the village at the beginning was 500 
taka/bigha, and now it is between 4-7,000 taka/bigha). When Wakil refused to return their 200 
																																																						
92 Zamindar baris were the residential palaces and centers of business administration of the large colonial-
era estates of zamindars. Many were abandoned after the abolition of the zamindari system in Bengal after 
independence. Today some of the larger estates have been turned into museums, while others are inhabited 
by squatters or the descendants of their former proprietors. 
93 Shrimp cultivation is certainly not the only cause of the change in this family’s fortunes. Like many large 
Hindu landowners in what is now Bangladesh, Radhika told me that her family left for India around the time 
of Partition. They returned after Bangladesh’s war of Independence in 1971, but they are unlikely to have 
fully recovered their former wealth from the period prior to their migration.  
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bighas to them, Radhika’s family pressed charges against him with the local police. Their family’s 
wealth and political position in the community gave them significant influence with the local 
authorities, and their case was successful.  
Once they regained control of the land, Wakil’s gher still stood between them and the 
river, making access to water and drainage difficult. Radhika told me they didn’t want to continue 
running the gher, but they didn’t want to give up their land either, and under the circumstances, 
they didn't have a choice. Also, having observed Wakil’s success, they thought they might get 
some benefit from their own shrimp gher, and so they began to cultivate shrimp independently. 
When I asked Radhika how they like the shrimp gher business, she looked at me impassively and 
said, shrugging, that they don’t really care, they hire other people to do the work. On another 
occasion, she told me that they were disappointed with the profits they earned from shrimp, so 
they don’t really like it. This ambiguous indifference may or may not be genuine; several 
smallholders, whose own narratives I explore in further detail below, reported to me that Radhika’s 
family support the continued production of shrimp in the village and that they were among the 
greatest obstacles to a collective mobilization toward transitioning back. In this sense, despite their 
earlier conflicts with Wakil, Radhika’s family may now be allied with him in ensuring the 
perpetuation of shrimp production in the village.  
In addition to their shrimp gher, however, Radhika’s family has three bighas of land 
surrounding their home where they have continued to successfully grow a crop of aman rice. They 
have their own private tube well that they can use to supplement rain water for irrigating a garden 
(and from which they also retrieve drinking and cooking water for their own household use). The 
land is elevated near their home, being at a higher point than the surrounding ghers, so salinity 
seepage poses less of a problem, and gravity facilitates drainage. To cultivate these three bighas of 
rice, they usually employ about 7 people per season. For their 200 acre gher, by contrast, Radhika 
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said 2 of her sons look after managing its operations (in addition to the work they do in 
Paikgachha), and once or twice a month they hire a group of 5-7 women to do sheola kaj, 
collecting scum off the surface of the water, which I explore in more detail below. Before the 
shrimp boom, they said they cultivated both aman rice and sesame, a winter crop requiring very 
little water, and relatively tolerant of salinity, making it well-suited to cultivation in the saline-
prone parts of the coastal region. The people they hire for this work of rice cultivation are local 
laborers, this being one of the only agricultural opportunities left in the village. An elderly couple 
doing mid-season weeding work in the field surrounding the zamindar bari told me that they were 
formerly sharecroppers, but once the land they used to farm was leased out to Wakil, this labor in 
the last remaining rice fields was the only livelihood left for them in the village.  
Though Radhika says their yields are slowly declining every year, they still get about 10-12 
maund/bigha. Radhika and her family keep all the rice grown on their land for their own 
consumption, and despite the declining yields, they say it feeds them throughout the year. Yet, 
besides the income from the gher, it is not their only source of livelihood. Radhika’s sons do 
business in Paikgachha, and they use this income to supplement their consumption. They thus 
inhabit the same ambiguous occupational category as Arjav’s sons; although they earn some 
income from shrimp, it is their off-farm earnings that sustain their family.  
Once Radhika’s family had regained control over their own land, a precedent was set that 
created an opening for the smallholders who remained in the village. One small gher operator 
described this to me as gono dokhol, meaning collectively taking possession or control. Yet, the 
recovery has been uneven, and those whose adjacent plots holdings are smaller, or are surrounded 
by Wakil’s still-sizable gher, have been unable to reclaim their land. As Gorongo, the 
aforementioned cricket star explained to me, 
“So, we saw that they did so well, we wanted to try ourselves. We had a struggle with 
them, we went to war. And through the struggle, we got the land back... Some landless got 
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work in shrimp trading, but very few. Everyone else had to leave. It's very important that 
you tell people, like at big seminars, that we want our land back. You have to take this 
story back with you and tell people. Many people here who just had small plots of land 
have never been able to get them back." 
 
Gorongo’s statement here is indicative of the descriptions of this period of land repossession 
among smallholders. They clearly articulate the hardships they experienced in losing access to 
their land, then express the struggle to have it returned to them, yet they also appear hesitant to 
characterize this recovery of their land with any sense of triumphalism. As they expand on their 
current conditions, it becomes apparent that this hesitance is primarily due to their sense that they 
still don’t have autonomous control over their land, and they have been largely unsuccessful in 
managing their own ghers. Even as Wakil technically returned their land to them, with drainage 
blocked and all of the land in the village perpetually covered in salt water, their choices are 
severely constrained in how they can use it. Instead of recounting their success in regaining 
control of their land, they recount the struggles they experience now in trying to earn a livelihood 
from it.  
Today Gorongo operates a gher 10 bighas in size. In relation to average landholdings in 
rural Bangladesh, this is a very large amount of land, while it is among the smallest shrimp ghers. 
The results have been mixed. Sometimes the profits can be good, but the threat of diseases that 
plague the shrimp industry here (in particular, White Spot Syndrome, which villagers refer to 
simply as “virus”), poses a constant threat of killing all the shrimp in a gher, spreading quickly 
between plots. Because shrimp requires a significant upfront capital expenditure, the loss of a gher 
full of shrimp to the virus can be catastrophic. The post-larvae must be purchased either from 
dealers who get them from a hatchery or from people who collect them wild in the river. They also 
purchase other inputs such as feed and fertilizer. Each of these items comes in variable qualities 
and costs, although aquaculture development agencies say that using inferior quality post-larvae 
and inputs results in both lower yields and greater susceptibility to shrimp viruses. The 
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international shrimp market also fluctuates significantly, which has a dramatic effect on these 
smallholders. They say that the price they are paid for shrimp should be 700 taka/kg, and that they 
need about 500 taka/kg to break even on their investment. In 2014, they were receiving 350 
taka/kg, despite a national supply shortage that should have driven prices up (Moni 2014). These 
declining rates are likely due both to the power of the many middlemen within the country’s 
lengthy shrimp supply chain, as well as a sharp and unexpected plummet in exports to the United 
States, where importers were prioritizing cheaper and lower-quality imports from China, Vietnam, 
and Thailand (Haque 2014).94  
In order to afford these significant upfront investments, smallholders like Gorongo take 
microcredit loans at the beginning of the season. When their gher is struck with the virus and all 
their shrimp die, or they don’t earn enough to break even, they take more loans to repay the 
previous ones. I regularly heard that there were many people who had lost their land in this way – 
after years of trying to get their land back, they finally regained control, only to lose it altogether 
when they couldn’t afford to manage the gher and all of the costs it entailed. These people, who 
have lost their land through debts to microcredit agencies or wealthier neighbors, have all left the 
village.95 Staff at a local BRAC microcredit branch office told me that most of the loans they give in 
Paikgachha are for investments in ghers, and that they encourage borrowers to take loans for 
shrimp cultivation because it is good investment in the area. One collection agent said to me 
																																																						
94 The variety of saltwater shrimp produced commercially in Bangladesh is giant tiger shrimp, or Penaeus 
monodon, known locally as bagda. This variety grows larger than the whiteleg shrimp, or Litopenaeus 
vannamei, that is the most commonly cultivated variety of tropical shrimp globally. Vannamei grows well in 
intensive conditions, which entail even more significant investments, allowing for greater yields per hectare, 
more common in these other large shrimp-producing countries. Monodon grows “extensively,” meaning that 
it takes up more space, with lower yields, but allowing for shrimp that are larger in size. This means they are 
considered higher quality and higher cost; as a result, economic downturns often cause international buyers 
to shift to the lower cost variety. The large Monodon shrimp, one WorldFish employee told me, using an 
Australian colloquialism, “is the kind you want to put on the barbie.” 
95 Throughout rural Bangladesh, it is common for people to be forced to migrate away from their homes 
when they are unable to repay microcredit loans. See Paprocki (2016) for more on this process of 
dispossession. 
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“when you look around this area, you can see that it is more developed.” When I asked for 
clarification of what made it more developed, he looked at me as if it was obvious – “because of 
all the ghers.” By continuing to encourage the use of microcredit loans for investments in shrimp 
aquaculture, microcredit agencies participate in the promotion of this particular vision of 
development for rural communities in Khulna.  
In this context, despite intermittent success with his own gher when prices are high and the 
virus is kept at bay, Gorongo explained to me, that he likes farming rice, and would love to return 
to it, but with big ghers like Wakil’s, the choice is out of his hands. “If everyone was doing rice, 
then we would be happy,” he said, “we all want to farm rice, but we can’t… If everyone moved 
back to rice, we would be free of saltwater. But without that, we can’t do it.” This antipathy 
toward shrimp cultivation expressed by Gorongo and Arjav is the prevailing sentiment among 
smallholders in Kolanihat. In casual conversations with residents, sitting together in small 
courtyards and tea stalls, questions about shrimp provoke deep groans, eye rolls, people throwing 
up their hands in resignation, gesturing to the surrounding barren landscapes. They explain that 
they sometimes earn well when the price of shrimp on the international market is high, but these 
markets are erratic, and therefore livelihoods dependent on them are unreliable. The word most 
often invoked to describe their conditions under shrimp cultivation is obhab, meaning scarcity or 
deficiency. One woman whose husband manages a 10 bigha gher, complaining about Wakil 
blocking the river, explained to me “we have scarcity because we don’t do rice.” 
Besides Radhika’s family, a few others have occasionally attempted to farm rice in the 
village under the current water management regime. One man who now lives in Paikgachha town 
was able to lease a 6 bigha plot of land from some wealthier landholders in Kolanihat around the 
year 2000; the land is located near the head of the canal inlet coming off the river, but outside of 
the contained area that is flooded by Wakil’s sluice (see Figure 39). Prior to taking this lease, he 
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had been working as a shrimp trader, but he said he really wanted to go back to rice farming. 
Although the land had previously been used as a gher, he decided to try to flush the salt and use it 
to cultivate an aman rice crop, which he has been doing over the past several years. He told me 
that every year he has been operating at a loss with the rice, with low yields and significant costs 
for land rent, seeds, and insecticides. The yields were increasing, however, and he said he 
believed that eventually enough salt would be leached that he could turn this rice plot into a 
successful operation. It is evident in seeing the crop that recovery of the soil is still ongoing, but 
that cultivation will certainly not be impossible (see a picture of the crop mid-season in Figure 40).  
	
Figure 40. Rice plot near the river recently converted back from shrimp gher 
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For now, he and his family are just eating the rice, but he thinks that within a few years he will 
have a surplus to start selling. His growing success with this rice cultivation demonstrates the 
continued potential of rice cultivation in this area, despite claims that these shrimp-producing 
landscapes are no longer viable for agriculture.  
I also observed a few other people inside the embankment in Kolanihat and the villages 
around it who were attempting to farm rice during the aman season. I Kolanihat they were 
concentrated on the far side of the village from Wakil’s gher, and I could see that they had 
fashioned small drainage ditches to try to siphon off the saltwater. While no one had done this for 
any significant period of time, some told me that they had been doing it a few years, despite 
meager yields. They said that their farming was hampered by insufficient drainage and residual salt 
deposits in the soil, but that the monsoon brought enough fresh water to flood the rice paddies. 
They estimated yields between eight and 12 maund/bigha, which is about one half to one third of 
standard rice yields (one person cited yields as low as two to three maund/bigha). The best they 
could hope for would be to break even, a couple of them told me. Given these low yields and 
bleak prospects, I asked them why they continued to try to cultivate rice. They said that they had 
ghers on their land in the dry season, but they weren’t having a lot of success with either shrimp or 
rice, so they might as well try farming rice, since at least their families could eat that. It seemed 
like a better gamble, given that they could lose everything if their shrimp were struck with a virus. 
One man who said that he expected enough rice to feed his family for five months told me that 
rice was better for the environment, so they hope to keep expanding the area under rice 
cultivation in the village. They also expressed some hope that if they could start farming rice, even 
if they weren’t having much success, by leaching some of the salinity buildup in the soil, it may 
facilitate a return to year-round agriculture if the whole village ever was ever able to do so. 
Despite the great costs entailed in producing rice under current conditions, their commitment to 
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continuing to attempt it reflects an optimistic vision of the future quite at odds with that of the 
adaptation regime. In anticipating the possibility of an agrarian future, they refuse the ruination of 
the adaptation regime’s dystopic imaginaries. In Chapter 6, I examine village-level transitions in 
neighboring polders grounded in similarly optimistic imaginaries of the future. 
 
Depeasantization96 
These attempts to continue farming rice also speak to a desire to hold onto an agrarian 
lifestyle that is in the process of being lost. People like Radhika’s sons, who earn most of their 
money through non-farm livelihoods, no longer identify as farmers. Even when they are speaking 
of their work with in the village with the gher, they say chingri byabsha kori, meaning “we do 
shrimp business,” as opposed to chingri chash kori, meaning “we farm shrimp.” Some smallholders 
say “I am a farmer” but “I run a gher,” as opposed to “I farm shrimp” (though they are technically 
interchangeable). These shifting identities speak to broader shifts in the agrarian political economy 
of the village. Villagers in Kolanihat repeatedly spoke of the demise of the farmers in their 
community. As I quoted one former farmer in Chapter 3, “chingri krishoker dhongsho koreche” – 
“shrimp has destroyed all of the farmers.” This is meant both literally and figuratively. Indeed, in 
the literal sense, many people have been forced to leave the village, particularly landless people, 
for whom labor opportunities in the village have been eliminated. Remaining residents describe 
this great exodus that has taken place in the aftermath of the shrimp boom; as one smallholder 
explained to me, "those who didn't have land, they have all left." With opportunities for work 
disappearing, and their ecology no longer able to support the kind of subsistence production that 
formerly sustained them, life for these people in these shrimp producing landscapes becomes 
																																																						
96 See also Paprocki and Cons (2014) on the relationship between shrimp aquaculture and dispossession and 
depeasantization. 
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increasingly untenable. A professor at a university in Dhaka with several decades of experience 
studying Khulna’s coastal ecologies attributed this specifically to the transition from rice to shrimp, 
explaining that where saline shrimp is produced, "the area becomes almost uninhabitable," and 
"people have nowhere to go," indicating both the ecological and socio-economic impediments to 
maintaining human settlements under such inhospitable conditions. 
In addition to these literal reference to the departure of so many residents, the demise of 
farming also refers figuratively to the people who have stayed, but who can no longer be identified 
as farmers in the traditional sense. For some it reflects their profound struggles to survive in this 
landscape. One widow in Kolanihat who farmed rice on a half-bigha plot before shrimp, that has 
now been completely consumed by Wakil’s gher, lamented the loss of opportunities for survival in 
the village, the lack of drinking water, and the failure of her garden. “We don’t have any money; 
we can’t pay for medicine or meet any of our needs. So, we are dying,” she said to me. For others, 
like Arjav, it means that their survival has become so dependent on off-farm incomes that their 
identity as “farmers” has become compromised. Those who have stayed and today operate small 
shrimp ghers do so primarily through the support of off-farm employment by at least one if not 
multiple family members. These non-agrarian incomes increasingly become the backbone, rather 
than a supplement to, this rural economy. This shift is the reason that they say their village will 
have no future unless they can find a way to return to agriculture. 
 
Job Loss 
Shrimp cultivation entails a radical reduction in labor demand relative to rice farming. 
While the shrimp boom has produced limited labor opportunities in Kolanihat (described below), 
the amount of rural labor that has been created is dwarfed by the amount which has been 
eliminated. As one woman explained, 
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“Previously, if one person had one bigha of land, 20 people would be employed for 
working on that land. They would be busy cutting the earth, harvesting rice, plucking 
grains and various other activities. Those who did not have any land would survive just by 
working in the fields. Nobody was unemployed. After the ghers happened almost everyone 
is unemployed. Nobody can avail any work. A person with a gher, manages it on their 
own. Only one person is needed to manage a gher. Previously one person would employ a 
minimum of 5 people but now more and more people have become unemployed. Now 
whoever has 1 bigha of land does not employ anyone else. They do the work on their 
own.” 
 
The result of this transformation is rampant unemployment among landless people who formerly 
depended on agricultural labor to survive. Joining their ranks are the landless who formerly 
depended on sharecropping, regarded as a more secure livelihood than that of day labor. Larger 
landholders like Arjav, who earlier arranged with landless neighbors to grow rice as sharecroppers 
on his surplus land, no longer required such arrangements, and the availability of land quickly 
dwindled. While rice is often grown on plots as small as a single bigha (one third of an acre), 
shrimp ghers operate at much higher economies of scale, as most gher operators describe plots of 
even a few acres as being untenably small. Most of these people, who have become redundant to 
the new rural economy, have by now left Kolanihat. 
It is common for development agencies promoting shrimp aquaculture to claim among its 
economic benefits the creation of new jobs. However, most jobs created by the shrimp industry 
are in cities like Khulna, where workers (mostly women) work in processing factories peeling and 
"de-heading" shrimp for freezing and packaging before they are exported. The levels of labor 
demand within villages that have transitioned to rice are also a source of great uncertainty and 
disagreement. I frequently heard from Nijera Kori activists and laborers in Kolanihat and elsewhere 
in Khulna that shrimp cultivation requires about 1% of the amount of labor that rice farming 
requires. A member of the ESPA Deltas team (see Chapter 4) told me that their surveys suggested 
estimates of somewhere closer to 10%.  
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Rice Shrimp 
182.73 PD/ha97 
(single cropping) 
80 PD/ha98 
240 PD/ha99 
(double cropping) 
80.4 PD/ha100  
308 PD/ha101  
(double cropping) 
106 PD/ha102 
Figure 41. Calculations from different studies of labor requirements for rice and shrimp cultivation systems. Calcuations 
in person-days per hectare per year. 
The table in Figure 41 lists a series of estimates of labor demand for shrimp cultivation and rice 
farming from several different studies. The figures demonstrate a great deal of variance in estimates 
of the amount of labor required for both shrimp and rice production, although all figures denote 
significant discrepancies between rice and shrimp. Nevertheless, these figures also reflect a greater 
ratio of labor requirements for shrimp than the estimates I heard from landless community 
members in Khulna.  
Bighas 
owned 
Land in 
hectares 
People hired Approximate person-
days per ha hired 
(PD/ha) 
Notes 
200 26.99  5-8 for 1 or 2 
months 
5.6 – 17.8 PD/ha (calculated at wages paid 
every day for 1-2 months, 
which is unlikely) 
25 3.37  (none) 0 Sons do work in addition 
to their off-farm labor 
170 22.94 2-3 for 5-6 
months 
13.1 – 23.5 PD/ha  
18 2.43 3 for 1-2 months 37 – 74.1 PD/ha  
7 .94 (none) 0 Sons do work in addition 
to their off-farm labor 
80 10.8 1 man, year-
round 
33.8 PD/ha  
Figure 42. Kolanihat gher owners' estimates of the amount of labor they hire annually for shrimp cultivation 
																																																						
97 This figure is based on data collected in a primarily single-cropped area in Paikgachha in 1987-88 by 
Datta (1998, 43). 
98 (Joffre et al. 2010, 57). 
99 (Dey et al. 2012, 15). 
100 (Alauddin and Hamid 1999, 291). 
101 (Karim et al. 2006, 36). 
102 (Nuruzzaman 2006, 448). 
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Estimates from gher owners in Kolanihat also offer a different picture of these labor 
requirements, and while they do not suggest a clear pattern, they do give us a better sense of how 
the lower estimates above could have been reached. The figures from Kolanihat listed in Figure 42 
are based on conversations I had with six different gher owners or their agents based in the village. 
They are very rough because the shrimp cultivation season is not predictable. Two of the owners 
said they didn't hire anyone because their sons did all the work (although it is possible that they 
would occasionally hire groups of women for work in the gher once or twice a month). The 
estimates involving multiple laborers are possibly high, because there is rarely paid work available 
every day for large teams during the period when shrimp is being cultivated, so it is also likely in 
this case that many of these laborers were hired for only part time work during these periods. All 
but the one man hired to manage the 80 bigha gher said that if the shrimp were attacked with the 
virus, there would be no need for them to hire any labor, and the discrepancies in time periods 
reflect this uncertainty about the survival of the shrimp. All of these land plots are large enough 
that before shrimp they would have hired labor to support with rice planting and harvest, and in 
the bigger plots they almost certainly would have given the land to sharecroppers to farm for a 
portion of the yield (which several of them confirmed to me). 
This somewhat inscrutable collection of figures gives a sense of how unpredictable the 
availability of labor opportunities is in shrimp production systems; it also conveys that we should 
treat all figures relating to the labor in these systems with some caution. While some of the figures 
confirm the very low estimates provided by activists and landless people, the more important point 
to be taken away from them is how uncertain the work is for residents who would rely on it. As 
Edelman argues in relation to large-scale land grabs, focusing on the quantitative dimensions of 
this transformation, particularly in relation to problematic quantitative data (from NGOs and social 
movements, as well as what I have provided here), may divert focus from the very real 
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transformations taking place in social relations and livelihood patterns (Edelman 2013). One 
researcher studying shrimp and rural livelihoods in Paikgachha for an NGO in Dhaka told me that 
their survey research revealed that shrimp cultivation had caused residents’ incomes to grow, thus 
causing an increase in food security. However, in focus groups, they found that people 
consistently reported that they were food insecure, and that their food security had declined 
significantly from the period when they produced rice. The organization found the claims made in 
these focus groups to be dubious, given their own quantitative data indicating the contrary. The 
discrepancy between this NGO’s data and the local perceptions may indicate a straightforward 
preference among residents for more stable consumption. Indeed, if the incomes of some increase 
considerably at certain parts of the year, yet they are not stable or predictable, and their 
subsistence options in the village have declined throughout the year, then they may experience the 
transformation as an increase in periods of food insecurity, despite an overall increase in cash 
flow. Yet, my research in Kolanihat suggests that the foundation of these perceptions may involve 
a much greater scope of values and epistemological politics. Edelman writes that “every dataset 
has an implicit epistemology behind it” (Edelman 2013, 494). This is certainly true of the figures in 
both tables above, as well as my ethnographic dataset from Khulna. The testimonies presented in 
this chapter demonstrate that, for local residents, assessment of sufficient, meaningful, and 
properly remunerated labor opportunities must involve much more than a quantitative calculation 
of the number of jobs created or lost. 
 
Shrimp Labor 
A closer look at the type of labor available in shrimp ghers, however limited, facilitates an 
understanding of how these assessments are made. The most common work in the shrimp ghers is 
known as "sheola kaj," literally "algae work," in which one wades through the waist-high waters of 
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the ghers using their hands to skim the algal blooms that have collected on the water's surface, 
and piling them into mounds every few yards (see Figure 43). The work is conducted almost 
exclusively by women, who describe it as extremely unpleasant. Depending on the size of the 
gher, this work may be done every couple weeks to once a month or less. It is carried out my 
groups of women, usually in groups of about five to eight, starting in the morning around 8am and 
working until 2pm. They do the work with their saris hitched up around their thighs, but the 
saltwater eats away at them, and one woman told me that she needs to buy four saris a year now 
instead of two because the fabric begins to fall apart.  
Women in Kolanihat are paid 80 taka per day for their work in the ghers. This is 
significantly lower than what men are paid for agricultural labor (100 to 500 taka/day, depending 
on the work and time of season), and this reduced rate is the most likely explanation for this 
gendered division in the labor market. The limited availability of this work in the ghers combined 
with the abundant supply of underemployed laborers also significantly depresses wages in the 
ghers. One woman explained, 
“The gher owners are very comfortable. The big ghers, if they have a good shrimp 
production one year that money will last them for 5 years. The poor people, those who 
have to work day to day to earn a living, if they make even the slightest mistake they are 
kicked out and told they will be replaced by someone else immediately and that they are 
no longer needed. The owner makes sure that the new people that are brought in are paid 
even less than what the previous person was paid. Those people have no option but to do 
the work at the cheaper rate as they have nowhere else to go. They cannot even argue with 
the gher owner. For the gher owners, if they have a problem with the shrimp production 
one year, the next year the production is ok. He has money saved up so he can afford to 
buy shrimp fry and release it in the gher. What can a poor person do if he is forced to do 
Tk. 100 worth of work for only Tk. 50? He has no choice.” 
 
Several laborers also reported having their wages withheld for significant periods of time, even as 
much as a year, particularly when the price of shrimp is low or the gher is struck with a virus and 
the gher owners’ income is reduced. The precarious nature of this work is a cause of great concern 
for residents who have little other income earning opportunities on which to rely. In Salabunia, 
  219 
another village in Polder 23 that has experienced a similar transition to shrimp (with associated 
employment and land tenure dynamics), Belton and colleagues report that only two per cent of the 
jobs available in aquaculture in the village are permanent position, with 61 per cent of laborers 
working in temporary day labor arrangements in sheola and matir kaj (described below) (Belton 
2016). This contrasts with agricultural positions which are usually contracted on a seasonal basis. 
Once, standing at the edge of a gher with a woman who was hired occasionally for sheola 
kaj there, both of us grimacing slightly at the fetid water and the foamy scum collecting at the 
edges, I asked her if she liked working in the gher. She looked at me with a guffaw, eyes wide in 
disbelief, and asked me "would you like to get into this water?" I looked down, struggling to make 
eye contact with her, embarrassed to have asked what she obviously thought was a ridiculous 
question. The problem, she continued, is that only women who do this kind of work in the ghers, 
not men. As a result, the challenges of the work, and particularly the associated health problems, 
have received little attention.  
	
Figure 43. Gher covered in algae (left); gher in the process of being cleaned, with some algae piled in mounds (right) 
Though women are understandably hesitant to open up about these concerns, they 
describe skin rashes and gynecological conditions they commonly develop after working in the 
ghers. These concerns were confirmed by a doctor who runs the local government hospital. Upon 
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walking into this hospital, one is greeted by a large vinyl banner buoyantly describing a 
pharmaceutical injection called "Pradox," with the tagline "Reactivator for Life" (see Figure 44). 
The active chemical compound in Pradox, pralidoxime chloride, is used as an antidote to 
organophosphate poisoning, including chemical weapon nerve agent attacks against military 
personnel. In Paikgachha, the doctor explained, it is administered to patients, primarily women, 
who have attempted suicide by ingesting chemical fertilizers used in both aquaculture and 
agriculture. He estimated that he sees approximately 20 such patients each month (even as he 
brushed off questions about what might cause this dismissively, explaining to me that women 
often become hysterical if their husband doesn't buy them a piece of jewelry they want). As he 
gave me a tour of his hospital, the corridors of which were crowded with recovering patients 
huddled on mats laid out across the cement floors, he listed the variety of ailments that afflict 
women shrimp gher workers, including skin diseases and fungal and reproductive tract infections, 
such as leukorrhea, a kind of pelvic inflammatory disease causing discomfort and vaginal 
discharge. His description aligned with the symptoms women shrimp gher workers reported to me, 
which they described as vaginal infections, “tumors,” and excessive bleeding (“prochur 
porimane,” one woman said, meaning “enormous amounts”). However, among the women I 
spoke with in Kolanihat about these medical concerns, none had sought treatment at the hospital, 
citing the high costs of medical care, out of reach for female shrimp gher workers who earn 
approximately 50 taka per day (approximately 65 cents US), usually for a few days a month or 
less.103 
																																																						
103 Their failure to seek treatment could also have to do with the miserable conditions at Paikgachha’s 
government hospital and its limited capacity. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the official 
number beds in this hospital is 60 (BBS 2013, 83), serving a total upazila population of about 250 thousand. 
There is also a government community clinic where women can seek treatment, but women in Kolanihat 
said it was very far for them to travel, with transport there costing them 20 taka, which many felt was still out 
of reach. 
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Figure 44. Pradox sign in Paikgachha hospital 
Although it is rarely seen in Kolanihat, another source of work for contingent laborers in 
the shrimp producing areas is in the collection of wild shrimp post-larvae from the rivers, which is 
done with very fine blue nets fastened to wooden frames that collectors pull through the water 
along the river bank. They then dump the debris that has collected in the net in a metal basin, then 
use a spoon to sort through the twigs and other tiny plant and animal life that accumulated in 
order to pick out the shrimp post-larvae, which are approximately a centimeter long. They are tiny 
enough that I myself find it difficult to distinguish shrimp post-larvae from the other varieties of 
larvae present with the naked eye. This work is extremely low-paid and is considered very low-
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status, and is therefore often carried out by women and children. Quddus reports that 42 per cent 
of female fry collectors are widowed, divorced, or deserted by their husbands (making their 
economic condition particularly precarious) (Quddus 2006). Because the fine blue nets collect all 
aquatic life indiscriminately, the collection of wild shrimp fry has been blamed for a significant 
decline in aquatic biodiversity throughout the region (Pokrant 2014), and is likely the cause of 
much of the disappearance of wild fish stocks described above. While the government has banned 
the collection of wild shrimp fry for these environmental reasons, the ban is largely unenforced. 
While women are responsible for algae work, work in the ghers for men primarily involves 
"mathir kaj," or "mud work." This entails rebuilding the narrow mud embankments, barely wide 
enough for a person to walk across, one fit in front of the other, and rising no more than a foot out 
of the water. Composed of the silty alluvial clay that covers the land all over the delta, these squat 
embankments are ephemeral, dissolving haphazardly under heavy monsoon rains. After the rain, 
and occasionally in the dry season for more regular maintenance, men are enlisted for a short 
period to repair them by hand, digging into the silky fallen mud and mounding it back on top, 
smoothing the ridges with their hands as they go. Their labor is cheaper than a machine which 
could likely accomplish the task more quickly and durably (and which is used in areas with larger-
scale industrial operations than those in Kolanihat). The work itself is needed only occasionally 
and, like the embankments it produces, is entirely contingent. The earning opportunities it affords 
are dependent on the vagaries of weather. It does not follow any kind of schedule, like agriculture, 
with its growing seasons, and predictable cultivation calendar, with work needed for tilling, 
planting, weeding, and harvesting. This contingency produces deep insecurity, and laborers are 
unable to rely on it for regular income. It is thus only those laborers whose lives have become 
most precarious who engage in this work to supplement their livelihoods. 
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Migration 
As suggested in Arjav's story above, this dispossession of the rural poor through the 
expansion and intensification of shrimp culture has resulted in a mass migration from villages like 
Kolanihat to urban areas. In some communities in Khulna, landless residents survive through 
seasonal migration for agricultural labor of some male family members, this is less common in 
Polder 23, given the lack of subsistence and day labor opportunities to sustain their families in situ 
(Paprocki and Cons 2014). I heard a handful of reports of people migrating to the nearby district of 
Gopalganj, where vast tracts of lowland create the conditions for abundant rice production and 
high demands for labor. However, most people from Polder 23 migrate to Kolkata, in the 
neighboring Indian state of West Bengal. Residents explain that at the beginning of the shrimp 
boom, the majority of these migrants were the newly un- and under-employed landless people. As 
fewer of them remain, the flow of their out-migration has waned. Today, it is primarily the young 
sons of shrimp gher operators who are leaving Kolanihat in search of work. When I asked their 
families in Paikgachha why their sons migrated, the most common response was “because of 
poverty.” One mother explained to me soberly, “we don’t have any work here. We have to eat. 
Because of that, they are going to India.” Another person told me “their livelihoods depend on it.” 
The primary destination for these migrants is a small enclave104 within the aptly-named 
New Town, a planned satellite city on the outskirts of Kolkata. There could perhaps be no better 
archetype of "New India" than New Town. The city has sprung up rapidly in the wake of Kolkata's 
burgeoning IT sector, which claims an annual growth rate of 70 percent (World Bank 2014b, 214) 
(see Figure 45), manifested by names displayed on apartment blocks such as "Website Housing" 
and "TechnoNest." Both the Congress and BJP governments have undertaken programs labeling 
																																																						
104 Although it is well known in the area, I do not name the area within New Town where these migrants live 
in order to protect their identities. 
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New Town a "Solar City" and "Smart Green City," representing its important role as a model for 
visions of urban development in New India (Chakraborti 2014; Bagchi 2014; Chakraborti 2013). 
The city was formally established in 2007, after annexing a vast tract of farmland near Kolkata's 
airport. According to Dey, Samaddar and Sen, in preparation for building New Town, the 
government of West Bengal used colonial-era land laws to requisition over 3,000 hectares of land, 
displacing 131,000 rural residents (Dey, Samaddar, and Sen 2013, 3). Today it is a patchy urban 
jungle of sparsely inhabited concrete malls and apartment blocks towering as many as 20 stories 
high. These construction and residential zones are interspersed with residual farmland still being 
used to graze cattle and for the cultivation of crops in handful of isolated spots. Besides this, there 
are few traces of the area’s agrarian past, although a small number signboards posted on roadside 
shacks proclaiming "Land Losers' Cooperative," are evidence of the dispossession that took place 
here, set up by associations of farmers whose land was grabbed to make way for this new city. 
New Town is as much constitutive of visions for India's developed future as Khulna's shrimp 
landscape is of visions of the same for Bangladesh. Given the relationship between these dynamics 
of rural dispossession and urban growth, it is fitting that Khulna's migrants should come here in 
search of new earning opportunities. 
Everyone in Kolanihat knows people who have come to New Town, and many of them 
keep in touch across the border by cell phone. It is through one such contact in Kolanihat that I 
got in touch with Shonjoy, a young man who came from Kolanihat about three years prior in 
search of work. His story is typical of those shared with me in approximately 20 interviews I 
conducted with migrants in New Town.105 
																																																						
105 These migrants were identified through a snowball sample as an extension of my field site in Kolanihat, 
not as a representative sample of migrants in Kolkata. 
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When I visited Shonjoy’s family at their home in Polder 23, they told me about their struggles with 
shrimp cultivation that led to his migration. Before the shrimp boom, Shonjoy's father had farmed 
rice on a sizable 12 bigha plot that they owned, supported by hired labor from four landless 
community members. Debjit, the land grabber from a neighboring village mentioned above, took 
control of their land using a similar legal maneuver through which their land title was fraudulently 
signed away. During the period following the seizure of their land, Shonjoy’s father engaged in 
mud work and other kinds of manual labor that they found inadequate for sustaining the family. 
	
Figure 45. New buildings under construction in New Town 
Along with a campaign of other neighboring smallholders whose fields had been seized by 
Debjit, they worked to wrest control of their land for about 12 years. Through this collective 
pressure, the land was finally returned to them. Now, Shonjoy believes that about 40% of the land 
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in their area is controlled by smallholders like them in small plots of around 10 bighas. Before they 
got their land back, Debjit had absorbed it into his own neighboring gher, where he had cultivated 
shrimp for the entire period without flushing the salt water. By the time they got their 12 bighas 
back, they weren’t sure whether they could do anything but continue cultivating shrimp on it, and 
they said they also didn’t have a choice. Shonjoy said his father attempted to farm aman rice again 
about six years after getting their land back. However, his efforts were undermined when vandals 
(presumably hired by Debjit) cut the small embankments bordering his fields in the middle of the 
night, inundating his rice paddy with saltwater again. The entire crop died. So, they explained to 
me, despite their great aversion toward shrimp, they felt that rice wouldn’t be an option to them. 
Debjit continued to manage a 400-500 bigha gher immediately adjacent to theirs, so they 
explained that there was no way for them to make the decision on their own not to cultivate 
shrimp, despite having repossessed their land. Shonjoy said that perhaps if they along with all of 
their neighbors decided to collectively cultivate rice, they might have a chance of successfully 
returning (though they would still run the risk of having their embankments cut and fields flooded). 
Since then, they have operated their own small gher on this land. Yet, they struggled to 
make the investments needed to run a profitable gher business. Shonjoy’s father took some loans 
to try to make bigger investments with the hope of greater success, such as buying improved feeds 
and fertilizers, and superior pona (shrimp post-larvae) from hatcheries. Yet, despite their efforts, 
they repeatedly met with losses. The shrimp business does not provide a sufficient livelihood to 
sustain the family, Shonjoy explained to me. He speculated that he could have tried to stay in the 
village and work as a middleman, buying shrimp from neighbors and selling it to traders in 
Paikgachha town. He said, however, that he didn’t want to do this kind of work; it is economically 
risky, vulnerable to frequent shrimp virus attacks, and rarely provides sufficient income to meet 
financial needs. Faced with a failing shrimp enterprise at home and the family’s significant debt to 
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be repaid, Shonjoy left for New Town to earn money to send back to the village. “How else would 
we eat?” his father asked me, distressed but resigned. This was a common refrain throughout the 
area, particularly for those whose relatives had been forced to leave to support their families.  
	
Figure 46. Construction workers in New Town 
When I got ahold of Shonjoy on his cell phone in Kolkata, he told me to meet him one 
evening at a large, central bus stand in New Town. He seemed cautious but amenable to telling 
his story, and excited to hear that I had visited his home. Shonjoy first came to Kolkata with his 
older brother, who has since gone back to their village, so now Shonjoy lives there alone for most 
of the year. When they first came, Shonjoy found work in a power plant, and now he mostly works 
in construction. In New Town, even as a contingent day laborer, he found that he could secure 
daily or weekly contracts paying as much as 400 Indian rupees (US$6) per day, working seven or 
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eight hour days. Construction work in New Town's concrete jungle is readily available, and there 
is a local labor market where contractors explicitly hire Bangladeshi migrant workers.  
I asked Shonjoy whether he had thought of going to Dhaka to find work instead of 
migrating to Kolkata. He said that he knows some people from Paikgachha work in garment 
factories in Dhaka, and he considered this. Once he went to Dhaka to interview for a job in a 
garment factory, but he didn’t get the job, and was unhappy with the anticipated working 
conditions, which involved 12 hour days for 8,000 taka per month, just over US$102, still higher 
than the national minimum wage.106 Most of the jobs he could get in Dhaka are garment jobs, he 
said, and they don’t pay well. He also placed great value on the work schedule in Kolkata, with 
most days starting at 10:00am and ending at 5 or 6:00pm (this schedule is clearly not universal, 
however, as several other migrants reported to me working until 8 or 9:00pm). Yet, there are 
higher risks and costs involved in traveling to Kolkata than to Dhaka, in particular the 1,600 taka 
he has to pay someone to be transported across the river by boat. For this reason, he doesn’t return 
home for visits, although he said that some people do go home for Durga Puja, the most important 
religious holiday for Bengali Hindus. 
These migrants, however, do not live in the "Website Housing" nor "TechnoNests" which 
they are building, rather in densely-packed shantytowns on their outskirts. In these settlements, 
which they refer to as "gram" or "village," connoting their simplicity, migrants crowd together into 
small corrugated metal huts and creaky, swaying bamboo structures, many of which are perched 
precariously over open sewage canals. One such shanty where Shonjoy took me to meet with a 
group of migrants from Paikgachha was lit by a single light bulb hung from the ceiling, and had 
space for little more than a double bed and three plastic chairs they brought in from neighboring 
																																																						
106 As of December 2013, the minimum monthly wage for garment workers in Bangladesh is only 5,300 
taka, or about US$68, though men are typically paid more than women, who make up the vast majority of 
the workforce. 
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dwellings. The air was stifling despite a small electric fan, and a large stack of bedding folded up 
in a pile on the bed made it clear that at night, the entire space must have been covered with 
sleeping bodies. 
Despite anti-Bangladeshi xenophobia that infuses the national political discourse in India, 
Shonjoy explained that the local police don't bother them, recognizing the urgent demand for their 
labor in the construction of New Town. I asked him if he felt that he was competing for work with 
Indian labor migrants, such as Biharis, who are considered the other most visible migrant group in 
Kolkata. He said that there were jobs open to Biharis that he can’t do as a Bangladeshi, such as 
taxi driving and domestic work in private homes, both of which might require him to present 
immigration documentation. He said that the demand for the kind of contingent and low-paid 
labor provided by Bangladeshi migrants was high enough that it outpaced the supply of domestic 
migrants. Indeed, Mitra’s study of migrant workers in Kolkata confirms a hierarchy of informal 
labor in the city, in which construction work is largely performed by the most contingent, 
temporary migrants (Mitra 2016). 
Shonjoy regards questions about his future pensively. He is not optimistic about 
Kolanihat's return to rice farming. He said that his father usually comes in November and stays for 
1-2 months; this is the lowest season in ghers, because the cold weather prevents the shrimp from 
growing, and as a result there isn’t work to be done then. During this time his father stays with him 
and they both find work in the daily labor market. Even as his father returns home to continue the 
gher business, Shonjoy believes that it won't be viable in the long-term. Unless somehow the 
entire village decides to begin farming rice again, he explains, there will be no long-term future for 
them there. The migrants in New Town express mixed optimism about this possibility of return. 
One young man whose father and brothers have stayed in Khulna to manage a gher volunteered to 
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me that he would return to the village if they could farm rice again. But then he told me that he 
didn’t think that return would be possible. 
Shonjoy's story reveals the political economic dynamics driving migration out of Khulna's 
shrimp producing region. While these migrations are clearly linked with changes in the local 
ecology, calling them climate migration obscures the production dynamics which motivate 
dispossession across a range of rural classes. Thus, understanding the agrarian political economy 
of shrimp production sheds light on the broader demographic shifts taking place in this region, and 
calls into question claims of massive out-migration from the coastal region being driven by climate 
change. 
 
Conclusion 
Shonjoy represents the new face of agrarian change and dispossession in Khulna. Through 
the incursion of shrimp farming, even the livelihoods of those families whose landholdings once 
ensured their economic security have become tenuous. With these uncertain economic prospects, 
the younger generation are leading an urban transition driven not by personal choice, but by 
economic compulsion. The failure of most development agencies to acknowledge these social and 
ecological contradictions, and the political economies in which they are embedded, has facilitated 
the expansion of shrimp culture. Thus, the antithesis between shrimp and rice cultivation has both 
material and epistemological dimensions, and manifests both socially and ecologically.  
While the analysis of this process among NGOs promoting shrimp aquaculture and that of 
local communities is quite different, the empirics of the transition are in fact for the most part 
uncontested. Many NGO researchers, aware of the labor transitions taking place in the shift from 
rice to shrimp, celebrate the increased "productivity" associated with the labor market changes. 
WorldFish, a member of CGIAR (the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers), is 
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one of the primary institutions driving the expansion of aquaculture in Bangladesh as well as 
globally. At a WorldFish workshop I attended on the topic of “resilience,” one researcher 
described the decline in rural labor opportunities through aquaculture intensification as more 
"sustainable" because "less people have hard livelihoods" when they are removed from agrarian 
production systems. This comment is not unique among researchers and practitioners working in 
aquaculture development in Bangladesh. Even as development agencies express concern for and 
intention to serve the poorest, aquaculture development programs consistently marginalize the 
landless, reflecting the pervasive disregard of these groups as constituent participants of agrarian 
economies. 
This apparent blindness is reflective of a broader vision of rural development. Speaking the 
language of income diversification, development practitioners celebrate the de-agrarianization of 
rural labor markets, and the movement of all classes into non-farm livelihoods. The manager of 
one shrimp development program explained to me that the labor market transition resulting from 
the expansion of shrimp is a benefit to rural economies because it allows people to leave to seek 
out higher paying work, as opposed to agricultural work which is the "least rewarding financially." 
When asked about the impacts on the rural poor who would be displaced, this expert candidly 
responded "that doesn't concern me," explaining that reduced labor demand means profitability 
increase. These comments reflect a fundamental difference in understandings of who is and is not 
part of an agrarian society, and of who does and does not have the right to be a farmer. To these 
development agencies, farmers can only be landholders. This is at odds with the traditional 
understanding in Bangladesh that all people who participate in agrarian economies are 
peasants.107  The poorest members of these communities have historically claimed rights to 
																																																						
107 As Chatterjee and Hashmi have explained, this identification of the poorest members of the rural society 
with the peasantry of Bengal at large was fundamental to nationalist politics in anti-colonial struggles as well 
as in the formation of an independent Pakistani state (Hashmi 1992; Chatterjee 1994). For Hashmi, this 
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participate in rural economies as farmers, a participation which was necessary given their very 
sizable proportion within the agrarian class structure.  
This tension was illuminated in another conversation I had over dinner with a scientist 
from an elite European university who was visiting Bangladesh for the first time, supported by a 
multi-million dollar grant from a foreign aid agency, in order to study solutions to problems related 
to climate change in Bangladesh. The scientist explained to me his research team's plans to work 
in two sites: first, in a rural community somewhere in the coastal zone, and second, in 
collaboration with garment manufacturers, to help support the growth of Bangladesh's garment 
industry. The logic of this pairing is quite clear, as the scientist explained to me: "The history of 
development is the history of moving people out of agriculture." To this scientist, he and his team 
of researchers can promote what he refers to as "progress" by supporting development which 
facilitates the transitions of large populations of Bangladesh's rural workers off of the farm and into 
the garment factory. His comments illustrate a much broader vision of development in 
Bangladesh, of which the expansion of aquaculture is just one part.  
																																																						
historic identity formation affirms Shanin’s theses on the peasant class as a political force (Shanin 1966). 
Hashmi explains that this unity of the collective identity of the peasantry was particularly strong in Khulna 
historically because the rent-receiving zamindars and talukdars “had to be ‘benevolent’ landlords, as they 
needed the support of their tenants in the construction of embankments or bundhs to prevent saline water 
from entering the fields” (Hashmi 1992, 39). Chatterjee explains, however, that this unity was extended only 
to the Muslim rent-receivers, while Hindu landlords were not considered part of the peasant community 
(Chatterjee 1994, 11). Chatterjee argues that this aspect of peasant consciousness, grounded in “an entire set 
of beliefs about nature and about men in the collective and active mind of a peasantry,” is fundamentally 
religious, rather than being based on a consciousness of class differences within the peasantry. He traces the 
communalism in Bengal that in part led to the formation of independent Indian and Pakistani states to this 
particular form of peasant consciousness in the region. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
“WE HAVE COME THIS FAR, WE CANNOT RETREAT:” ADAPTATION, RESISTANCE, AND 
COMPETING VISIONS OF TRANSFORMED FUTURES 
 
 
Benoy came running as soon as he saw me walking down the path that bordered his field, 
waving his arms animatedly. All of Tilokpur was buzzing, working feverishly: the harvest was 
good. Better than it had been in 30 years. Good enough to confirm what they all hoped but no one 
knew: that agriculture is still possible in their village. It was late April of 2015. From approximately 
1985 to the mid-late 2000s,108 the rice fields of this village, which had historically produced two to 
three crops per year, had been taken over for shrimp cultivation. Through the collective and 
ongoing efforts of the landless social movement groups supported by Nijera Kori, Tilokpur 
smallholders began farming rice again in 2009. Benoy himself had been doing so since 2012 on 
one bigha of land he owns and three that he sharecrops. The pace of the work on this day was 
particularly frenzied due to the accumulating clouds in the sky that had everyone worried about 
rains rotting the cut stalks of rice before they could be bundled and hauled from the fields. For 
nine years prior to this return to rice farming, Benoy had been forced to migrate out of Tilokpur to 
earn money to support his family. He traveled to a market on the outskirts of Khulna city, where 
labor contractors hired him to do road construction work. He didn't enjoy this work, he said, not 
least because it was very risky, and because it meant he had to stay away from home for most of 
the year. Now his harvest was good enough that he could stay in Tilokpur year-round.  
																																																						
108 Exact dates for the end of shrimp cultivation are difficult to pinpoint both because residents' recollections 
vary and because the transition back to rice was slow and did not take place all at once. Given the ongoing 
water management conflicts, it would be fair to say that the transition is ongoing even now. For the most 
part, however, farmers in Tilokpur shifted back to rice from shrimp sometime around 2009-2010, with a 
number of stops and starts both before and after. 
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Figure 47. Rice in Tilokpur 
	
Figure 48. Loading harvested vegetables onto a rickshaw in Tilokpur 
  235 
Benoy's wife, Titash, is a leader in the local landless collective. An ardent feminist, Titash 
has a serene but commanding presence, and though she is soft-spoken, people listen intently when 
she talks. I once saw her have an irreverent but spirited fight with an elderly male leader about 
whether men or women have more suffering in their lives. In response to an off-handed remark he 
made that women don't suffer because they don't have to work, Titash delivered a calm but 
incisive and withering lecture on the political economy of household labor. The lecture ended on 
the agreeable note that one way they work toward mitigating these imbalances in her household is 
by all eating meals together at the same time, an almost unthinkable practice in rural Bangladesh, 
where female members of the family eat meals after serving male family members, as a matter of 
course. Beyond its significance in her own person life, household labor is, for Titash, critical to 
Tilokpur's political and existential struggles. During the years that Benoy migrated out of the 
village for work, Titash stayed home with their children and struggled to find ways to feed the 
family on what meager earnings he could send back to the village.  
In rural Bangladesh, though men are traditionally responsible for cultivating rice and other 
commodity crops, women cultivate the homestead gardens that feed the family year-round, and 
are often also responsible for rearing livestock. During the time of shrimp cultivation, homestead 
gardening and livestock rearing had become increasingly impossible, due to the rising soil salinity 
that crept into homesteads from surrounding shrimp ghers. Now that Benoy was back and the 
harvests were getting better, they had money to invest in livestock again. Titash had purchased 
three cows that she was successfully raising for milk for the family to both consume and sell. The 
cows grazed on the grass that had started to grow again as the soil salinity declined, and on the 
chaff from the rice harvest. Her garden was flourishing. For Titash, and other women who had 
stayed in Tilokpur while men had migrated out, the challenges of social reproduction in the 
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shrimp-producing period were just as great as the challenges of agricultural production in the 
midst of ecological collapse. Indeed, they could not be understood independently of another. 
Benoy wasn't the only one who left. During the shrimp producing period, most residents 
who had previously been dependent on agricultural day labor, particularly the men among the 
approximately 60 landless households in the village, were forced to migrate out of the village to 
find work. As one landless laborer described in 2013, 
“Now people have to leave the area to find whatever work they can wherever they can 
find work, because for shrimp farming you don’t need as many laborers so there aren’t 
many jobs. All the people who have to earn daily wages are still working outside, myself 
included, despite the fact that shrimp farming has stopped for two years. This is because it 
has yet to go back to the way it was before. And there are people who keep trying to open 
the gates.” 
 
These people went to Khulna city like Benoy, to Dhaka, or to India. Given the ecological 
conditions in Tilokpur linked with their migration, it is not difficult to imagine these people being 
classified as "climate migrants." Yet, the conditions motivating their decision to migrate were 
clearly much more complicated. By 2015, all of these people, including the landless, had 
returned, finding ample employment opportunities in the gradually restored agricultural fields. 
 
History 
Tilokpur lies within Dumuria, a subdistrict of Khulna on the inland edge of Bangladesh's 
coastal zone, in Polder 29. Due in part to its location further inland, the shrimp aquaculture boom 
came to this area later than adjacent com1munities closer to the coast. The brackish waters of the 
coastal region become less saline further inland, making saline water inundation of agricultural 
lands (to fill shrimp ghers) less convenient. Dumuria is bordered to the west by the Gangrall river, 
one of the countless tidal channels at the base of the delta of the Ganges-Padma river system. 
Tilokpur is a historically rice-producing area, facilitated by abundant rain in the monsoon 
season as well as ample freshwater supply from the dense network of rivers and canals, which 
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supports additional crops during the non-monsoon seasons. The most intensive cultivation takes 
place within a very large lowland area known as Boro Beel (literally "big marsh"), surrounded by 
settlements and canals on all sides. Depending on the exact geographic location of their fields, 
farmers in this area report that they historically were able to produce two or three crops per year, 
including rice, lentils, sesame, watermelon, and a variety of vegetables and leafy greens. During 
the time when shrimp was produced in this area, the low elevation of Boro Beel facilitated the 
sustained saline waterlogging which is necessary for shrimp cultivation, while also severely 
impairing continued agricultural cultivation.  
	
Figure 49. Shrimp ghers in Tilokpur in 2012109 
																																																						
109 This picture, taken in 2012, depicts some of the last remaining shrimp ghers in Tilokpur. Although most 
of the village had transitioned back to rice already by this time, the impacts of shrimp could still be seen at 
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Commercial shrimp production began in Tilokpur in approximately 1985, and continued 
into the mid-late 2000s. It began much like in Polder 23, through the instigation of outsiders with 
the support of several elites from the local area. As one resident explained, 
“We first had the WABDA [sluice gate], very few influential people got control of it and 
started bringing salt water in to start farming shrimps. When they started, .it was profitable. 
Then they had hired thugs who would go around the area and take land by force for 
expanding the shrimp farms. After taking over the land they brought in the salt water by 
cutting the embankments. After a while people began to notice that crops stopped 
growing. This is because of the salt in the water, nothing grew after a while. Neither trees 
nor fish grew… Some people in the area were willing to give 5 bighas of the land to them, 
but they took 10 bighas by force. This is how they took land by force.” 
 
The support for shrimp cultivation among local residents was driven primarily by wealthy 
landholders from an adjacent village located on the opposite side of Tilokpur from the river. 
Among these, the most powerful is a man named Imtiaz Saheb, whose wealth allows him to wield 
great control over a variety of local concerns beyond the conversion from rice to shrimp. For 
example, a group of landless group members told me (with considerable dismay) that Imtiaz was 
allowed to be present at the interviews of all candidates for teaching positions at the local school, 
leading them to raise questions about several issues in the administration of the school (explored 
further below).  
In addition to water being intentionally brought in to flood the shrimp ghers, at one point 
the embankment also collapsed because the gher owners had drilled holes in it to install large PVC 
pipes to bring in the salt water, which weakened them. The collapse of the embankment caused 
the entire area to flood. As one resident explained, conflating the intentional and unintentional 
inundation, “the water rushes in and destroys our homes, kills trees, animals, everything. The 
																																																						
this point. In particular, these ghers were on the opposite side of the main footpath through the village from 
Boro Beel. The path served as a natural barrier to prevent saline water from entering the beel, and thus it was 
not necessary for these plots to participate in the collective transition. By 2014, however, they had all 
returned to rice with the rest of the village. The picture indicates what most of the village looked like during 
the time when shrimp was cultivated there. 
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shrimp farms are always under salt water and nothing can survive this water, even roads and 
houses collapse in the water.” The ecological degradation resulting from shrimp farming as well as 
the unintentional inundation exhibited itself in Tilokpur in a variety of ways. The slow death of the 
trees was the most visible of these ecological impacts, and cited most frequently by village 
residents. As one farmer explained: 
“The first year shrimp farming started, the trees were okay but they stopped bearing as 
much fruit. By the next year, not only did the fruits stop growing, but the trees started 
dying. The leaves first started discoloring, then the branches started drooping. Slowly the 
tree itself died.  Our orchard was completely gone.” 
 
Despite the ecological crisis that the area experienced due to shrimp production, many farmers 
attempted to continue growing aman rice during the monsoon season, when shrimp production is 
less profitable, due to heavy monsoon rains decreasing salinity in the ghers. Rice yields were so 
low during this time that most farmers reported suffering an annual loss. One day laborer 
described the conditions during this time as such, 
“But the situation with the crops became like this, not even 2 maund of rice would grow 
on 1 bigha of land.110 I had no work, I would go to areas outside to find work. Unless you 
saw it for yourself you can't imagine how much I had to struggle to survive. I can't even 
describe to you how I suffered. I am trying to give you an idea with just my words how 
hard I had to work to stay alive.” 
 
This testimony reflects the importance of labor opportunities in rice cultivation for landless day 
laborers. In the context of such low yields, farmers growing rice don't require assistance from day 
laborers with harvesting. Opportunities for sharecropping (upon which many landless and land-
poor households had previously depended) disappeared, as the shares of rice for both land owners 
or sharecroppers themselves dwindled to next to nothing, and land owners became increasingly 
reticent to lease out their land under sharecropping arrangements for rice farming. 
																																																						
110 One maund is approximately 37 kg, and one bigha is equal to 1/3 acre. A good rice yield during this 
season is considered approximately 18-22 maunds, depending on the variety of seed used. 
  240 
Despite the struggles these farmers endured and the exceptionally low yields, their 
persistence in attempting to drain the ghers of saline water annually before the monsoon helped to 
flush some salt and chemical residue from the soil. This practice protected Tilokpur's soils from 
some of the worst ecological impacts suffered in other shrimp-producing areas, and may be a 
significant basis of their ability to transition back to rice.111 Although some researchers have found 
that annual flushing of salinity from the soil up to 4ppt is possible (more on this in Chapter 4) 
(Clarke et al. 2015), very little is known about whether there is a point at which return to 
agriculture is impossible, and how and when that point is reached. As one official at the 
Department of Agricultural Extension put it to me, “we have very primitive knowledge.” The cases 
of villages in Dumuria and Dacope that have returned to rice from shrimp offer a counterfactual to 
claims that agriculture is no longer viable in Khulna’s shrimp growing regions. I frequently raised 
these cases with practitioners in response to such claims; in response, they would usually accede 
the possibility, though question whether most communities would have the stamina to survive 
several years (no one could know how many) of low yields while they waited for their soil to 
regain its former fertility. However, my interviews with agricultural development practitioners 
indicate a belief that intrusion of salinity into the underground aquifer would make the return 
much more difficult, if not impossible, as salinity in the groundwater would for the most part 
preclude dry season agriculture. This would suggest that Tilokpur’s aquifer successfully withstood 
the salinity of the shrimp farming period, and that they have this at least in part to thank for their 
successful return to rice. 
One of the most insightful conversations I had in Tilokpur about the discrepancies between 
rice and shrimp production was with Khokhon, a rickshaw van112 driver who I met one day while 
																																																						
111 For reasons explored in Chapter 4, most assumptions about the possibility and process of return to 
agriculture in communities like Tilokpur are entirely speculative, and subject to the politics of uncertainty. 
112 A bicycle pulling an attached flatbed, used for hauling produce and other cargo. 
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he was transporting several bushels of vegetables to the market. As we walked and chatted, I asked 
Khokhon what he thought about rice and shrimp. This seemed like a question with a fairly self-
evident response. As a rickshaw driver, I anticipated that Khokhon's attitudes about shrimp might 
have been more moderated than those of his neighbors who depended on agricultural labor. 
Rickshaw van pulling is commonly cited as the primary form of work for which demand increases 
within the village in the transition from rice to shrimp, because shrimp, unlike rice, is harvested 
year-round and requires prompt refrigeration, so there is an increased need for people to regularly 
transport what is produced in the village to nearby markets for sale. Indeed, Khokhon confirmed, 
as a small but critical link in the export shrimp value chain, he made more money than ever before 
or since. As a participant in the agriculture value chain, his labor is only required infrequently for 
transporting the harvest to market, primarily for periods of a few weeks three times per year, and 
besides that for various ad hoc needs of fellow villagers.113 Yet, Khokhon looked at me 
incredulously when I asked him this question. During the shrimp time, everyone in the village 
experienced obhab (অভাব), meaning deficiency, dearth, or scarcity. He described obhab as a 
generalized condition, one which affected the community as a whole, even the few like him who 
profited financially. During that time, the only way he could get food was by buying it in the 
market from people who brought it in from outside, as nothing was growing in the village's fields 
or gardens. This meant that food prices were much higher. But now food in the market is cheap, 
he explained, as people in the village are growing a surplus, and he can thus purchase rice and 
vegetables in the market quite inexpensively, or barter the services of his rickshaw. Though the 
cost of food and other necessities was not out of his reach during that time, owing to his increased 
																																																						
113 There are considered to be three primary growing seasons in Tilokpur; however, given the variable 
schedules of different vegetable harvests, a rickshaw might be needed to transport harvests more frequently, 
depending on the diversity of planted crops and their growing seasons in a given year. Rickshaw van drivers 
are also occasionally hired by village residents for personal transport or other needs, so this is not a 
dependable or lucrative source of income. 
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income from his rickshaw van, it was nevertheless unfavorable for him as it was for his neighbors. 
In explaining this shift to me, what he most seemed to want me to understand was that what was 
good for his community was what was good for him. 
 
Movement Against Shrimp 
Responding to this environmental degradation in the midst of displacement and personal 
economic difficulties, residents of Tilokpur faced a protracted struggle to return to rice cultivation. 
One woman told me that they were inspired to act by stories they heard from residents of Polder 
23 about the extreme degradation they had experienced. The opposition to shrimp cultivation was 
spread across a broad base of local class interests. In addition to the Nijera Kori landless 
collectives, there was also a group that called itself the Saline Water Resistance Committee, 
composed of people who were too wealthy to be eligible for Nijera Kori membership, such as 
teachers and smallholder farmers. One of these people described their mobilization, 
“The first year shrimp farming started, the trees were okay but they stopped bearing as 
much fruits. By the next year, not only did the fruits stop growing but the trees started 
dying. The leaves first started discoloring, then the branches started drooping, slowly the 
tree itself died.  Our orchard was completely gone. After that the few of us got together and 
decided, with the help of Nijera Kori’s landless organization, to close of the gates bringing 
in the salt water. We keep closing it, the shrimp farmers keep opening the gate to bring in 
salt water. It has been 3-4 years, and we had to go back and forth closing and opening the 
salt water gates. But finally we have been somewhat successful. The salt is slowly going 
away, we have started planting trees, rice is growing as well.” 
 
As this smallholder farmer notes, by 2013, the ecological conditions had improved significantly, 
and Tilokpur had begun to look quite different from the reports of the ecological collapse during 
the shrimp period. While some trees had indeed died, farmers were excited to find that most had 
begun sprouting leaves again, and many were even bearing fruits. Whereas the saline water had 
killed most grass and other plant life in the areas surrounding the ghers, by 2013, most of the 
landscape was again quite green and lush. The return of rice cultivation, as well as grass and 
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shrubs, made fodder available, creating opportunities for farmers to once again raise poultry and 
livestock. In 2013, one farmer explained "some people have started keeping cows and hens, now 
that grass has started to grow, but only a few people have started." Thus, Benoy's enthusiasm two 
years later in 2015 reflects not only the joy of the successful harvest, but the success of this 
protracted struggle which these families took individually and collectively, despite uncertainty 
about the potential for such a robust ecological recovery. 
Yet, as the smallholder above points out, even as they have been successful in their return 
to agriculture, the movement against shrimp is ongoing. In one village next to Tilokpur, where 
many local residents had also joined the anti-shrimp movement, farmers woke up one morning in 
April 2015 to find that in the middle of the night, someone had drilled a pipe into the embankment 
and flooded their land with salt water to try to force a return to shrimp. Though residents plugged 
the hole immediately, and the water dried up quickly, the salt, still visible in chalky deposits 
covering the soil, would make it impossible for them to grow rice or vegetables that season. Men 
from this village continued to migrate out to Gopalganj, Khulna, and Kolkata to find work.  
One small farmer was singled out for harassment and intimidation by a wealthy 
businessman who wanted to appropriate a piece of his land to build a canal to bring salt water for 
a gher in another adjacent village. He showed me a stack of legal documents related to a series of 
false criminal cases that had been filed against him with the local police. This kind of judicial 
harassment is a common means of coercion against the poorest, for whom even the obligation to 
travel to government offices in a nearby town to contest a false charge can be punishing burden of 
time and travel costs. Nijera Kori supports people subject to this kind of harassment both through 
contributing funds to cover expenses related to travel and legal fees, as well as by connecting 
members with legal aid support, particularly from the Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers 
Association (BELA), an advocacy group that has led several major cases against shrimp 
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aquaculture at both local and national levels. This farmer received special support from the local 
landless groups because their opposition to using the canal for salt was linked with advocacy to 
have it excavated for rainwater collection to expand the irrigation area. They referred to this as the 
Khal Andolon, or Canal Movement (such struggles over canal excavation are explored in greater 
detail below). 
 
	
Figure 50. Anti-shrimp rally poster on a house in Tilokpur 
 
Mobilization Beyond Shrimp 
While the movement in Tilokpur was catalyzed around a demand to transition away from 
shrimp and back to rice production, its demands did not end there. Understanding how the 
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movement's concerns with ecological destruction caused by shrimp cultivation are entangled with 
a host of other social and economic struggles is essential to understanding their motivations and, 
more broadly, the nature of human-environment interaction in the region. This attention draws on 
a tradition in political ecology which investigates material foundations of environmentalism in 
peasant and indigenous social movements (Baviskar 1995; Martinez-Alier 2002; Peet and Watts 
2004; Rangan 2000). The "environmentalism of the poor," Martinez-Alier explains, derives from an 
ethics of demands for social justice among humans, not from some inherent reverence for Nature 
(Martinez-Alier 2002). Similarly, the movement in Tilokpur has challenged shrimp cultivation on 
the grounds that it engenders inequitable access to resources and livelihood opportunities among 
community members, impacts which correlate (but are not synonymous) with its ecological 
implications. I bring these perspectives on environmental social movements into conversation with 
those on resistance in Tilokpur in order to lay the foundation for a discussion of alternative 
perspectives on the possibilities of climate justice in Bangladesh and elsewhere. 
In Tilokpur, the Nijera Kori collective united to mobilize against shrimp cultivation in their 
village. They developed strategies and skills for activism which made their mobilization more 
effective. Sometimes this involved protest marches and demonstrations in regional market centers. 
They also organized watch committees to monitor sluice gates and protective dikes, particularly at 
night, to ensure that saline water would not be illegally brought in by people hired by would-be 
shrimp farmers. This often entailed direct physical confrontation by groups and individuals. In 
addition to these modes of direct agitation, they also learned to use legal channels to support their 
advocacy. One such channel was the use of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, which was enacted 
in 2009. The RTI Act gives Bangladeshi citizens the right to request information of public interest 
from any government or public authority (including NGOs). Several advocacy organizations have 
begun training citizen groups to use it to hold government agencies accountable for fulfilling 
  246 
obligations to its citizens, such as provision of social security entitlements. Nijera Kori landless 
collectives have had success with using the law to press officials for information about 
entitlements to common land access, government decisions about water management, and other 
concerns which have a concrete bearing on the cultivation of shrimp or rice.  
Having learned how to utilize the RTI Act from Nijera Kori organizers, the landless 
collective in Tilokpur began putting the principles of the right to information to work in a variety of 
other contexts. The awareness that information was not only their right, but was also often publicly 
available, and moreover that it could be used to demand accountability, became a critical plank in 
their organizing efforts. For example, suspecting that the local schoolmaster was charging 
excessive fees for administering exams (preventing the children of landless families from being 
able to take them), the landless collective in November 2014 enlisted the computer teacher to go 
online to the school district website and find the table of exam fees mandated by the government. 
After having this chart printed, they enlisted a Nijera Kori staff member to write a formal letter of 
complaint on their behalf, explaining that the fees being charged were more than double the 
mandated amount and demanding that they be reduced. Following a contentious meeting with an 
agitated headmaster who clearly was not prepared for such a sudden shift in power114, the fees 
were adjusted to the appropriate rate. In detailing this protest strategy to me, the landless collective 
members explained that while they had learned about the utility of securing information for 
pursuing environmental concerns and securing land rights, these strategies were important in 
relation to shifting power dynamics around a whole range of social and economic issues. 
Environmental activism was only one piece of a broader vision for social justice. Restoration of the 
																																																						
114 The headmaster’s agitation was also likely due in part to having his authority openly challenged in front 
of a foreigner. It is also certainly possible that my presence in the room played a part in the success of their 
request to have the fees adjusted, and that in other circumstances their demands may have required 
additional or different forms of pressure.  
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environment was also, then, only one part of a necessary struggle to pursuing their vision of a 
more equitable agrarian future. Insofar as environmental activism provided the opportunity for 
expanding their “repertoire of resistance” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Wolford 2010), it 
provided the foundation for a larger struggle for social change. 
 
Polder 22 
The first time I visited Polder 22 was in August 2012, at the height of the monsoon. It 
poured hard without stopping all day, and I was soaked, my cotton salwar kameez and long orna 
hanging heavy and cold. We had chartered a boat to take us there, as the roads in this part of 
Khulna frequently begin to wash away during the monsoon, often becoming completely 
impassable. For hours all I saw were tall grey mud embankments fading into the river as we passed 
island after island. These embankments are formed of alluvial soil rendered barren by the salt that 
seeped into them from the shrimp ghers they held in. When we came around the bend in the river 
and got our first sight of Polder 22, it was, for me, a revelation. In dramatic contrast to the 
surrounding islands, the embankments of Polder 22 are cloaked in green grass, with trees and 
settlements rising out of them. There were people, too, despite the steady rain, signs of life which 
were otherwise sparse in the area.  
This anomalous ecology is the result of decades of struggle by inhabitants of the villages of 
Polder 22. In the 1980s, when the government and development agencies began promoting the 
conversation of agricultural lands to shrimp ghers, in Polder 22 the landless social movement 
supported by Nijera Kori actively opposed it. In 1976, the Dutch development agency in 
Bangladesh launched the Delta Development Project (DDP) in Polder 22 as part of its overall 
portfolio of water management programming (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996; Sur 
2010). One aspect of this work involved the construction of a mud embankment surrounding the 
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outside of the large polder embankment. Similar to the traditional oshto masher badh described in 
Chapter 5, this embankment is impermanent, and provides additional protection from storm surges 
and tidal flooding, while also shielding the internal embankment from erosion and breaches. The 
area between the two embankments was subsequently managed like khas land, though technically 
under the ownership of the Water Development Board. Nijera Kori was engaged to facilitate this 
project, reflecting broader support among donor agencies in the aftermath of the 1971 Liberation 
War for more progressive development pathways (in Nijera Kori's case, social mobilization and 
"conscientization").  
Nijera Kori used their role in the DDP to organize landless collectives and help them 
successfully lobby the government for access to common lands for use in cooperative agricultural 
production. In exchange for these groups taking responsibility for the manual labor required for 
maintaining the external embankment, the Water Development Board gave these landless 
collectives year-round access rights to the ring of land between the two embankments surrounding 
the polder. Anjan Datta, now a development economist who worked in Polder 22 as a community 
organizer for Nijera Kori under the DDP in the 1980s and 90s, explained to me that the project 
facilitated an opening for land access that the collectives were able to transform into an ongoing 
entitlement. “Once they had established a precedent for working on the land,” he said, “they 
established their rights to it, and showed that they could manage it effectively.” This combination 
of leverage from the DDP intervention with community organizing by Nijera Kori (and activists 
such as Datta) thus facilitated a transformation in land rights in Polder 22 that has continued into 
the present. 
Collectively, these groups farm indigenous aman varieties during the monsoon season. 
During the dry season they cultivate fish, which they bring in by breaking the embankments at 
high tide to allow native species to flow in, then trapping them by re-damming the embankments 
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before the tide goes down. The common land between these two rings of embankments is thus 
essential both to the protection of the polder’s inhabitants as well as the production and social 
reproduction of many of its most vulnerable inhabitants. The groups plan and perform the 
embankment maintenance in large teams when necessary, as well as individually or in pairs or 
smaller groups throughout the year as needed. Riding in a boat around the polder, it is common to 
see at least one or two people out with small spades conducting this kind of repair work.  
These landless collectives were thus already quite strong and well organized by the 1980s, 
when land in surrounding polders began being rapidly converted to shrimp ghers through 
widespread, unchecked land grabbing, primarily by elite urban outsiders (Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1996; Paprocki and Cons 2014). By November 1990, this anti-shrimp movement 
had mobilized in opposition to pressure from Wazed Ali Biswas, a businessman from Khulna city 
who intended to acquire over 2,000 acres of agricultural land in Polder 22 for shrimp cultivation. 
On November 7th, this conflict came to a head in a confrontation between the landless collectives 
and a mob of armed mercenaries hired by Wazed, during which Karunamoyee Sardar, a local 
landless leader, was attacked, abducted, and presumably murdered.  
Karunamoyee's martyrdom thus catalyzed the movement in Polder 22 and beyond. Citing 
her last words, which are said to have been "we have come this far, we cannot retreat," Nijera Kori 
members celebrate her sacrifice both to the landless collectives of Polder 22, as well as 
symbolically to the movement against shrimp more broadly. Her death is commemorated annually 
on November 7th by thousands of landless movement members who gather in Polder 22 from all 
over Bangladesh for songs, speeches, and jatra street theater performances (see Figure 51). Today, 
peasant activists thank the sacrifices of Karunamoyee and other leaders for the island's ecological 
resilience in midst of surrounding destruction. At the Karunamoyee Day celebration in 2014, a 
landless group leader from Polder 22 roused the crowd gathered from areas long taken over by 
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shrimp ghers, gesturing toward their fields bursting with the aman rice crop, "You can see how 
beautiful our environment is here in Polder 22...we have goats, cows, chickens, and sweet [fresh] 
water... It is because of our leaders that the environment is still so beautiful here!" In articulating 
this history of ecological protection through collective mobilization, activists enjoin their 
neighbors from surrounding communities to organize in their own villages. 
	
Figure 51. Karunamoyee Day 2014 
This narrative suggests a radically different interpretation of the drivers of environmental 
change in the coastal region than that of the popular imagination of climate crisis offered by 
development practitioners and in media accounts. The activist narrative undermines the "common 
sense" of climate crisis by suggesting that it is neither natural nor inevitable. More significantly, it 
emphasizes the role of social mobilization in protecting the environment from degradation. This 
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emphasis also suggests important dimensions of their alternative vision for the future of this region 
and production and social reproduction within it.  
	
Figure 52. Monument to Karunamoyee in Polder 22 
Landless groups in Polder 22 continue to pursue this vision of ecological alternatives both 
through resistance to shrimp cultivation as well as a variety of collective agricultural activities. 
During the time of the DDP, landless groups were able to secure access to much of the common 
land controlled by the government on the island, in particular much of a ring around the perimeter 
of the embankment. Since then, they have farmed that land together in groups of about twenty (see 
Figure 53).  
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Figure 53. Collective rice farming in Polder 22 
Datta explained to me in 2015 that the successful environmental preservation of the island 
(relative to surrounding polders) was due to this "strong social organization" supported under the 
project, which persists even today. However, he also said that the work to address the political 
economy of land tenure through this pilot project was not replicated subsequently by the Dutch or 
other development agencies. In an evaluation of Dutch aid in Bangladesh conducted in 1997, the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs found that despite the successful organization of landless 
groups under the DDP, this work was discontinued due to the rapid expansion of shrimp 
cultivation in surrounding areas, and the apparent possibility of it spreading to Polder 22. The 
report explains that: 
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“In the surrounding polders shrimp cultivation expanded rapidly, putting sever pressure on 
landowners in the polders to undertake the same activity. Because of this, the evaluation 
mission questioned the sustainability of the project achievements after its completion. The 
project was eventually discontinued because the appraisal mission for its third phase 
shared the same concern, and the Bangladeshi authorities in question did not request 
continuation.” (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996, 142).  
 
Despite this discontinuation of support, the landless groups organized under the DDP have 
remained strong, in part through the organizing support Nijera Kori has continued to provide. As 
described above, in between the double ring of embankments surrounding the island, they grow 
aman rice for about four months out of the year. During an additional six months, they raise fish 
from a diverse mix of indigenous larvae that flow in from the adjacent river. Some of this fish and 
rice is sold in nearby markets, but much of it is also consumed by the families of the landless 
group members, among whom the remaining harvest is split up equally. One member told me that 
her share of the rice yield was usually enough to feed her family for six months (which 
supplements the rest of the families’ independent earnings and production, either from work in or 
outside the village, or what they grow in their own personal small plots or gardens).  
Another critical aspect of this alternative vision of the agrarian future of Polder 22 is the 
commitment of landless groups to cultivating indigenous varieties of seeds for rice and other crops. 
Since the Green Revolution, one of the key tenets of rural development in Bangladesh (as 
elsewhere) has been the promotion of the use of hybrid seed varieties, which are either imported 
from outside the country or developed within the country, often using foreign technology. The 
principal merit of hybrid seeds is said to be that they result in higher crop yields relative to 
indigenous varieties. Among NGOs working in climate change adaptation, hybrid seeds are 
particularly celebrated as a solution to addressing some of the worst climatic vagaries, such as 
drought, salinity, flooding, unpredictable rains, and uncertain seasonal change (Mackill et al. 
2010). Yet, many farmers in Polder 22 have shifted not toward these new hybrids, but instead have 
embraced traditional varieties, and are working collectively to revive them. Whereas farmers have 
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found that crops grown from hybrid seeds can be destroyed in conditions of excessive flooding, 
several farmers described to me indigenous strains of rice that within a matter of days would 
naturally grow in height to reach above flood waters when submerged. They also described 
traditional varieties which were naturally saline tolerant, more adapted to the brackish waters of 
the coastal flood plains than new hybrid strains promoted by agricultural extension agents. 
Farmers in Polders 22 and 29 cite this natural adaptive capacity of indigenous rice strains 
as a major reason for their growing interest in cultivating them today. This shift in cultivation has 
required a collective mobilization to revive varieties that had begun to decline in use, and that do 
not enjoy the support and dissemination of government and NGO extension agents. This 
mobilization has primarily taken place through the development of community seed banks for 
saving and sharing local rice and vegetable varieties (see Figure 56). Though some organizers 
described to me visions of more formalized institutional spaces for preserving and propagating the 
use of these seeds, the approximately half dozen seeds banks I observed in the area were housed 
informally in people's homes (see Figure 54 and Figure 55). Rice seeds are often stored in 
traditional earthen vessels, while less ubiquitous vegetable seeds are kept in repurposed plastic 
bottles, bowls, and crumpled up pieces of newsprint and fabric. The ad hoc system of revolving 
dispensation involves farmers depositing particular seed varieties after a harvest, borrowing from 
the bank again the following season before planting, and then re-depositing a portion of their 
successfully harvested seeds. The success of this system is contingent on the unique feature of 
indigenous seed varieties to be saved from season to season, unlike hybrids, which lose their high-
quality characteristics when saved between generations, requiring farmers to buy new seeds 
annually. 
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Figure 54. Home seed saving in Polder 22 
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Figure 55. Home seed saving in Polder 22 
 
	
Figure 56. Nijera Kori collective seed bank in Polder 22 
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Canal Movements 
Another critical component of the agricultural capacity in both Tilokpur and Polder 22 
involves the presence and excavation of canals that, in addition to facilitating drainage, also store 
and supply fresh water throughout the year. In Polder 22, the capacity at the northern end of the 
village to farm winter crops is facilitated by a canal that runs diagonally through the polder, 
dissecting the village from top to bottom. The canal connects with the river through a sluice gate 
on the west side of the polder that is opened during the monsoon, when it fills with fresh water 
(both from the river and from natural drainage of rainwater into it). However, at the southern end 
of the village, the canal has filled with sediment, causing its bed to rise, its width to narrow, and its 
capacity to reduce to such an extent that it quickly dries up shortly after the monsoon. This process 
of sedimentation is an unexpected result of the polder system, examined in Chapter 4. The 
reduced velocity of water within the canal (caused by the hydraulic system inside the polder being 
cut off from the outside) results in a reduced capacity to flushing the sediments out, and they are 
instead deposited within the canal. As a result, the lack of available fresh water at the southern end 
of the island during the winter means that most of this land lies fallow during the dry season. 
The remedy for this sedimentation problem is fairly straightforward: the sediments can be 
excavated from the canal. This can be done either by hiring local laborers (certainly the preferred 
option among local residents), or through the use of dredging machinery. Excavation of the canals 
was among the greatest demands I heard from villagers throughout the coastal region, in a variety 
of different ecologies and production systems. In the parts of the coastal zone where the rivers run 
saline in the winter, the storage of fresh water during the dry season adds an extra crop to their 
annual production calendar, meaning that farmers could as much as double their incomes over the 
course of the year. At a conference on the Ganges Coastal Zone organized by the CGIAR 
consortium in 2014, one researcher from the International Water Management Institute (IWMI, a 
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member of the CGIAR consortium) cited an unpublished study indicating that these canals can 
store enough water to irrigate a full crop of winter boro rice in 25 per cent of the area, and that this 
area could be increased to 40 per cent if the canals were properly dredged. The researcher argued 
that these findings undermine common perceptions that water resources are a constraint to 
production in the coastal zone. At this same conference, a researcher from the Bangladesh 
Agricultural Research Institute (BARI) explained that even canals filled with low to medium salinity 
water could be a good source of irrigation for more saline-tolerant winter crops like wheat, 
mustard, and watermelon. 
The major challenge to pursuing these options is a vacuum of responsibility for carrying 
out this essential infrastructural maintenance. This represents a long-term entrenched failure 
resulting from the ambiguous division of responsibility between donors and the government in 
short- and long-term development intervention; we already observed this dynamic in the inception 
of the CEP in the 1960s in Chapter 1. The Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) is 
responsible for infrastructural construction but not necessarily maintenance. It could also be 
considered the purview of the Local Government Engineering Division (LGED), although they are 
also responsible for construction, and their focus on maintenance is usually confined to larger 
infrastructures like roads, cyclone shelters, and certain large embankments. Some among the 
donor and government community say that local communities should be responsible for dredging 
their own canals. The responsibility vacuum is compounded by the fact that donors are sometimes 
willing to fund maintenance as part of their limited-term project activities in a given area, so the 
possibility of this additional funding discourages government commitments to maintenance. 
Despite sometimes funding such activities, donors consistently deny responsibility for them, 
instead expressing a preference for new and novel interventions and short-term commitments. 
When I talked to an official with one large USAID climate change adaptation program in Khulna, 
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he described at length the key role the community played in planning and management of the 
project interventions, including the kinds of work that would be carried out under the auspices of 
the project and what production systems would be promoted as a result. However, when I asked 
about what the boundaries of potential work might be to be carried out under the auspices of the 
project, he explained that water management (including canal dredging) would not fall under the 
possible scope of interventions they could support. He described one community that had 
requested that the available project funds be spent on excavating a reservoir (fulfilling the same 
function as a canal). However, the project staff believed that such an intervention would not 
improve villagers’ incomes, and therefore they instead decided to connect the community with a 
commercial aquaculture project. 
In 2014, I attended a Consultation Workshop115 hosted by the FAO in Khulna to solicit 
feedback on a new project being funded by the Global Environment Fund (GEF, a global climate 
finance agency) to promote aquaculture as a climate change adaptation strategy. Held in a 
conference room in Khulna City’s nicest business hotel, the meeting was attended by about 20 
invited local government bureaucrats and some faculty from Khulna University, along with a 
group of Bangladeshi and foreign consultants hired to plan the project.  One consultant explained 
to the gathered local experts, “we’re most interested in finding out what technologies are most 
appropriate, what kinds of protocols to recommend, like stocking densities [in ghers].” Despite the 
consultant’s request for purely technical recommendations about interventions that had already 
been planned, several of the attendees wanted to talk about the conflicts between rice and shrimp, 
and related needs for alternative water management systems. Several mentioned the need for canal 
																																																						
115 The Consultation Workshop is another term for the Stakeholder Workshop mentioned in the Introduction. 
Both are considered obligatory components of the project conception process, although they are usually 
held after significant planning work has been carried out and funding commitments have been made for 
particular project components. 
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dredging to improve freshwater storage for irrigation. An official from the Department of Fisheries 
pressed the consultants that “canal excavation should definitely be a component” of the GEF 
project, explaining that lack of access to water due to sediment canals was the primary obstacle to 
production for farmers in Khulna. These recommendations were at odds with the plans that had 
already been developed for the project, and approved by the GEF, and were therefore not of 
particular use to the project team. Another of the consultants weighed in,  
“It’s good to brainstorm, I have no objections to that. But we need to identify what actually 
needs to be done. If water logging [related to shrimp ghers] is the key issue, then how to 
identify problems and potential solutions? And then what kinds of problems might be 
created downstream? If it cannot be solvable, what can be done to get the farmers to adapt 
to the problems. If the problems are intractable or very costly [to address], then we should 
help farmers adapt regardless.” 
 
This statement recalls the conflicts over water logging observed in Chapter 4, but also speaks to 
the recurrent insistence that agriculture is no longer viable in this area, and farmers should learn to 
accept and adapt to shrimp aquaculture.  
These widespread discourses about the unviability of agriculture do not take into account 
the potential for expanded irrigation through improved canal maintenance. The maps of salinity 
fronts discussed in Chapter 4 particularly conceal this possibility through the suggestion that the 
water salinity in the rivers is the salinity level of available irrigation water. Yet, as we see in 
Tilokpur and Polder 22, the excavation and storage of fresh water in these canals extends the 
possibility of dry season irrigation, facilitating year-round agricultural production.  
 
Ongoing Mobilization 
The testimonies celebrating the successes of these movements should not be mistaken for 
lack of contestation. Indeed, their movement to continue farming rice is ongoing, and entails 
vigilant and ongoing organizing efforts. Though it wasn’t a common occurrence, I met two 
separate people in Polder 22 who told me that they had formerly been members of the landless 
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collectives, but that they had left because of aversion to the continuous agitation entailed in 
membership. One man told me he had left because he didn’t like the constant fighting required of 
movement members, and others latter mentioned to me that he was a very “peaceful” man, and 
therefore wasn’t inclined to the ongoing work of mobilization. Another woman told me she had 
left because there was ongoing violence directed at members from outsiders and some local elites, 
and she was afraid of the conflict, so she thought it was better to stay out of it. Another man who 
lived on a marginal piece of land on the embankment, and had moved to Polder 22 when he was 
pushed out of his home village in another polder by shrimp farming, told me that he didn’t like the 
landless collectives because they controlled the land around the outside of the embankment, and 
although he could have joined one of the collectives, he would have preferred to have had a plot 
of land to himself. Nevertheless, even those who choose not to participate in ongoing mobilization 
benefit from the continued agricultural production system in the polder, and these expressions of 
disinterest in the movement did not translate to dissent against the agriculture it promotes.  
The ongoing work of mobilization takes many forms beyond the continuous collective 
cultivation undertaken by landless group members, though today it is often more mundane than 
spectacular, as in the attack in 1990. One example of this was the introduction of a program 
funded by the Dutch embassy known as “Blue Gold” beginning in 2012. Polders 22 and 29 were 
two of several polders in which Blue Gold had planned interventions to promote new agricultural 
technologies, market linkages, and improved water management infrastructures in the coastal 
region. I met several times with staff involved in this program in both Dhaka and Khulna, and they 
told me repeatedly that they had no plans to promote shrimp aquaculture in Polder 22, and some 
articulated to me their opposition to the inequitable agrarian political economy of shrimp 
aquaculture. Yet, I also repeatedly heard doubts about the program from landless group members 
in Polders 22 and 29, who insisted that they believed the program would in fact support the 
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introduction (and re-introduction) of commercial shrimp cultivation in the village. Whether or not 
this was the intention of the planners and administrators of the program, in both communities, I 
heard reports that the program had targeted as beneficiaries the local elites who had opposed their 
movements against shrimp.  
It was clear to me that these assumptions of Blue Gold’s interest in promoting shrimp on 
the part of movement members were based on the evidence of experience, and were in this sense 
logical even if program staff continuously insisted on the contrary. In one particularly troubling 
incident in Polder 22, a landless movement member told me he had been attacked after dark in a 
small field he was cultivating by Blue Gold members who wanted to take over the landless groups’ 
collectively cultivated lands and turn them into shrimp ghers. His broken arm hanging in a sling 
indicated the quite seriousness of this attack. As I spoke to other community members and Nijera 
Kori organizers about this incident, a modified version of this interpretation of the event seemed 
more likely. Indeed, there is anger among wealthier community members about the landless 
groups’ near-monopoly of the land around the outside of the polder; although landless people 
have a constitutional right to khas lands, in many communities this right is co-opted by elite 
residents. Even as these residents may also be members of Blue Gold, their interests in these lands, 
or even possibly in shrimp cultivation, are not necessarily related to their membership in the 
program. I did hear from some landless group members that they were also members of Blue Gold 
as well (although I also heard reports from some landless members in both Polder 22 and 29 that 
they had been explicitly excluded as beneficiaries because of their activism against shrimp). 
This mess of ambiguity and confusion over the goals, plans, and beneficiaries of Blue Gold 
might have been cleared up through direct and concerted communication about the program 
between all parties. Yet, in 2015, frustrated that the information was not forthcoming, landless 
groups in Polder 22 submitted an RTI application to the Khulna Blue Gold office requesting details 
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about the work proposed in their community under the project’s purview. They received support 
in filing this application from local Nijera Kori officials, including completing the application and 
transportation to the office where it was deposited. When the information was not forthcoming, 
they appealed their request all the way up to the national RTI arbitrator, who ordered Blue Gold to 
provide the relevant documents. To attend this national adjudication in Dhaka, they received 
support for transportation from Nijera Kori, and also lodging in the Nijera Kori central office, 
which houses two small dorm rooms on its top floor for precisely this kind of activity. When the 
details were still not forthcoming, the landless groups appealed to this national body again, they 
were finally given some documentation from Blue Gold officials, although they found it to be thin 
and not particularly detailed, leading them not to trust its veracity and completeness. I discussing 
these events with one Nijera Kori organizer, I said that I had personally received more detailed 
reports from program staff when I visited their offices, and offered to share it with them, which 
might clear up what I saw as confusion over whether or not Blue Gold would be promoting shrimp 
or not. He looked at me as if I had misunderstood the point of their efforts; “they have to give the 
information directly to the landless groups; it is their right to request it and to have it.” This 
experience of the struggle of the landless groups to understand and have a say in the interventions 
planned and taking place in their community is an example of how the ongoing agitation against 
shrimp transpires in Polder 22. Even as the violence of the early period of shrimp land grabbing 
has receded, the maintenance of their enhanced control in the production system requires ongoing 
vigilance and action. The landless group member who had been attacked explained to me that if it 
weren’t for the collectives, the landless people would have all disappeared by now, saying “we’re 
not afraid of the lathi (sticks) because we know our rights.” 
 
Incremental vs. Transformational Adaptation 
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The modes of resistance and collective mobilization demonstrated in Polders 22 and 29 
reflect a particular imaginary of the future of this region that is at odds with the future imagined by 
many development agencies, and actors who participate in the adaptation regime. The political 
economy of rice and vegetable production in Tilokpur, as well as in Polder 22, demonstrates a 
vision of the possibilities for rural futures imagined by local communities that has been 
undermined both discursively and ecologically by the enthusiasm for shrimp production among 
development agencies. In particular, the vision from these villages in Khulna demonstrates a 
transformation toward agrarian futures, as opposed to a transformation away from them. 
These divergent visions and trajectories of transformation are significant in light of 
widespread calls among adaptation practitioners and academics for a focus on “transformational 
adaptation” (Rickards and Howden 2012; Kates, Travis, and Wilbanks 2012; Haque, Dodman, and 
Hossain 2014; Pelling 2011). In framing the scope of the activities carried out under the banner of 
adaptation, experts have increasingly begun to refer to the distinct categories of "incremental 
adaptation" and "transformative adaptation," which are understood to be discrete paradigms that 
address different kinds of interventions and different timeframes of change. The IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report defines the scope of and difference between these paradigms as follows: 
"Incremental adaptation refers to actions where the central aim is to maintain the essence 
and integrity of the existing technological, institutional, governance, and value systems, 
such as through adjustments to cropping systems via new varieties, changing planting 
times, or using more efficient irrigation. In contrast, transformational adaptation seeks to 
change the fundamental attributes of systems in response to actual or expected climate and 
its effects, often at a scale and ambition greater than incremental activities. It includes 
changing livelihoods from cropping to livestock or by migrating to take up a livelihood 
elsewhere, and also changes in our perceptions and paradigms about the nature of climate 
change, adaptation, and their relationship to other natural and human systems" (Noble et 
al. 2014, 839). 
 
While incremental adaptation is understood to be the current modus operandi of climate change 
adaptation, calls for a paradigm shift toward transformational adaptation arise in every discussion 
of the path forward for adaptation in Bangladesh as well as globally. These discussions typically 
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involve a distinction between incremental adaptation as a short-term process (often referred to as 
“addressing symptoms”) and transformational adaptation as a long-term process aimed at more 
fundamental and systemic change, while recognizing that pursuing both strategies simultaneously 
will be necessary. “Transformation” has become the word used to indicate a change in 
development priorities, and often a different vision for the future to be pursued by development 
agencies. 
The notion of transformation carries the implication of a normative progressive orientation 
in both popular and scholarly usage, and many academics have also explicitly identified the 
concept’s emancipatory possibilities (Bahadur and Tanner 2014; Bassett and Fogelman 2013; 
Eriksen, Nightingale, and Eakin 2015; O'Brien 2012; Smucker et al. 2015). In this vein, at a 
conference on climate change adaptation in Kuala Lumpur in 2014, Farah Kabir, the Country 
Director of ActionAid Bangladesh described transformational adaptation as “the new way to 
development,” explaining that it would entail a “redistribution of power.” Yet, like many 
development “buzzwords” before it (Rist 2007), transformational adaptation - what it means, and 
how to pursue it - remains ambiguous and elusive. Transformation to what? For whom and how? 
  
Incremental Adaptation 
 In Bangladesh, programs reflecting the incremental adaptation paradigm often involve 
technical interventions with roots in a "business as usual" development approach. In Bangladesh, 
these projects often involve relatively minor technical interventions, such as the introduction of 
hybrid rice seeds that are considered to be more saline tolerant, or the promotion of homestead 
container gardens for growing vegetables in areas where the soil has become too saline to plant 
gardens in the ground. They are, by definition, pursued with the goal of intensifying status quo 
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production dynamics and power relations. For example, one report prepared by BRAC116 for UN 
Women proposed alternative livelihood options that would be appropriate for promotion as 
climate change adaptation strategies among women in each of 20 particular upazilas in the coastal 
zone (BRAC 2013). In Paikgachha, their high-priority selected interventions involve the 
introduction of non-climate sensitive livelihoods (read: non-farm livelihoods), including 
manufacturing of handicrafts (for example dolls, handmade paper, and other decorative household 
items such as those sold at BRAC's urban department store chain, Aarong), as well as interventions 
that support the "extension" of aquaculture, including the collection of shrimp post-larvae from 
rivers and repair of nets and cages used in aquaculture . These strategies are contingent on and 
bolster the continuation of the particular relations of production currently existing in Paikgachha. 
This is precisely what makes these incremental adaptation strategies. Yet, in the sense that they 
also entrench dynamics of dispossession from agricultural livelihoods, they might also be seen as 
transformational. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the effects of incremental adaptation can be found in 
southern Shatkhira, in the area surrounding Munshiganj, to the east of which lie Paikgachha and 
Dumuria. Shatkhira is iconic for its crises and its failures. After it was devastated by cyclone Aila in 
2009, donors and NGOs flocked to the area to establish new climate change adaptation programs. 
Today the remarkable density of these programs is made visible by the signboards that line 
Satkhira's main highway, all the way to Munshiganj, where it ends in a dusty road through a small 
market, and a handful of tea stalls surrounding a wall of NGO and foreign embassy logos, 
photographs, and signs pointing in different directions to various adaptation program offices and 
demonstration sites. The Climate Smart House described in Chapter 2 is an example of one of the 
most celebrated and publicized incremental adaptation interventions in Munshiganj. While there 
																																																						
116 Formerly the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, BRAC is the largest NGO in the world. 
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is a great deal of celebration of hitting project targets and implementation goals through programs 
in this area, one donor confided to me that he considered this landscape a "graveyard of failed 
projects," reflecting both the sense of failure of many projects, as well as the great abundance of 
experiments that have made their way through the area. Moreover, the comment indicates that the 
adaptation regime, more than producing any particular "successful" strategy for sustainable 
development and continued habitation of this region, generates precisely this landscape of 
intervention itself - a never-ending stream of experiments with no future. Incremental adaptation 
programs are significant for what they represent; in their aggregation, they propose and enforce 
new ways of governing this landscape. 
Adaptation experts who I spoke with about the timeframes of these interventions estimate 
that the impacts of incremental adaptation will last for somewhere between zero to twenty years. 
(some cite the figure as zero to five years, others say two decades might be possible), whereas 
transformational adaptation is designed and anticipated to generate changes that are sustainable in 
the much longer term. There is no clear consensus on these figures; as observed in Chapter 4, they 
can be based on both predictions of future environmental change, as well as normative planning 
assessments. Some scientists have ventured into the intersection of both, such as one recent study 
in Nature Climate Change that estimates a potential timeframe for the necessity of transformative 
adaptation of 20-50 years (Rippke et al. 2016). The expected sustainability timeframe of these 
interventions reflects the more systemic expectations about the sustainability of rural livelihoods in 
these areas in general. Incremental adaptations in coastal villages in Khulna are not expected to 
last longer than two decades because for many adaptation practitioners, these spaces themselves 
and the communities that inhabit them are not expected to last longer than two decades.  
 
Transformational Adaptation 
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Development practitioners working in Bangladesh promoting climate change adaptation 
frequently discuss the imperative for transformational adaptation. Many experts cited to me the 
need for "social engineering" to effect transformational change, though exactly what this 
engineering would entail remains somewhat nebulous. While calls for a shift toward 
transformational adaptation abound in Bangladesh, concrete examples of existing transformational 
programs are rarely given. The need for transformation in socio-ecological systems that are 
perceived to be threatened with (or already experiencing) dystopia is considered to be self-evident; 
however, the transformations necessary to avert this are far more elusive. 
In Bangladesh, the role of rural out-migration in imagining this vision of the future through 
transformational adaptation is stark, and rural-urban migration is one transformational adaptation 
strategy that is always cited. In every conversation I had with development practitioners about 
what transformational adaptation could look like, or how it might be pursued, they discussed the 
critical role of rural out-migration from Khulna. Options cited for interventions to support this 
migration included “planned migration,” training farmers in skills more appropriate to work in 
urban areas, as well as production transformations from agriculture to shrimp aquaculture and 
related transformations of rural economies to urban ones. One DFID official explained that they 
were reorganizing their programs in order to specifically address transformational adaptation, and 
that this would entail skills training for “transformed livelihoods” and migration from the southwest 
to urban areas. 
This reliance on migration as an example of potential transformation is indicative of the 
broader normative dimensions of how transformational adaptation has come to be understood. 
The need for transformation is, for the adaptation regime, a way of introducing a pathway toward 
this particular vision of development in the time of climate change. It serves to arbitrate the kinds 
of futures that are deemed possible and necessary. Of all the possible kinds of socio-economic and 
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ecological transitions that may be conceivable in southwestern Bangladesh, when it comes to the 
field of transformational adaptation to climate change, moving people out of their communities 
appears to be the only conceivable option. Thus, transformational adaptation is indicative of the 
broader dynamics of how the adaptation regime is governed. While containing multiple and 
sometimes conflicting perspectives, it also governs the boundaries of the kind of futures or  
While the idea of the need for transformation is talked about with a high degree of 
confidence, when it comes to specifying what this might look like, most experts become more 
circumspect. Many discuss the need for a combined approach involving both incremental and 
transformational interventions, pointing out the challenges that true transformational change will 
entail (for recipient communities rather than for practitioners). Many cite the inevitable disruption 
that will be necessary in rural communities in the southwest in order to achieve adaptation. One 
program staff member explained to me frankly, "You cannot do things overnight. People will 
suffer. Things will have to change." Discussions of necessary transformations thus entail not only 
assumptions about their inevitability, but also about the dispossession that will take place through 
and as a result of it. Another climate expert, reflecting on his organization's advocacy for 
recognition of migration as a climate change adaptation strategy, explained to me that the need for 
transformation also entails a "need to reorganize societies." In order to do this, he said, it will be 
necessary to confront the fact that "there will be winners and losers." 
This phrase, "there will be winners and losers," is one that is repeated frequently among 
climate experts who are invested in the project of establishing transformational adaptation as the 
new adaptation paradigm. In this way, it has come to be a kind of orthodoxy of the adaptation 
regime. It is also reflective of the understanding that there are already winners and losers. Indeed, 
the people living in what is understood to be Khulna's dystopic ecology today are clearly among 
those who will be the "losers" in this emerging paradigm. There is some slippage in the nature of 
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how these losses are understood and discussed. While their supposed inevitability is attributed to 
the dynamics of climate change itself, the discourse of transformational adaptation indicates that 
the actual dynamics of dispossession will be carried out through adaptation itself, interventions 
that are by no means a foregone conclusion. Through the adaptation regime, the process of 
adaptation is rendered technical (Li 2007), and dispossession is rendered apolitical (Ferguson 
1990). 
 
Convergence of Incremental and Transformational Adaptation 
While incremental and transformational adaptation are often understood to be directly in 
opposition to one another, a deeper analysis of the programs, their fundamental logics, and effects, 
suggests that they may share more ground than is recognized. While transformational adaptation 
proposes the overt displacement of inhabitants of the coastal zone through planned strategies for 
resettlement, incremental adaptation arises out of a longer-term development project that effects 
these agrarian dispossessions through the intensification of capitalist relations of production 
(McMichael 2004). An analysis of both alongside one another and their combined role in 
constituting the adaptation regime indicates that they are both fundamentally embedded in this 
development project. In this way, the convergences between the incremental and transformational 
adaptation paradigms reflect those of the adaptation regime with its predecessors. 
The use of shrimp aquaculture as a climate change adaptation strategy offers an 
opportunity to examine the correspondence between these two paradigms of incremental and 
transformational adaptation. While no clear boundaries between the paradigms have been 
defined, the implications of aquaculture and its expansion in the coastal zone suggest that it could 
be an example of either or both, shedding light on each strategy and the nature of adaptation more 
generally in the coastal zone. Indeed, the rationale and discourse for the use of shrimp aquaculture 
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as a climate change adaptation strategy extends across both paradigms. Some proponents focus on 
contributions of shrimp aquaculture to rural development, suggesting an incremental approach. 
However, often these same proponents acknowledge the drawbacks of shrimp production and 
they, along with others who are aware of the agrarian dispossessions wrought by aquaculture 
expansion, propose that regardless of its drawbacks, it is the only option for this landscape on the 
brink of destruction. 
Most adaptation inventories indicate that a transition to "climate smart" agriculture, 
meaning agrarian production that is less vulnerable to the ecological changes being experienced 
and anticipated due to climate change is a key platform of incremental adaptation. In many such 
inventories in the southwest, promoting aquaculture intensification is proposed as a viable 
intervention because it advances production systems that currently exist in the coastal area. In the 
sense that aquaculture production is also often proposed as the only viable rural future in many 
coastal areas, it forecloses other production systems and possible futures. This is particularly true 
to the extent that its expansion itself engenders dispossession of rural inhabitants (Paprocki and 
Cons 2014). 
However, the expansion and intensification of shrimp farming also entails the fundamental 
transformation of socio-ecological systems in the coastal zone. To the extent that it is implicated in 
the forced migration of dispossessed (former) farmers, it is also a constituent part of the accepted 
paradigm of transformative adaptation through rural-urban migration. The affinity between these 
approaches is demonstrated by frequent calls from adaptation practitioners and policy makers for 
land use zoning in the coastal zone, which would adjudicate land use conflicts between rice 
agriculture and shrimp aquaculture. To be sure, the implications of zoning (and specifically its 
effective enforcement) are potentially transformative. If the adaptation regime governs the possible 
futures that can be imagined in the era of climate change, then zoning and other measures that 
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enforce the implementation of these futures are the regime's mechanisms to police the capacity of 
individuals to inhabit, resist, or participate in creating those futures. 
 
Conclusion 
 The experiences of these communities in Polders 22 and 29 offer a radically different vision 
of the possibility of rural life in Khulna in the time of climate change. The landless group members 
that mobilized against and continue to resist the transition to shrimp aquaculture have drawn on 
their lived experiences in these communities to develop alternative visions of transformation for 
life and livelihoods. In this sense, the “spatial imaginaries” of these communities are constituted 
precisely through the particularly situated experience of agrarian production itself (Wolford 2004). 
Discrepancies between the visions of life in a climate changed-future that draw on spatially-
situated lived experience and those that appeal to a geographically dis-embedded development 
teleology thus highlight the key tensions in the adaptation regime.
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CONCLUSION  
 
TOWARD A NEW POLITICAL ONTOLOGY OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
 
In the process of enframing Khulna as a climate dystopia, the adaptation regime treats the 
dynamics of agrarian dispossession as externalities.117 In so doing, it naturalizes this dispossession 
and, indeed, reproduces it. In contrast, in this dissertation, I have demonstrated the need to 
understand these dynamics collectively with climate change. 
There is no question that coastal Bangladesh must grapple with the quite serious 
biophysical challenges presented by climate change (Bangladesh is not unique in this regard – 
serious, concerted climate action is a global imperative). The dynamics described here suggest 
ways in which the region and its inhabitants will be made dramatically more vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change in the future. 
We need to integrate our understanding of these different dynamics in order to account for 
the interrelations between them. We can only understand climate change in relation to broader, 
historical concerns about how landscapes and communities are shaped in ways that reflect power 
dynamics operating at a variety of scales. The physical sciences have been able to successfully 
uncover and articulate the physical processes that are driving global climate change, to a high 
degree of certainty (IPCC 2013). But the mechanisms of transformation at the local scale are much 
hazier and are difficult to untangle. Attempts to connect these local transformations to global 
dynamics have often marginalized their interactions with longer historical processes of change. 
To that end, I argue for a new political ontological of climate change that accounts for its 
embeddedness within a broader historical pattern of development. To do so, I draw on Hart’s 
distinction between “Big D” Development as an intentional post-war practice of intervention in 
																																																						
117 This discussion of “enframing” draws on Mitchell (1988), and is also informed by his epistemological 
analysis of “externalities” (2002). 
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the “Third World” and the “little d” development of capitalism as an immanent global process 
(however spatially uneven) (Hart 2010). Drawing on Polanyi, Hart links them to one another, 
explaining that Development comes out of demands produced in response to development. I build 
on Hart’s formulation by delineating “big C” and “little c” climate change. “Little c” climate 
change refers to the global biophysical phenomenon resulting from the increase of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide. “Big c” Climate Change refers to the broad scope of multiply scaled intentional 
discursive and material practices generated by humans to think about and act in response to 
climate change.  
The adaptation regime is a paradigmatic example of the kinds of practices and politics that 
fall under the rubric of Climate Change. The activities taking place today in Khulna are part of all 
the things that humans do to make sense of and shape life in the time of climate change. “Big C” 
also involves the environmental dynamics that cause and intensify climate vulnerability but that 
are not themselves the result of greenhouse gas emissions. Other examples include the social and 
ecological impacts of biofuel production (Borras, McMichael, and Scoones 2010), carbon trading, 
and other practices falling under the broad umbrella of “green capitalism” (Prudham 2009; 
McMichael 2009; Lohmann 2009, 2011). 
An examination of Climate Change also facilitates an understanding of the historical 
specificity of these processes, of how the impacts of climate change are produced and refracted 
through a variety of temporal and geographic scales.118 Bangladesh is not more vulnerable to 
climate change than other communities around the world because of some “natural” proclivity of 
this recent global shift, nor because of its “bad latitude” (Watts 2003). As a coastal environment, 
																																																						
118 This historical argument also in part takes up the challenge of Chakrabarty’s third thesis in his seminal 
essay, “The Climate of History” – that is, “The geological hypothesis regarding the Anthropocene requires us 
to put global histories of capital in conversation with the species history of humans” (Chakrabarty, 2009: 
212). 
  275 
Khulna, for example, is threatened by cyclonic storm surges and sea level rise, just as Wall Street is 
(indeed, the severity of Hurricane Sandy highlights the latter’s vulnerability to extreme weather). 
Rather, Bangladesh is more vulnerable because of a planned historical process of development 
within the global capitalist system. Indeed, the discourse of Climate Change, in the words of 
Michael Watts, “feeds the great semiotic machine that naturalizes the consequences of social 
exploitation” (Watts 2001, 139). To examine Climate Change in relation to these planned and 
intentional processes, then, is to denaturalize this exploitation, and to question its inevitability. 
There is still much that can be done, through the abandonment of fossil fuels, to mitigate 
the worst effects of climate change. Indeed, there are no inevitable impacts of climate change. At 
the global scale, the possibility of greater than 1.5 degrees warming is the result of particular 
decisions about industrial growth and resulting emissions calculated against known effects (Rogelji 
et al. 2016). Likewise, at the local scale, in every community, choices are being made now to 
address these changes that also drive ecological transformation in the future. Recognition of this 
human agency must be the first step in forging a radical politics of climate justice. 
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EPILOGUE  
 
ON CLIMATE JUSTICE: LESSONS FROM AGRARIAN STUDIES (AND BEYONCÉ) 
 
 
Beyoncé's feminist anthem for the Black Lives Matter generation, "Formation," begins with 
a provocation in the form of a question: "what happened after New Orleans?" The music video 
opens and closes with a haunting image of Beyoncé herself standing defiantly on top of a New 
Orleans police cruiser being submerged in flood waters, clearly signifying the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. In the chorus, she describes herself unapologetically as a "Texas 'bama," a 
reappropriated epithet referring to rural black migrants from the South, akin to "redneck" or "hick," 
with explicitly racial connotations. She declares: "earned all this money but they never take the 
country out me." There is a black cowboy with spurs strapped to his Adidas. A small boy in a 
black hooded sweatshirt boldly breakdances in front of a line of white cops in riot gear. Beyoncé 
dances, synchronized with an expanding group of women, at the bottom of an empty swimming 
pool. The video invokes solidarity in the face of violence - "we are literally drowning," the dancers 
seem to assert (or is it "we refuse to drown"?). The song is an ode to blackness in a time when 
young blacks are being shot in the streets (called out by an image of scrawled graffiti: "stop 
shooting us"). But more than that, it inserts a proud rural identity into a politics of racial and 
environmental justice. Beyoncé unabashedly claims her rural roots as the grounds on which she 
demands a reckoning with the racism linking police violence and the engineered disaster of 
Katrina which decimated black communities across the Gulf Coast. 
Moreover, it does so with allusion to the histories of agrarian exploitation in the South in 
which these contemporary forms of racism are embedded. In a series of scenes, Beyoncé's 
signature leotards are adorned with characteristically antebellum flourishes, sitting or dancing 
inside what appear to be 19th century southern parlors. In another she stands dramatically in a 
black gown in front of the decaying columns of a southern gothic plantation mansion, flanked by 
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black men whose garments, including a red fez, seem to invoke those of the Jim Crow-era black 
mutual aid societies, whose allusions to Islam asserted both solidarity and power (Kohn 2016). 
Awareness of the history of rural slavery in the South, Beyoncé is telling us, is critical to our 
contemporary political struggles. 
"Formation" is a paean, not an elegy. The refrain "ok ladies, now let's get in formation," is a 
call to arms for a social movement, disguised with a wink as a choreography direction. Even as 
Beyoncé calls out ruination, she also celebrates and incites resistance. In her tributes to black 
movements from the post-civil war south to Black Lives Matter, she illuminates the linkages 
between histories of resistance to racial and economic oppression. Her references to Katrina 
proclaim the relationship between these histories of oppression and contemporary ecological 
crisis. Understood collectively, how could we imagine any kind of climate justice in the absence 
of its racial and rural dimensions? Claiming the right to survive is, in this context, a radical political 
leveler. For Beyoncé herself to maintain a proud rural identity in service of this politics speaks to 
the importance of asserting the value of the survival of rural communities in the face of claims to 
their impending destruction in the time of climate change. 
The specter of the erasure of the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Katrina is linked with the 
specter of climate crisis across coastal Bangladesh. In that sense, what we might learn from 
Beyoncé, and from the social movements in Khulna is that a progressive politics of climate justice 
must contend with a politics of agrarian justice, and of the dynamics of historic and present day 
capitalism through which agrarian communities have become profoundly vulnerable to climate 
change. Any climate politics that does not embrace this recognition is part of the problem, not the 
solution.
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GLOSSARY 
 
aman rice (আমন ধান) – Bangladesh’s most important rice crop, cultivated after the monsoon 
 
aquaculture – Controlled cultivation of aquatic animals in penned enclosures, often on former 
farmlands. 
 
bagda shrimp (বাগদা িচংিড়) – Giant tiger shrimp that survive in saltwater, existing in the wild and 
also cultivated in southern Bangladesh.  
 
beel (িবল) – A marshy lowland. 
 
bigha (িবঘা) – A variable unit of land area commonly used to measure size of farming plots. In 
most of Khulna, one bigha is equivalent to approximately 33 decimals, or one third of an acre. 
 
boro lok (বেড়া &লাক) – Literally “big guy.” A popular colloquialism used to refer to elites with 
economic and/or political power. 
 
gher (&ঘর) – An enclosed area of land flooded with salt water to cultivate shrimp. 
 
khas land (খাস জিম) – Common lands legally available for access among landless populations 
according to Bangladesh’s constitution. 
 
lakh (ল>) – A unit in the South Asian numbering system, equivalent to one hundred thousand 
(written 1,00,000). 
 
maund (মণ)– A local unit of weight standardized throughout South Asia under the British colonial 
government to 37.3242 kilograms. Maund per bigha is the standard unit by which yields are 
measured at the farm-level.  
 
polder – Dutch word for a low-lying enclosure surrounded by protective dykes. 
 
pucca (পাকা) – Ripe, mature, permanent. Used to refer to homes made of brick or roads paved with 
asphalt. 
 
taka (টাকা) – The Bangladeshi unit of currency (denoted by the symbol ৳ or Tk). $1 USD is 
equivalent to approximately 80 Tk. 
 
thana (থানা)- Term for a police station, but also referring to an area controlled by a police station; 
the lowest level of administrative unit in Bangladesh above the village. 
 
upazila (উপেজলা) – An administrative sub-district. 
 
zamindar (জািমনদার) – Traditional large landowners in Bengal. Responsible for revenue collections 
under the Permanent Settlement laws of British colonial administration. 
